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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I explore the extent to which the incorporation of same-sex relationships 
into formal regulatory domains is working to reinforce heteronormativity.  I am 
focusing on this issue in relation to the provision of legal advice on civil partnership 
dissolution.  My research brings together a range of theoretical and methodological 
tools from the social sciences and humanities to examine the degree to which lesbian 
and gay men are being assimilated into the marriage model in the realm of legal 
recognition.  My thesis concentrates on three main questions: 1) How can same-sex 
relationships, in light of civil partnerships (and, by extension, same-sex marriage), 
help to challenge social and legal constructions about the gendered nature of roles in 
intimate relationships?  2) To what extent do solicitors construct the issues and legal 
framework as being identical in same-sex matters to different-sex cases?  3) How do 
lesbians and gay men understand and experience the law of financial relief? 
 
To address these questions, I draw on the two theoretical frameworks of 
heteronormativity and equality (which I develop in chapter 2).  Methodologically, I 
argue that a mixed methods approach facilitates a broader and more comprehensive 
understanding of a research topic (chapter 3).  Consequently, I utilise quantitative and 
qualitative data to explore the ways in which assimilation (and, indeed, 
transformation) has taken place in the civil partnership dissolution context.  As to the 
quantitative element, I use data from an online questionnaire on the conduct of 
domestic labour and household finances to argue that the family lives of subsisting 
lesbian and gay partners raise questions about the way that we think about gender in 
relationships (chapter 4).  In the qualitative chapters, I interrogate the clients’ and 
solicitors’ discursive formulations of sameness and difference in terms of the making 
and breaking civil partnerships (chapter 5), the construction of the legal cases of civil 
partnership clients (chapter 6) and, more specifically, narratives relating to same-sex 
finances and approaches to the apportionment of ‘future’ assets (chapter 7).  In the 
final chapter, I set out directions for future research addressing gender, sexuality, and 
the law of financial relief. 
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In the thesis, I argue that heteronormative conceptions of gender have been carried 
over from (different-sex) marriage into civil partnership proceedings, and that 
lesbians and gay men have, to a large extent, been assimilated into the mainstream.  
That said, civil partner clients have also resisted the imposition of heterosexual norms 
on their relationship, preferring to settle dissolution matters on their own terms, and 
particularly opposing substantive financial remedies such as maintenance and pension 
sharing.  In this way, given the assumptions around financial interdependency that are 
inherent in the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, civil partnership 
dissolution does still pose some novel challenges for family law. 
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Chapter 1- Same-sex relationship recognition: Assimilation or transformation? 
 
There was historically a lack of legal recognition of the familial relationships of 
lesbians and gay men.  Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, increasing 
numbers of jurisdictions have created frameworks of formal recognition for same-sex 
relationships.  Full same-sex marriage is now available in Argentina (2010), Belgium 
(2003), Brazil (2013), Canada (2005), Colombia (2016), Denmark (2012), France 
(2013), Iceland (2010), Ireland (2015), Luxembourg (2014), parts of Mexico (2010), 
the Netherlands (2001), New Zealand (2013), Norway (2009), Portugal (2010), South 
Africa (2006), Spain (2005), Sweden (2009), parts of the UK (2014)1 and Uruguay 
(2013), and the American Supreme Court has declared it legal across the entirety of 
the United States (Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 WL 213646).  A “stepping 
stones” model was adopted in a number of jurisdictions, as was the case in England 
and Wales, where civil partnership was initially introduced (Waaldijk, 2001). 
 
The Civil Partnership Act, which was passed in November 2004 and came into force 
in December 2005, provided same-sex relationships with access to a similar legal 
status to that obtained under civil marriage.  It was made available only to same-sex 
couples, unlike the alternative frameworks introduced in, for example, France.2  More 
recently, the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 introduced same-sex marriage in 
England and Wales, commencing from March 2014, and couples were enabled to 
convert their civil partnerships to marriage from December 2014 (Marriage of Same 
Sex Couples (Conversion of Civil Partnership) Regulations 2014).  Section 15 of the 
2013 Act specified that the future of the Civil Partnership Act was to be reviewed in 
light of same-sex marriage, potentially with a view to it being set aside.  Yet, 
responses to a subsequent consultation displayed a lack of consensus as to the way 
forward, with less than a third of respondents supporting the abolition of civil 
partnership (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2014).  That being the case, it 
seems that the two institutions will continue to co-exist, at least for the time being.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Same-sex marriage is still not available in Northern Ireland, although it is in Scotland. 
2 A test case was launched challenging the ban on heterosexual civil partnerships, but it failed 
in the High Court (Steinfeld and another v. Secretary of State for Education [2016] 4 WLR 
41). 
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There are a small number of substantive differences between civil partnership and (at 
least, heterosexual) marriage: you cannot annul a civil partnership on the basis of non-
consummation;3 adultery is not set out as an express ground for dissolution;4 and a 
surviving civil partner can be lawfully prevented from accessing the benefits of their 
partner’s pension contributions made before 5 December 2005 (Equality Act 2010, 
Sched. 9, para. 18(1)).5 
 
My focus in this thesis is mainly on the breakdown of formalised same-sex 
relationships, and specifically on those who seek legal advice on financial relief under 
such circumstances.  I will be concentrating on civil partnerships, rather than same-
sex marriage, as my empirical research fell outside of the one-year period required to 
have passed before the initial same-sex marriages could be terminated (Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1973, s.3(1), inserted by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 
1984, s.1).  Even so, I contend that many of my findings are likely to be applicable 
across both institutions.  This is not least because civil partnerships have commonly 
been viewed as a “marriage-like status” “without the name ‘marriage’”, with Jacqui 
Smith MP having stated at the time of their formulation that civil marriage was to 
provide the “template” for them (Harding, 2007: 225; HC Hansard, 9 November 
2004).  Notably, the statutory provisions for financial relief on dissolution correspond 
with those applicable to married couples under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
Accordingly, as with section 25 of the 1973 Act, the courts should take a number of 
factors into account in deciding how redistribution should be conducted (including the 
parties’ respective current and future income and financial resources, their financial 
needs and obligations, and their standard of living during the civil partnership) 
(Sched. 5, para. 21(2)).  I will be examining the effects that incorporation into formal 
regulatory domains has had on lesbian and gay men at a time when attention needs to 
move away from arguing for legal change, and towards investigating its impact.  
Consideration of what happens at the end of relationships, and especially how law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act also excludes same-sex marriages from nullification 
by non-consummation (Sched. 4, para. 4(3)). 
4 Same-sex adultery is still not available as a ground for divorce under same-sex marriage. 
5 For same-sex marriages, pension providers need only provide for survivor’s/ widow’s 
benefits in respect of contributions from 5 December 2005 as well. 
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comes into play at that moment, is often overlooked, although it is vital to reflect on 
when thinking critically about same-sex relationship recognition. 
 
I will also, more widely, be examining the potential held by that incorporation for 
challenging societal norms, and particularly, the oppression of women.  Feminists 
have often looked to same-sex marriage as a method of transforming women’s 
experience in marriage because both women’s oppression and the exclusion of 
lesbians and gay men from marriage have been gender-based problems rooted in 
patriarchy (Watson, 2003).  As part of this, it has been suggested that both have 
operated from assumptions about ‘natural’ masculine and feminine gender roles 
(Calhoun, 2006).  In the discourse of neoliberalism, married women are assumed to 
take responsibility for children and to be dependent on their husbands (Duggan, 
2003).  Thus, a key feminist conceptual aim has focused on the emancipation of 
women from unpaid domestic and caretaking labour, and on liberating them from 
being defined as belonging to the private world governed by individual men.  In this 
respect, it may appear that women are in a more advantaged position than ever.  Not 
only is divorce relatively common, and less stigmatised than is was previously (with 
an estimated 42% of marriages in England and Wales ending in divorce), but 
additionally there are greater opportunities for women within the more public sphere 
of the workplace, at least for the more educated and affluent (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013a; 2013d). 
 
It has, however, also been suggested that there has been a recent increase in stay-at-
home mothering, and a report of the European Commission (2015) has cited that 
British mothers are almost twice as likely to stay within the home than their European 
counterparts (The Economist, 2014).  This may be due to the comparatively high cost 
of childcare in the UK (Rogers, 2012).  On top of that, where women do work, many 
are now required to adopt the “occupation: superwoman”, taking responsibility for the 
house and the children in any event (Barker, 2012).  Men remain primarily viewed as 
the breadwinners and providers, whilst women are viewed as carrying out 
complementary responsibilities.  Furthermore, the continued exploitation of women’s 
unpaid work and the privatisation of responsibility for care labour continue to amount 
to intrinsic components of the capitalist mode of production (Hennessy, 2000).  
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Therefore, as the Commission identifies, “despite positive trends in labour market 
outcomes, social challenges persist” (European Commission, 2015: 4). 
 
It is within that context that this thesis seeks to answer three main questions:  1) How 
can same-sex relationships, in light of civil partnerships (and, by extension, same-sex 
marriage), help to challenge social and legal constructions about the gendered nature 
of roles in intimate relationships?  2) To what extent do solicitors construct the issues 
and legal framework as being identical in same-sex matters to different-sex cases?  3) 
How do lesbians and gay men understand and experience the law of financial relief?  
These questions give rise to subsidiary questions, to which I return below.  As is 
evident from the first question, central to my research focus is the degree to which 
formalised same-sex relationships have resulted in the assimilation of lesbians and 
gay men into the ‘mainstream’ or, alternatively, generated possibilities of 
transforming heterosexual relational culture.  Consequently, I begin my initial chapter 
by situating my research in relation to the literature around the possible effects of 
same-sex relationship recognition, looking particularly at the issue of gender in 
intimate relationships.  Secondly, I expand on my main research questions before, 
thirdly, I outline the contents of each chapter and the key arguments that I will use in 
this thesis. 
 
Same-sex marriage and gender: the existing debate 
The battle for same-sex marriage comprised a variety of ‘fronts’.  From an ‘external’ 
perspective, conservative religious bodies, such as the Church of England, objected 
on the basis of marriage necessitating a complementarity of genders (Goddard, 2015).  
Whilst this objection was presented so as to centre around procreation, it was stressed 
that, “even where, for reasons of age, biology, or simply choice, a marriage does not 
have this issue, the distinctiveness of male and female is part of what gives marriage 
its unique social meaning” (Church of England, 2013: 2-3).  From a more ‘internal’ 
standpoint, the crux of the debate was neatly summarised by Eskridge (2002: 202) as 
follows: “Who can tell what will be ‘normalized’ […] Homosexuality?  Marriage?”.  
The lines were drawn broadly between those (opposing) who offered a feminist 
critique of marriage (for example, Auchmuty, 2004; Polikoff, 1993), and those (in 
favour) who perceived a possibility in same-sex relationship recognition to disrupt the 
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status quo (for example, Hunter, 1991).  There were also those who employed the 
discourse of marriage equality (for example, Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 2004), as 
against those who, from a queer perspective, saw in the fight for equality a 
reproduction of heteronormativity (for example, Duggan, 2003).  I will be engaging 
with this ‘internal’ literature (not only from the UK, but other countries such as 
Canada and the US) to introduce the various positions adopted and, in so doing, to 
contextualise this thesis.  A significant portion of that international work stems back 
to a period when (in America, at least) the onset of neoliberalism was attacking 
downwardly redistributive social movements (such as feminism and gay and lesbian 
liberation), and when the AIDS epidemic forced same-sex partners to debate the legal 
issues surrounding their relationships (Duggan, 2003).  I will be drawing insights 
from the writings of feminist and queer theorists, which form the bases of my 
theoretical framework.  It is argued here that the two share common ground, given 
that both are, “subversive, to the extent that they question traditional, hegemonic 
understandings of sex and gender” (Fineman, 2009b: 1).  Moreover, they offer 
complementary perspectives that are essential to the focus of my research: whilst one 
critiques gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality, endeavouring to dismantle 
the traditional power dynamics between male and female, the other is concerned with 
problematising identity categories and developing a, “notion of the subject as fluid, 
unstable [and] constructed” (Carline, 2006: 309). 
 
The case against same-sex marriage: regulation as assimilation 
For some, marriage is inherently flawed, given that it reflects, “the existence of a 
structured set of inequalities attached to the living and loving arrangements we make 
in our personal lives”, always privileging some (traditionally men) and subordinating 
others (women) (Donovan, 2004: 24).  Auchmuty (2004: 105) has viewed the effects 
of marriage’s “socially approved unequal dynamics of power” as problematic, 
especially given its role in, “limiting, impoverishing, and rendering [women] 
vulnerable to abuses of power by their husbands”.  Indeed, marriage has been 
perceived as, “a restrictive institution of the state, epitomising the worst aspects of 
heterosexuality” (Weeks et al, 2001: 193).  That being the case, it was asserted that 
the extension of it could not possibly result in the liberation of same-sex partners (or 
women) from the existing patriarchal structures, and those lesbians and gay men who 
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sought such inclusion were criticised for trying to, “mimic the worst of mainstream 
society” (Polikoff, 1993: 1536).  In this respect, it was questioned why it should be 
assumed that lesbians and gay men should want to be just like heterosexual people, 
and why they should wish to replicate patterns of support and dependency that have 
typified patriarchal marriage (Jackson, 1999: 155).  This question may seem all the 
more pertinent given a previous tendency to position ‘queerness’ in opposition to the 
notion of the future, with the corresponding devaluation of longevity (Edelman, 
2004).6 
 
Taking the idea further, Boyd and Young (2003: 757) warned that same-sex couples, 
who have traditionally been treated as ‘other’, were at risk of being “included into the 
dominant system”.  This was arguably a serious issue, resulting in the strengthening 
of the existing system of norms, and in lesbians and gay men losing their uniqueness 
(Boyd and Young, 2003; see also Lannutti, 2005).  It should be borne in mind that the 
jurisdiction within which Boyd and Young were writing (Canada) recognises ‘de 
facto’ couples for a range of purposes, including pension and next of kin rights.  
Consequently, Canadian same-sex partners have been in a more privileged position 
than those in England and Wales, where the position is not as clear.  Nevertheless, 
Young and Boyd (2006: 213, 219) stressed that, whilst changes to the law might, 
prima facie, appear to be an “incredible success story for the lesbian and gay 
movement”, it may be that, “struggles to achieve legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships […] require a normalisation of lesbian and gay intimate relationships to 
appear as marriage-like as possible”. 
 
Young and Boyd (2006) use as an example the challenges that have been made under 
the Canadian Charter, as part of which affidavits in same-sex marriage cases 
emphasised (alongside, significantly, factors such as joint finances and monogamy) a 
desire to be ‘just like’ other couples.  This ties in with Harding’s (2011: 63) 
explanation of an implicit acceptance that, for lesbians and gay men to be eligible for 
the, “protection of law, the similarities between lesbians, gay men and heterosexual 
people must be emphasised”.  It may be unsurprising that many lesbians and gay men 
have willingly declined to challenge the role of marriage in reinforcing unequal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See chapter 7 for further discussion of futurity. 
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relations, given that they are themselves a product of their society (which still 
includes powerful traditional ideologies of the family) (Young and Boyd, 2006).   
Yet, it posed the risks of jeopardising the more diverse and democratic qualities that 
same-sex relationships have been suggested to possess, and of leaving intact the 
hierarchical social and economic relations embedded within marriage (Donovan, 
2004; Burns et al, 2008). 
 
Polikoff (1993) likewise predicted a de-radicalisation of pro-marriage discourse in 
order to ‘win’ (drawing examples from abortion and ‘gays in the military’ 
campaigns), and Ettelbrick (1989), in her earlier work, was concerned that marriage 
would act to constrain same-sex partners so as to make them more invisible.  Whereas 
Ettelbrick (1989) felt that “justice” could only be achieved when homosexual couples 
are supported in spite of their difference from the dominant culture, she held that their 
incorporation into marriage would commence the process of silencing them.  Such a 
“normalising” force would work to position gay and lesbian life so as to become 
intelligible within the heterosexually dominated framework, omitting to “embrace 
non-heterosexual lifestyles” (Harding, 2011: 40).  Ettelbrick (1989) considered this 
difficult, given that she perceived herself, as a lesbian, to be “fundamentally 
different”.  The institution of marriage, she emphasised, ought to be interrogated 
because, “being queer is more than setting up house, sleeping with a person of the 
same gender, and seeking state approval for doing so.  It is an identity, a culture with 
many variations” (Ettelbrick, 1989: 15).  However, formalised same-sex relationship 
recognition carried with it the possibility that underlying critiques, especially of the 
way that gender works in marriage, were to become, “not only secondary, but 
marginalized” (Polikoff, 1993: 1549).  Accordingly, many considered that same-sex 
marriage was unlikely to challenge male economic privilege or the sexualised division 
of labour in the privatised family, and that it would most probably reduce the potential 
for reform (Harding, 2011). 
 
In fact, Boyd and Young (2003: 763), drawing emphasis to a key notion underlying 
my thesis, suggested that an “assimilation discourse”, which “reinforces the 
heterosexual norm”, has been built into the legal process.  They pointed, by way of an 
illustration, to a lower court decision in the Canadian case of M v. H [1999] 132 DLR 
(4th) 538, 545 (a lesbian matter concerning spousal support), where it had been 
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commented that ‘H’ had been more involved in the couple’s shared business, whereas 
‘M’, “appeared content to devote more of her time to domestic, rather than business, 
tasks” (545, per Cory J).  It is notable that England and Wales currently has little 
judge-made law relating to same-sex couples (an exception being Lawrence v. 
Gallagher [2012] 1 FCR 557, which I will discuss in detail in chapter 2), although 
cases such as Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 AC 27 and 
Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 are instructive.  Both cases dealt with 
the rights of a surviving same-sex partner of a tenant who held a statutory tenancy 
under the Rent Act 1977 and, in Fitzpatrick, the House of Lords found that paragraph 
2(2) of the 1977 Act was gender-specific, referring to living “as his wife” or “as her 
husband”. 
 
In contrast, in Ghaidan (by which point, the Human Rights Act 1998 was applicable), 
the majority of the Court opted for the purpose expressed in the statute rather than the 
language, extending succession rights beyond married couples to others that had made 
their home together.  This later decision might appear progressive, moving the focus 
away from the (heterosexist) male/ female gender complementarity of the partners 
that had been a feature of the previous case law.  Nevertheless, the decision centred 
around the question of how “marriage-like” a relationship is in deciding whether it 
meets the statutory test of living together “as husband and wife” (albeit with Lady 
Hale acknowledging that “husbands and wives decide for themselves who will go out 
to work and who will do the homework and the childcare” (609)).  The discourse of 
the judgment may, of course, be a result of the particular wording of the statutory 
provision.  However, in order to obtain the protection sought, Mr. Godin-Mendoza 
still had to ‘fit’ into the marital mould. 
 
The judgment also placed emphasis on the “homosexual couple”, raising a further 
issue concerning the way that the law approaches same-sex partners, in terms of the 
focus being diverted away from non-monogamies and alternative forms of 
relationships (Klesse, 2006).  It has been argued that non-heterosexual relationships 
are able to construct their relationships “from scratch”, having the freedom to create 
their own guidelines around monogamy (Heaphy et al, 2004).  It was previously 
found that 65% of American gay male couples and 29% of lesbian couples had some 
kind of non-monogamous arrangement (as against 23% of heterosexual married and 
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31% of heterosexual cohabiting couples) (Blumstein and Schwartz, 1983).  Weeks et 
al (2001) have identified that non-monogamy, especially for gay men, can amount to 
a conscious rejection of heterosexual values, and Rosa (1994: 107) has contended that 
this “anti-monogamy” provides, “a challenge to the institution of compulsory 
heterosexuality”.  Same-sex marriage would seem to work against this, given that it 
legally enforces a “monogamous ideal” (Barker, 2012).  Sullivan (1989) (whose work 
was, in fact, used to advocate same-sex marriage in the UK) viewed this a positive, 
asserting that this discouragement of promiscuity promotes a stable family 
environment.  He links this in with the idea of marriage bringing about a “deeper 
commitment”, behind which lie notions of the privatisation of care (which do not 
assist in dispelling the expectation that care will be done for free at home by women) 
(Sullivan, 1989; Barker, 2015). 
 
Non-monogamy has been heralded as a way for women to challenge the dualities that 
are inherent in heterosexuality, which favours, “the interests of both men and 
capitalism, operating as it does through the mechanisms of exclusivity, possessiveness 
and jealousy, all filtered through the rose-tinted lens of romance” (Robinson, 1997: 
144).  It has been contended that monogamy is of benefit to men, keeping women in 
unpaid domestic labour, and increasing their dependence on their male partners 
(Barker and Langdridge, 2010).  A continued association of marriage with monogamy 
and procreation might be viewed to work to, “sediment patriarchal ideas and re-
inscribe gender roles within the family” (Harding, 2007: 223).  By extension, in 
operating to privilege two-partner sexual relationships, same-sex marriage imposes 
the norms of heterosexual culture onto the lesbian and gay community (including 
those relating to, “the presumed ownership of another individual” (Emens, 2004: 
152)).  It fails to acknowledge the rejection by many polyamorous people of the 
prioritisation of sexual over non-sexual relationships, and the blurring of distinctions 
in their relationships between friends and lovers, wherein ‘families of choice’ are 
created (Ritchie and Barker, 2006).  Instead, it strengthens the nuclear family, 
neglecting the opportunity to, “use sexuality […] to arrive at a multiplicity of 
relationships” (Foucault, 1996a: 308).   Not only this, but the legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships has been perceived to result in the continued marginalisation 
of those in less traditional forms of relationship (Warner, 2000).  The suggestion 
behind this is that marriage occupies a privileged status that is posited as the ideal, 
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positioning other intimate identities as deviant (Fineman, 1995).  As a consequence, 
its extension arguably creates a new distinction between ‘good gays’, who conform to 
heterosexual norms, and ‘bad gays’, who violate them (Cossman, 2002). 
 
It has ultimately been argued that, given its sex-stereotyped history and its invidious 
role in the oppression of women, lesbians and gay men should, “learn from the 
heterosexual experience” of marriage, and not seek to imitate it (Donovan, 2004: 28).  
Therefore, as opposed to embracing the institution as, “an accolade that grants us 
normality and acceptance, we should be reflecting on and challenging this version of 
love” (Donovan, 2004: 28).  Fineman (1995: 230) has discouraged, “analogizing more 
and more relationships to marriage”, and Auchmuty (2004: 101) similarly cautioned 
lesbians and gay men against allowing themselves to be drawn into the heterosexual 
model (stressing that they should emphasise, “the potential for our relationships to act 
as better models for all relationships”).  Indeed, many have endorsed the seeking of 
“true alternatives” and advocated the abolition of, “marriage as a legal category for 
everyone” (Ettelbrick, 1989; Polikoff, 2000: 176). 
 
Regulation as radical 
As against the idea that obtaining formalised relationship recognition necessitates 
having applied to oneself a conventional family form, others more optimistically 
lauded it as an opportunity for a more systematic reform of broader culture and 
politics.  Such an approach borrows from Foucault’s work on power, and the way that 
feminist scholars have subsequently used it.  According to Foucault (1980a), power 
does not simply function as a negative force, but it also performs a productive role.  
He argued that one of the greatest effects of this productive power is the subject, with 
individuals being constituted as such, and their behaviour being shaped, through their 
subjection to power relations (Foucault, 1980b).  Power acts to set the parameters of 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour; his conception entails that, “conformity to the 
norm is desired and non-conformities are marked and punished with a view to 
correcting the deviation” (Bell, 1993: 66).  In this way, Foucault describes how, 
“everyone is pushed towards particular, normative modes of being” (Harding, 2011: 
40).  Inspired by the notion of subjection, Butler (1990) adopted the standpoint that 
feminists should aim to establish how the category of ‘women’ is both produced and 
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constrained by the structures of power through which they were seeking their 
emancipation.  She saw the potential to, “deconstruct the substantive appearance of 
gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within the 
compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of 
gender” (Butler, 1990: 44).  As such, she sought to reveal and challenge the legally 
and socially constructed ideal of ‘woman’, encouraging analysis of the existing 
“scripts” in an attempt to disturb them, and to expose opportunities for 
“resignification and subversive transformation” (Carline, 2006: 35). 
 
Butler (1990: 45) argued that, “woman itself is a term in process, a becoming”, 
although that such constructions “congeal” into forms that make them seem 
permanent and natural.  This bears relation to the social constructionist perspective 
that all knowledge is derived from, and maintained by, social interactions, with 
common sense knowledge being negotiated by people, and eventually coming to be 
presented as part of objective reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).  It also builds on 
the view that identity is shifting and contextual in nature.  Butler (quoted in 
Blumenfeld and Breen, 2005: 20) claimed that gender was far from natural, being a 
“matter of doing rather than an inherent attribute”.  In so doing, she disaffirmed 
“identities/ essence/ stability” (Halley, 2009: 27).  Particularly, she theorised gender 
as being independent of sex (which she also viewed to be culturally constructed), 
rather than mirroring, or being restricted by, it (Butler, 1990).  Butler (1993) asserted 
that gender is constituted “performatively”, amounting to the effect of a regulatory 
regime in which genders are divided and placed in a hierarchy.  The process by which 
this occurs, she suggested, involves the repetition of prior norms that work to animate 
and restrain the subject (Butler, 1993).  Notably, Smart (1995: 192) drew on this 
notion of ‘performativities’ in employing the term “gendering strategies” to set out 
how individual, social and institutional practices bring into being, “gendered subject 
positions as well as subjectivities or identities to which the individual becomes […] 
associated”.  Providing a justification for the focus of the current research, Smart 
(1984: 101) contended, more specifically, that family law had symbolically 
reproduced the, “social relations between the sexes” (see further O’Donovan, 1993).  
Similarly, Fineman (1995; 2004), who depicted the law as a “dynamic process” 
whereby norms are generated and implemented, considered gender differences central 
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to law’s consideration of the family, reflecting ideas of women being tied to that 
family. 
 
Distancing herself from widely held assumptions about sex, gender and sexuality 
existing in relation to one another, Butler (1986: 35) held that the female body is, “the 
arbitrary locus of the gender ‘woman’, and [that] there is no reason to preclude the 
possibility of that body becoming the locus of other constructions of gender”.  This 
being the case, she highlighted the possibility of disrupting the “heterosexual matrix”, 
under which ‘maleness’ entails masculinity and ‘femaleness’ femininity (with the 
latter incorporating ideas about reproducing, caretaking and nurturing), by subverting 
the stylised repetition of acts and doing things differently (Butler, 1990).  She 
considered that “subversive” identities, such as those of lesbians and gay men, could 
help to demonstrate the constructed nature of gender roles and work to destroy their 
normative status, or to redefine the norm (Butler, 1990). 
 
It might be acknowledged that Butler (2002: 17) was unconvinced by the benefits of 
state legitimation, stating that it necessitates one, “to enter into the terms of 
legitimation offered there and to find that one’s public and recognizable sense of 
personhood is fundamentally dependent on the lexicon of that legitimation”.   
However, Butler’s work has encouraged a plethora of academic commentary and 
critique on how gender performance is practised and regulated in contemporary 
society.  Consequently, her writings proved useful in the development of ideas as to 
how same-sex marriage could potentially work to disassociate the institution from its 
sexist trappings, “destabilis[ing] the gendered definition of marriage for everyone” 
(Hunter, 1991: 12).  Within lesbian relationships, in the absence of a man or husband 
to define it against, the social role of women might arguably be exposed as a gendered 
creation.  In this respect, lesbian partners are, “uniquely positioned” to “violate” 
traditional gendered expectations that they, as women, will be “dependent on men in 
their personal relations, will fulfill the maternal imperative, will service a husband 
and children, and will accept confinement to the private sphere of domesticity” 
(Calhoun, 2000: 43).  The incorporation of such relationships within the framework of 
marriage could therefore operate to deprive the institution of its hierarchical binaries.  
It could work to break down norms from within, disrupting the dividing lines that 
allow for the connection of ‘sex’ (used to refer to the category into which we are born, 
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which is determined initially by chromosomes) to ‘gender’.  Once marriage is simply 
a relationship between two people, rather than between a man and a woman, gender is 
displaced (Harding, 2007). 
 
Hunter (1991) viewed there to be significant potential in this line of argument, given 
that she perceived that marriage has no natural existence outside of a particular 
regulatory environment.  Hunter (1991) asserted that the extension of the institution in 
this way would work to remove the authority/ dependence status of husbands and 
wives, with this consequently raising the question as to what, without gendered 
content, these two “foundational constructs” mean.  Indeed, it has been suggested 
that, “to legalise same-sex marriage would be tantamount to declaring that gendered 
husband and wife roles are inessential to marriage” (Calhoun, 2000: 115).  This is 
important, because marriage as it stands operates to reinforce, “the linkage of gender 
with power by husband/ wife categories, which are synonymous with the social power 
imbalance between men and women” (Hunter, 1991: 17).  Without the process of this 
reinforcement occurring, the possibility would arise for all women and men to defy 
conventional gender norms. 
 
Foucault (1996b: 370) himself further declared that being gay held a capacity for 
resistance, claiming that it, “means rejecting the usual ways of life […] we must use 
our sexuality to discover, to invent new relations”.  His revolutionary sentiment is 
echoed in the work of Weeks (2004: 159), who has described how non-heterosexual 
people are “in the vanguard”, having the potential to become the “arch inventors” in 
society’s “life experiments”.  Such premises are based on a belief that ‘queerness’ 
entails, “sexual freedoms, dyadic innovation, and support for gender nonconformity”, 
bringing with it a multiplicity of sexual possibilities and a plurality of sexed and 
gendered practices (Green, 2010: 429).  Weeks (2007: 187) proceeded to observe that, 
in the absence of strong external guidelines for lesbians and gay men as to how to live 
within partnerships, “nothing can be taken for granted, and the evolving norms […] 
are based on the assumption of equality”.  He considered that their ethos is frequently 
based on notions of autonomy and choice, with them having, “unique possibilities for 
the construction of egalitarian relationships” (Weeks, 2007: 187).  As a result of such 
reasoning, it has been suggested that, where formalised relationship status is granted 
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to same-sex couples, their ways of living and being might serve as an example to 
heterosexual partners (Peel and Harding, 2004). 
 
In terms of that idea, researchers committed to lesbian and gay rights have conducted 
empirical projects to demonstrate that same-sex relationship practices and dynamics 
differ from heterosexual gender scripts.  A key structural difference has been 
pinpointed in the division of household labour and childcare.  Kurdek (1993: 136-
137), for instance, in a study drawing a comparison between U.S. gay, lesbian and 
heterosexual married couples, found that it was more likely that one partner (the wife) 
did “the bulk of the housework” in heterosexual married couples, whereas “gay 
couples tended to distribute the pattern of specialization equally so that […] one 
partner did not do all the work”.  This latter finding is important, given that capitalism 
has been characterised as requiring an unequal division of labour (Hennessy, 2000).  
Subsequently, Patterson (1995), in her American study of 26 lesbian families, 
reported the equal sharing of household tasks, albeit with biological mothers having 
greater involvement in childcare (although Sullivan (1996), in her interviews with 34 
lesbian coparenting couples, found a relative absence of a primary breadwinner/ 
primary caregiver arrangement). 
 
Dunne (1997), who conducted interviews with 60 British lesbian women, also found 
that chores were either undertaken together or that turns were taken, with both 
partners performing the ‘male’ and ‘female’ responsibilities.  She described her 
respondents as having felt, “relatively free from the expectations and responsibilities 
associated with a gendered division of labour”, with there having been a lack of any 
clear, “overriding power dynamic shaping the relationship” (Dunne, 1997: 184, 205).  
This, they considered, was more conducive to an “egalitarian outcome” (Dunne, 
1997).  I recognise that such accounts cannot necessarily be assumed to reflect actual 
practices, with Carrington (1999) contending that an ideological commitment to 
egalitarianism means that inequality, where it exists, is denied.7  Even so, where each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Carrington (1999) asserted this commitment to be especially common amongst lesbians, but 
Dryden (1999) also found amongst heterosexual women that, although it was felt that 
contemporary personal relationships should be more egalitarian, their experiences often did 
not match this. 
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partner carried out different roles, Carrington (1999) reported that the division was 
still perceived to be fair, and it is important to be mindful of the multi-layered nature 
of terms such as ‘egalitarianism’ and ‘fairness’.  The accounts of egalitarianism 
additionally sit consistently with the outcome of Green’s (2010) interviews with 30 
Canadian same-sex “spouses”.  Green (2010: 421) discovered that the majority of his 
participants described a, “domestic division of labour organised by individual 
interests, rather than predetermined, role-differentiated tasks”.  He identified that the 
“negotiated character” of domestic labour was attributed by some respondents to the 
absence of gender differentiated roles in same-sex relationships, and by others to the 
fact that the partners, “experience the same gender socialization” (Green, 2010: 423).  
That character is relevant, as egalitarianism has been argued to be best measured 
through the process by which decisions are made (Barnes, 2013). 
 
Another difference has been located between same and different-sex couples in the 
conduct of household finances.  Dunne (1997) discovered a strong emphasis on 
independence and dual earning, whilst, in Weeks et al’s (1999a) interviews with 96 
British non-heterosexuals, joint finances were considered “too heterosexual”.  These 
findings work against the assumption made by the state that partners will take 
financial responsibility for each other’s wellbeing, a notion that underlies the frequent 
loss of social assistance when entering into a marriage or cohabiting relationship (as 
income is aggregated when calculating entitlement) (Harding, 2011; Young, 1994).  
That those studies offer a challenge on this basis is significant for the feminist cause; 
assumptions of this nature have historically been problematic for women, who have 
tended to have smaller incomes and fewer assets (Young and Boyd, 2006).  Yet, the 
findings now date back some time, and the question is begged as to whether they are 
still reflective of modern-day lesbian and gay lives.  More recently, Burgoyne et al 
(2011: 699) conducted a study on money management by British lesbians and gay 
men, which confirmed Weeks et al’s (1999a) suggestion of a lack of financial 
merging, and the widespread occurrence of shared financial decision-making.  
Nevertheless, the data drawn on still pre-dated civil partnerships in the UK, and there 
is currently a lack of research on the impact of the institution in this respect. 
 
Peel and Harding (2004) contend it to be unlikely that extending a marriage-like 
status to lesbian and gay couples would suddenly create household inequity.  That 
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said, it is possible that those who have elected to enter into a civil partnership (and 
have thereby sought the state’s approval of their relationship) will be more likely to 
conform with traditional values, and further that incorporation into the institution 
could encourage the same.  More empirical research is therefore required to examine 
the degree to which, within the actual context of legally recognised same-sex 
relationships, these potentially transgressive features of lesbians and gay men have 
been retained.  Accordingly, this thesis aims to map the extent to which legal 
recognition forces those who decide to engage in it into ways of living that are 
compatible with heterosexual norms.  This is especially in light of Auchmuty’s (2015: 
216) suggestion, from her interviews with 14 women and five men who had entered 
into a civil partnership, that, “most of the ‘different’ and ‘egalitarian’ qualities of 
same-sex relationships disappeared” with the advent of the institution.  Of course, 
Auchmuty’s research focused on ‘failed’ civil partnerships (having looked at 
dissolution).  Consequently, it is perhaps difficult to generalise from it, and it may be 
that something different is happening amongst subsisting relationships. 
 
Regulation as rights-conferring 
An alternative, altogether narrower, assertion commonly made in support of the 
inclusion of lesbians and gay men into the formal regulatory frameworks of marriage 
was a human rights based one centring around ‘equality’ (see, for example, Eskridge, 
2002).  The idea behind it was that the systematic exclusion of a group of people from 
marriage is a powerful means of oppressing that group, and that it conveyed a 
symbolic message that that group was not worthy of equality and was less than human 
(Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 2004).  Stoddard (1989: 12) notably argued from this 
standpoint, stating lesbian and gay marriage to be the, “issue that most fully tests the 
dedication of people who are not gay to full equality for gay people, and also the issue 
most likely to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men”.  Likewise, Sullivan (2004: 205) considered “full gay equality” as entailing 
“equal access to marriage”, with denial of access to it constituting, “the most public 
affront possible”.   
 
The introduction of civil partnership, rather than marriage, was praised by some 
because the institution is less encumbered by heterosexual relational assumptions.  
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There were also suggestions of a potential to create distance from the past through the 
use of different terminology (Polikoff, 2008).  On the other hand, many adopting a 
rights-based perspective saw little such potential, with it being stressed that, “when 
marriage is universally understood as the key social imprimatur of the couple 
relationship, it is fundamentally unjust to introduce a parallel system of relationship 
recognition for same-sex couples” (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2006: 56).  Systems of 
this nature have been subjected to criticism for being a product of political 
compromise, created by the heterosexual majority to maintain the segregation of gay 
men and lesbians (Merin, 2002).  In this way, the adoption of a separate institution 
and the consequent identification of same-sex partners as being, “different to the 
norm” might be viewed as contravening, “entrenched understandings of the meaning 
of equality” (Harding, 2011: 14, 41).    
 
Nevertheless, a simplistic discourse surrounding equal rights was a common theme 
amongst the legal arguments made in favour of civil partnership, with Jacqui Smith 
MP claiming that, “we are doing this for reasons […] of social justice” (HC Hansard, 
9 November 2004: col. 776)).  This ties in with wider indications within the 
parliamentary debates that the focus of the 2004 Act was on, “inclusion, rather than 
social change” (which was perhaps necessarily going to be the case, given the stress 
on sameness of treatment adopted by gay campaigning organisation Stonewall, who 
advised on the drafting of the legislation) (Stychin, 2006b: 81).  That focus was 
additionally a feature of the discourse within the more recent debates about same-sex 
marriage in England and Wales.  David Cameron (2011), for instance, stated that, “I 
don’t support gay marriage despite being a Conservative.  I support gay marriage 
because I’m a Conservative” (whilst Montgomerie (2012) placed emphasis on the 
“conservatizing” nature of marriage).  It seems that the neoliberal state is willing to 
accommodate new sexual citizenship only so long as it ‘fits in’ with the familial 
heteronorm (and its accompanying ideas about the privatisation of caring labour). 
 
In fact, the way that the debates were framed in this respect might be considered to 
work against the transgressive possibilities of formalised same-sex relationships, 
“drowning out feminist perspectives” (Auchmuty, 2015: 217).  Hunter (1991: 29), for 
instance, accepted that the radical potential of formalised lesbian and gay 
relationships will be effected by the arguments made in favour of it, claiming that, 
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“the impact of law often lies as much in the body of discourse created in the process 
of its adoption as in the final legal rule itself”.  Polikoff (2000: 167) further criticised 
the ‘equality’ model for, “fail[ing] to envision a […] transformative model of family 
life for all people”.  By seeking inclusion into institutions rooted in justifications of 
this nature, lesbians and gay men may seem to become the champions of heterosexual 
marital values.  In accordance with Duggan’s (2003: 179) conception of “new 
homonormativity”, they promise, “the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency 
and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” 
(simultaneously not contesting heterosexual assumptions).  Whilst activism is 
necessary to achieve change in the ‘real world’, it may seem unlikely that systems of 
oppression will be challenged where there is a politics of equal rights, which 
reproduces the homonormative subject.   On top of this, the terms upon marriage has 
been sought are not supportive of the multiplicity of relationships that might provide 
care, and neither do they encourage social responses to the question of who will 
provide such care (McRuer, 2012).  The stress is on the privatisation of lesbian and 
gay men, embracing moves towards the downsizing of government (Duggan, 2002). 
 
It is against this backdrop that this thesis rests.  My concern is to examine the extent 
to which civil partnerships, having at least prima facie facilitated greater social and 
legal equality, have at the same time stood to, “impose a ‘marriage model’ based on 
traditional gendered power relations” (Rolfe and Peel, 2011: 324).  The existing body 
of literature on this subject has failed to keep up with and reflect social realities, with 
much of it arising from a period when same-sex partners were actively challenging 
the structures from which they were excluded.  Not only this, but the majority of it is 
theoretical, asking what might happen at a time when very few countries recognised 
lesbian and gay relationships in law at all, and it originates from jurisdictions where 
the legal (not to mention economic, political and social) systems differ immensely to 
our own.  Particularly, in America, marriage brings with it a number of advantages, 
including eligibility for Supplemental Security Income and spousal benefits for 
retirement and disability funds (McCormick, 2015).  This is as against the position in 
England and Wales, where the financial benefits of marriage (at least whilst the 
marriage is ongoing) are minimal to non-existent. 
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In bringing together a variety of insights from the existing work, and using them to 
explore the issue in practice in the current day English and Welsh context, this thesis 
will introduce a new perspective into the literature and offer an original contribution 
to socio-legal scholarship.  I seek to highlight the continuities and contrasts between 
theoretical and practical understandings of gender in relationships, with a view to 
establishing whether, “those claims about difference and the superiority of gay and 
lesbian modes of relating were ever fulfilled in practice, or remained in the realms of 
unrealized ideals” (Auchmuty, 2015: 214).  I consider the extent to which, given both 
that the formal legal framework of civil partnership largely mirrors that of marriage, 
and that political rhetoric has indicated towards the assimilation of same-sex partners, 
the arguments concerning transformation are relevant today.  This issue is pressing, 
given suggestions of a recent lack of debate about marriage as potentially problematic 
(with many gay men and lesbians expressing a desire for “ordinariness”) (Bindel, 
2014).  In the next section, I turn to set out my research questions, and introduce more 
specifically the theoretical frameworks that I draw on in my thesis. 
 
Research questions and theoretical frameworks 
My focus coheres around the ways that same-sex relationships, in light of civil 
partnerships (and, by extension, same-sex marriage), can help to challenge social and 
legal constructions about the gendered nature of roles in intimate relationships.  I 
explore this question predominantly with regard to financial relief on civil partnership 
dissolution, looking at the extent to which solicitors construct the issues and legal 
framework in civil partnerships as being the same as in (different-sex) divorce cases.  
This thesis examines how solicitors are negotiating gender in their interactions with 
lesbian and gay clients.  I would add here that, whilst using the term ‘lesbians and gay 
clients’ to refer to those who have sought legal advice on civil partnership, I am aware 
that not everyone that embarks on a same-sex relationship identifies as gay or a 
lesbian, and that people move between gay and heterosexual identities (Auchmuty, 
2015). 
 
I am interested in the degree to which legal actors are applying heteronormative 
assumptions to same-sex relationships.  I am concerned with assumptions surrounding 
those three aspects that the existing literature has identified as potentially being 
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disparate between same and different-sex couples: monogamy; financial dependency; 
and the gendered division of domestic and market labour.  This thesis initially seeks 
to examine those aspects, concentrating especially on the way that household labour 
and finances are conducted in modern-day same-sex relationships.  It then 
investigates the extent to which the differences found within subsisting same-sex 
relationships (as against existing data on different-sex couples) have been recognised 
by, and incorporated into, the law of financial relief.  Moreover, I aim to interrogate 
how lesbians and gay men understand and experience the law in this area.  This is 
with a view to considering the extent to which the introduction of formalised 
relationships has brought about a greater engagement of same-sex partners with the 
law.  As part of that consideration, I will be questioning the degree to which the 
approaches of same-sex partners to financial division are reflected in those developed 
by the courts in previous heterosexual cases, and which solicitors apply within the 
precedent-based system.  Comprehending lesbian and gay perspectives in this respect 
will help to inform a wider discussion of how gender and relational contexts should 
be regulated. 
 
As I have touched on, I am employing within the thesis the lens of heteronormativity 
(which has tended to be more closely associated with queer popular liberation),8 
alongside the traditionally feminist concern of equality.  I am using the term 
‘heteronormativity’ to refer to a combination of the two ideas of heterosexuality and 
normativity.  This creates the view that heterosexual identity and practices are, 
“expected, demanded and always presupposed by society” (Chambers, 2007: 662).  
Heteronormativity works to privilege those behaviours and relationships that closely 
replicate the norm, whilst condemning, disregarding or ignoring those that deviate, 
and I argue in chapter two that its shaping role means that it can helpfully be 
recognised as ‘legal’ from a pluralist perspective (Chambers, 2007).  It might be 
considered a way of arranging or ordering society in a manner that is similar to 
Butler’s (1990) “heterosexual matrix”, in that the gender, sex and desire of subjects 
all cohere (Markell, 2003).  The assumption is made that there are only two genders, 
with a number of suppositions following from that, including that a woman would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Further developed in chapter 2. 
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prefer to remain within the home than to enter the economic sphere, and that she is 
only able to opt for one of those endeavours as her predominant life role. 
 
Turning to equality, this concept goes to the heart of both the debates around the 
gendered nature of roles in intimate relationships, and about the recognition of same-
sex relationships.  The sameness/ difference debate, concerning the relative treatment 
of women and men, forms the underpinning of the (heterosexual) financial relief case 
law to date.  I aim, within this thesis, to establish whether the ways in which the 
courts have employed the concept of equality in different-sex matters has been 
transplanted over into civil partnership cases.  Particularly, I am looking at whether, 
now that same-sex partners are able to formalise their relationships, there is any 
possibility of a movement away from the binary gender roles that the courts’ 
understandings of equality have entailed.  That there may be such potential hinges on 
the notion that same-sex couples ‘do family’ differently, and I consider the extent to 
which this could work to challenge the status quo. 
 
I argue that heteronormativity and equality are interlinked concepts, with the former 
being a feature of both the formal and the substantive approaches.  I will give a 
detailed analysis of this contention in chapter 2 in relation to the more formal case law 
of financial relief.  In this thesis more broadly, I interrogate the various meanings 
given to ‘equality’ (and their interplay with heteronormativity) in the discourse of 
legal actors and their lesbian and gay clients.  Gaining a clearer understanding of 
those meanings allows for a more nuanced evaluation of the outcomes of legal 
developments for same-sex couples, and, by extension, for women.  Whilst a stress 
has been placed on formal equality, my research makes an original contribution by 
raising new questions about how to implement ‘equality’ for lesbians and gay men 
where their lives differ from traditional heterosexual behaviour.  In terms of the 
clients, the research also offers insights into the as yet under-researched subject of 
how same-sex couples go about unwinding their financial affairs, and their attitudes 
towards economic allocation (Leckey, 2013).  
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Thesis overview 
In chapter 2, I set out how heteronormativity and equality can help to explain White v. 
White [2001] 1 AC 596, Miller v. Miller; McFarlane v. McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618, 
and Radmacher v. Granatino [2011] 1 AC 534, three key heterosexual cases 
concerning financial relief, as well as Lawrence v. Gallagher [2012] 1 FCR 557, the 
only reported civil partnership dissolution case to date.  In White, the Court (adopting 
a difference-blind, formal equality type of approach) introduced a “yardstick of 
equality” to address the hierarchical positions of women and men.  However, in so 
doing, insufficient emphasis was placed on how the lives of the parties in the specific 
case had diverged from those positions.  In Miller/ McFarlane, a new element of 
‘compensation’ was introduced into the financial remedy equation.  This was intended 
to achieve a form of substantive equality, although the economic obligations created 
by caregiving under this element are quantified in terms of lost market opportunities 
(working to sustain structural disadvantage).  Finally, I contend that the decision to 
hold the husband in Radmacher to an unfavourable pre-nuptial agreement evinced a 
further type of formal equality, under which the husband and wife were treated as 
decontextualised contracting parties.  The outcome seems to have been reached on the 
following bases: the husband’s failure to live up to his ‘masculine’ earning potential; 
his lack of (‘feminine’) vulnerability; or in recognition of his autonomy (as less 
frequently occurs with women).  In this chapter, I demonstrate that the courts have 
been maintaining the constructed ‘breadwinner’/ ‘homemaker’ binary through a 
process of constant repetition, even to the point of implicitly following these norms in 
Lawrence.  In doing so, the courts are both acting out, and requiring, a particular type 
of gendered performance, in the sense conceived of by Butler (1993). 
 
In chapter 3, I provide a critical overview of the methodological and analytic 
approaches that I use in the rest of this thesis.  My research is positioned within the 
realms of socio-legal studies and law, gender and sexuality and, as such, I draw on 
research methodologies that sit well with these areas of legal study.  By ‘socio-legal 
studies’, I mean that I will be using insights from sociology as tools for the collection 
and analysis of data (Campbell and Wiles, 1976).  I draw on two distinct methods 
which are traditionally used in the social sciences: firstly, an online questionnaire 
exploring the division of labour and conduct of finances in same-sex relationships 
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(301 respondents); and, secondly, interviews with 14 family solicitors and with 10 
people (6 men, 4 women) who have sought legal advice relating to civil partnership 
dissolution.  The chapter highlights the benefits of adopting a ‘mixed methods’ 
approach to empirical work, with it allowing me to generate rich data from 
individuals and to explore in detail their thoughts and experiences, as well as to attain 
a greater level of generalisability. 
 
In chapter 4, I discuss the findings of my online questionnaire (consisting of 
quantitative and qualitative data).  The quantitative analysis included a range of 
statistical analyses, including descriptive statistics and t-tests, whilst qualitative 
analysis of the questionnaire data was conducted thematically.  The chapter helps to 
answer my first research question by exploring the ways in which same-sex couples 
subvert understandings of the traditional gender dichotomy.  Childcare was shared 
more equally than it is amongst the wider population, and accounts of equal 
apportionment featured even more strongly with reference to caring for a sick family 
member.  In this way, rather than reinforcing assumptions about binary gender roles, 
the respondents described their arrangements in an altogether less segregated fashion.  
Most participants similarly reported the equal sharing of domestic chores, and having 
conversed about and chosen these with their partner.  In terms of the finances, the 
partners again commonly reported a more equal apportionment, supporting the notion 
of a greater egalitarian ethos amongst same-sex couples.  For the purpose of 
clarification, I am using the term ‘egalitarian’, consistently with the above discussion, 
to mean that the couples shared tasks between them, and that aspects of those tasks 
were open to negotiation.  Moreover, my same-sex participants were less likely than 
heterosexual couples to have a joint account alone.  I argue that the findings raise 
potentially transformative challenges to traditional ideas about gender in 
relationships, demonstrating that there remain other ways of living and being beyond 
‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’. 
 
In chapter 5 (as is additionally the case in chapters 6 and 7), my focus moves to my 
interview data.  The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the participants, and it 
includes within it discussion of the reasons why people choose to enter into a civil 
partnership, comparing the accounts of the clients and the solicitors.  I explain that the 
partners themselves most commonly cited pragmatic reasons, tying in to the 
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discussion of rights in the current chapter (and therefore fitting well with some of the 
existing literature).  The solicitors instead tended to rationalise decisions to opt for 
civil partnership on the basis of (heterosexual) romance.  Setting the scene for their 
wider endorsement of formal equality in chapters 6 and 7 (which provides an answer 
to my second research question), their focus on sameness is used to justify the 
imposition of an identical regime of property division as is applied to different-sex 
partners on divorce.  However, this approach ignores the indication, within the 
clients’ accounts of relationship formation, that they often did not intend to take on 
the financial obligations associated with marriage.  It simultaneously results in 
insufficient attention being paid to the ways in which same-sex partners diverge from 
heterosexual practices, some of which are evident in chapter 4.  I further consider the 
reasons why the clients’ relationships broke down, concentrating on the issue of the 
inability to petition on the basis of adultery.  Several clients felt that there should be 
an adultery-like provision included within the same-sex legislation, stressing a desire 
for sameness of treatment.  My data demonstrates the difficulty of adopting a formal 
equality based legislative framework that largely mirrors marriage, but as to which 
there are a few exceptions.  That said, the suggestion was that the meanings that the 
partners attributed to adultery extended beyond the legislative focus on the specific 
act performed, signalling some transgressive potential. 
 
In chapter 6, I interrogate the ways in which sameness and difference between civil 
partnership dissolution and (heterosexual) divorce featured in the narratives of my 
interviewees.  In so doing, I make an original, empirical contribution to the 
assimilation/ transformation debate.  Four themes are identified in terms of sameness: 
that the solicitors used the same language; that they have asked their clients the same 
questions in introductory meetings; that they have argued their lesbian and gay cases 
in ways that centre around gendered stereotypes that have been carried over from the 
heterosexual case law; and that they have tended to view equality as entailing 
sameness of treatment or, in terms of asset division, a 50/ 50 split.  Turning to 
accounts of difference, I identify that disparities were observed in the factual matrices 
of civil partnership and (heterosexual) divorce cases, although that the solicitors are 
not necessarily responding to these.  There are also suggestions that lesbians and gay 
men may be adopting a different approach to financial relief to that taken in the ‘big 
money’ case law.  This links in with the fact that, whilst formal legal recognition has 
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brought same-sex partners to law to a greater extent, practitioners have still reported a 
relative determination by their civil partner clients to settle on their own terms.  In this 
way (and in addressing both my first and third research questions), even though 
heterosexual relational norms are being imposed on lesbians and gay men, they are 
making some attempts to resist them. 
 
In chapter 7, the last of my empirical chapters, I explore my interviewees’ responses 
to questions relating to the conduct of household finances.  Consistently with my 
findings in chapter 4, I describe having found a relative lack of resource pooling, and 
greater financial independence, amongst same-sex couples.  I observe a particular 
objection amongst same-sex clients to the division of ‘future’ assets as well (which, 
once more, assists in answering my third research question).  I argue that this 
resistance may stem from the lack of futurity in gay and lesbian thinking.  My finding 
as to ‘future’ assets would seem to indicate that clients would prefer to opt out of the 
substantive remedies introduced to address heteronormative assumptions about 
imbalance within relationships.  I reflect on the fact that lesbian and gay negativity 
towards the future is not always optimal, as it could result in lower levels of 
compensation for economically weaker parties in financial relief matters.  However, 
these attitudes can provide food for thought about assumptions of necessary 
dependency in couples. 
	  
In chapter 8, I bring together the strands of argument discussed in chapters 2-7 so as 
to answer my research questions set out above.  I consider where they stand in 
relation to my hypothesis in embarking on the project, which had as its basis the 
notion that the dichotomous framing of the arguments around ‘transformation’ and 
‘assimilation’ cause the literature to paint an unrealistic picture as to what is 
happening ‘on the ground’.  It may be difficult to imagine that significant challenges 
to the existing heteronormative model of social relations can be realised in the context 
of the formal equality derived, rights driven approach.  Yet, I also perceive that the 
legal recognition of same-sex couples still carries with it some transformative effects.  
Indeed, empirical evidence has already supported a possible conjuncture between 
assimilation and transgression; Green (2010: 429), who described his participants as 
having, “one foot anchored in heteronormativity and the other in homosexuality”, 
observed amongst gay and lesbian spouses, “complex […] arrangements that bring 
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together tradition and innovation”.  I argue that, whilst same-sex partners have 
retained some transgressive potential whilst their relationships continue, it may be 
blunted when they come to ‘law’ at the end of those relationships.  Even so, lesbians 
and gay men are providing some opposition to attempts by legal actors to impose 
heterosexual norms upon them (although the outcome of this can, in some respects, be 
questionably desirable). 
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Chapter 2- Equality and heteronormativity: a theoretical framework 
 
In this chapter, I will be exploring the ways in which the two major theoretical 
concepts that frame my thesis, heteronormativity and equality, have played out in the 
key (heterosexual) financial relief case law of England and Wales.  I discuss the 
sameness/ difference debate that has taken place within the feminist literature, before 
setting out how the conceptions of equality at the heart of this debate have featured in 
three ‘big money’ cases.  I then proceed to consider the approach to equality adopted 
in Lawrence v. Gallagher, particularly focusing on the extent to which the case law 
centring around heterosexuals has been carried across.  Whilst equality as a concept is 
generally considered progressive, the specific ways in which the courts have applied it 
in this context has received relatively little attention to date.  At its most basic, it 
might be described as the ideal that, “at some […] level, human beings have equal 
worth and importance, and are therefore equally worthy of concern and respect” 
(Baker et al, 2004: 23).  Often, equality is taken to imply an element of sameness,9 
and the extent to which the concept necessitates this type of treatment has proved a 
source of great friction. 
 
In terms of the debate surrounding gender equality, ‘difference’ feminists, on the one 
hand, have espoused the differences between men and women.  They have called for 
the law to address women’s unfavourable position within the societal power structure 
(Mentone, 2002).  Such feminists have asserted that women’s needs and 
circumstances demand different legal remedies, notably ‘special’ concern and 
responsiveness, in order to achieve equality (Burchard, 2004).  This is because, they 
argue, equality is only attained once women are raised from their inferior and 
subordinate position (a notion widely referred to as substantive equality) (Littleton, 
1987).  This standpoint has, however, been objected to on a number of bases.  Firstly, 
it might be contended that affirming the difference between women and men has the 
potential to naturalise feminine traits that are the consequence of women’s continued 
oppression (Ascher, 2010).  It carries with it the possibility of perpetuating the idea of 
women as being, “biologically domestic and dependent”, treating their difference 
from men as inherent (Sorial, 2011: 31).  Secondly, it can work to reinforce 
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stereotypes and assumptions about a ‘woman’s place’ and ‘women’s work’ that 
women have struggled for years to escape (Lacey, 1990).  ‘Special’ treatment may, in 
itself, reinforce women’s marginalisation and create a, “more separate than equal” 
society (Rhode, 1989: 121).  Thirdly, focusing on women’s difference from men can 
result in the oversimplification of women’s characteristics as a group and an 
inattention to their individual characteristics (Scales, 2006).  It may, furthermore, 
direct attention towards those group characteristics to such an extent that it detracts 
from the more important task of considering the ways that societal institutions 
privilege some whilst disadvantaging others.  Fourthly, MacKinnon (1989: 219) 
claims that emphasising difference works to rationalise and cover over disparities of 
power between men and women, referring to it as, “the velvet glove on the iron fist of 
domination”. 
 
Conversely, it has been emphasised that, despite their physical differences, women 
are equally capable of functioning within the (‘masculine’) public sphere.  Hence, 
they are, or at least have the potential to be, like men (Barnett, 1998).  The premise is 
that women should arguably be treated ‘equally’ to men on the basis of the 
Aristotelian formal equality principle that dictates that like cases should be treated 
alike (Gosepath, 2011).  To do otherwise might be viewed as highlighting the 
characteristics that have historically been drawn upon to prevent women’s access to 
the rights and protections enjoyed by men.  Nevertheless, the treatment of men and 
women as being fundamentally the same in this way risks ignoring the socially 
constructed and conditioned gender disparities that differentially shape their lives.  
Fineman (2011: 53) has identified that formal equality is necessarily an “uneven” 
equality for women, given that they remain “mired” in a prevalent notion of the 
family within which they are understood to have, “unique reproductive roles and 
responsibilities that define them as […] necessarily subordinate in a world that values 
economic success”.  Some time ago, she contended that the treatment of women as 
though they are in a comparable position, and have the equivalent possibilities, to men 
ultimately works to perpetuate their inequality of result (Fineman, 1991).  This is 
because to do so is arguably to disregard the socioeconomic factors that place them at 
a disadvantaged position in the market, and favour their taking on domestic roles.  
Whilst, more recently, Fineman (2009a: 256) has recognised that women may have 
attained political and civil rights, and successfully achieved equality in a formal way, 
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she still contends that, “equality for women remains elusive in practical and material 
terms”.  The ‘sameness’ approach might also be criticised on the ground that it omits 
to provide a framework for challenging the substantive inequalities and disparate 
allocations of privilege produced by existing institutional arrangements, perhaps even 
working to “deepen” them (Fineman, 2008; 2011).  Indeed, it is difficult to suggest 
remedies for unequal circumstances where the dominant paradigm lays stress on 
treating everyone the same (Fineman, 1992).  The approach has therefore been 
disparaged for operating as an obstacle to the creation and implementation of 
solutions to women’s societal problems (centring around a confinement to 
domesticity). 
 
In the analysis that follows, I will argue that, in the law of financial relief post-2000, 
the courts have adopted a fairly unprincipled approach in deciding what amounts to a 
fair division of the assets.  Initially, they favoured a solution that most closely 
resembled (although did not quite attain) a formal, or sameness, type of equality.  
Subsequently, a substantive element was imported into the equation.  However, the 
courts more recently reverted back to the more formal approach, albeit of a different 
kind to that employed initially, under more unusual circumstances.  The inconsistency 
between judgments in their approaches towards these understandings of equality 
perhaps makes sense when reflecting on the lack of a clear overarching objective in 
the financial remedy context, and the centrality of the judge in the development of the 
case law.  In section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the various factors listed 
are not ranked in any order (apart from first consideration being given to the welfare 
of any child of the family), and judges are able to decide how much weight to 
attribute to any of them.  In so doing, they have played an integral role in shaping the 
law of financial relief, fleshing out the bare bones provided by the legislation.  It is by 
reason of this role that I contend that, in order to establish how financial relief 
‘works’, it is necessary to carefully scrutinise the judgments of the family courts.  
Given the “chaos, plurality, even antinomies” that appear on the face of such 
judgments, I suggest that a critical part of this exercise is to look behind the formal 
principles espoused and to critique the normative frameworks that underlie them 
(Diduck, 2011: 287).  I identify heteronormativity as being important in an area which 
functions more on the basis of ‘law in action’ than ‘law in books’ (Harding, 2011).  
By ‘law in action’, I mean that the law of financial relief is always shaped by the 
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actors involved, institutional knowledge and social norms.  I will now explore the 
meaning and signification that I am attributing to heteronormativity in greater depth. 
 
Heteronormativity as regulatory 
In setting out an approach also adopted in this thesis, Harding (2011; 2015) has 
argued for an understanding of heteronormativity as a type of legally pluralist 
structuring frame.  As was touched on in chapter 1, by ‘heteronormativity’, I mean, 
“the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make 
heterosexuality seem not only coherent […] but also privileged” (Berlant and Warner, 
2000: 312).  Heteronormativity entails the promotion of heterosexuality as, “natural, 
self-evident […] and necessary” (Cameron and Kulick, 2003: 55).  It manifests in 
various practices that work to entrench gender so as to accord with notions of 
‘maleness’ and ‘masculinity’ (so, behaviour such as engaging in the production and 
circulation of commodities, and a disengagement with domestic labour) and 
‘femaleness’ and ‘femininity’ (involving the performance of work within the home).   
In using the term ‘legal pluralism’, I refer to the notion that a system of ‘law’ is not 
confined to its own internal logic, but overlaps in an operational sense with cultural 
norms (Davies, 2010: 812).  This challenges ideas that state law is separate from other 
social codes, and suggests that some types of legal regulation whose formal origins do 
not lie in the state are becoming so important that their consequences for state law 
cannot be ignored (Davies, 2010).  Whilst is has often been assumed that non-state 
law is only of relevance at the “edges” of law, legal pluralism argues against this 
presumption, especially in terms of the ways in which patterns of social ‘normality’ 
(including normative gender assumptions) are reflected in, and sustained by, law 
(Davies, 2010: 816). 
 
Legal pluralism not only undermines claims by legal positivists (such as Hart, 1958) 
that the law is distinct from moral claims, but additionally that the legal system 
necessarily entails there being a single law in any particular geo-political space.  
Notably, this focus on singularity has meant that equality has been perceived as 
applying an ‘objective’ standard, regardless of people’s normative positioning 
(Davies, 2005: 92).  Part of the understanding of law as an ‘it’ entails that it is 
conferred with a status of ‘truth’: “it is true because we assume it, and perform it on 
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an ongoing basis” (Davies, 2005: 112).  The idea of the singularity of law has further 
resulted in law being depicted as a framework that performs no role in the distribution 
of power in society, entrenching law’s power and concealing its complexity.  On the 
basis of such thinking, critical legal scholars have contended that the separation of the 
“legal” is a “myth perpetuated by law in order to mask its true level of involvement in 
the construction of regimes of power” (Davies, 2003: 170).  They have conceived that 
law “is not separate from patriarchal power […], from heteronormativity – the social 
power of heterosexual norms” (Davies, 2003: 170). 
 
A plural understanding enables normative structures, such as heteronormativity, to be 
recognised as ‘legal’, rather than simply moral or cultural (Harding, 2011).  Viewing 
heteronormativity as an interior part of the legal domain is helpful, as it directs one’s 
mind to holding it up to the same level of examination and analysis as occurs in 
relation to the more “official law” (Harding, 2011).  It can expose the coercive force 
of such normative structures and the ways in which they work to shape, and it allows 
for the exploration of the impact that they have on social life.  Harding (2015) argues 
that importing heteronormativity into understandings of legal pluralism also helps to 
reveal the way that seemingly ‘egalitarian’ legal change might be working to protect 
existing axes of privilege.  The introduction of legislation recognising formalised 
same-sex relationships might seem, on the one hand, to have moved conceptions of 
‘family’ away from heteronormativity.  Yet, Harding (2015) asserts that the main 
purpose of marriage (or, in this case, quasi-marriage) is to bolster the heteronormative 
family, with all of its gendered implications.  She describes it as being a “danger” that 
the performance of heteronormative family life is imposed on lesbians and gay men 
by modern day legal frameworks (Harding, 2015).10  This risks losing the 
transformative potential offered by alternative family forms, and consequently 
undermines the recognition obtained by granting ‘equal’ status (Harding, 2015). 
 
I assert here that heteronormative constraints and pressures are experienced at all 
levels in family law as it attempts to attain equality.  Leckey (2013: 187) claims that 
the law of financial relief, “imposes the distribution thought to be just by some 
external standard in light of how spouses are expected to have acted during their 
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union”.  In this respect, the judiciary are unable to get past prevailing models that, 
problematically, derive from the notion of husbands and wives necessarily adopting 
distinct roles in a marriage.  Both the formal and substantive models start from a 
position of rigid, polar opposite ideas of ‘women’ and ‘men’ and pigeonhole gender 
in such a way as to fail to acknowledge its de facto fluidity and multiplicity, retaining 
the gender standards of the status quo (Thompson-Schneider, 1997).  Far from being 
progressive, the current dominant conceptions of equality evident in the case law may 
be closing off more creative ways of thinking about domestic relationships.  Legal 
practitioners are likewise tied into this ‘straitjacketed’ way of thinking, given that they 
advise and represent their clients on the basis of the outcomes and successes of 
previous cases.  As Smart (1984) observes, the boundaries of acceptability in this type 
of case are set by judges.  Moreover, practitioners, like the judges themselves, are 
exposed and subjected to social norms as individuals.  As Fineman (1992) claims, 
albeit in the American context, family judgments are typically made in response to 
social pressures.  Their clients are also subjected to these norms, and may feel obliged 
to behave in certain ways, or at least to present their lives in such ways, when seeking 
legal advice.  Accordingly, family law has been held back by heteronormativity, 
despite initially appearing, prima facie, to give its actors a relatively free reign. 
 
That said, it must be taken into account that the judiciary are limited by the facts that 
appear before them.  It is at this point that there appears to be a tension between the 
‘realities’ of the cases and the messages that, from a normative perspective, family 
law arguably ought to be sending out.  Pivotal here is Eekelaar’s (1984: 189) notion 
of the potentially supportive role of the law, under which it might work to promote, 
“certain ends of overall social justice policy”.  I am grounding my arguments in this 
notion of the normative function of the law.  The impact of high profile ancillary 
relief judgments is powerful, given that they offer, “guidance to family members and 
to society” (Diduck, 2011: 289).  Baroness Young affirmed this in claiming that, “law 
influences behaviour” (HL Hansard, 29 February 1996: col. 1638).  The current state 
of the law might be considered objectionable by reason that, in consistently drawing 
on ideas of the traditional gender binary, the courts are helping to reproduce patterns 
of expected roles.  I suggest that it is simplistic to rationalise this simply on the basis 
of the constraining details of the cases, as legal actors can even be understood to 
construct relations of coherence between wives and femininity and husbands and 
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masculinity where they may not be reflective of the case.  In this way, they work to 
reinforce stereotypes, particularly concerning the link between gender and biological 
sex (which Butler (1990) stressed was not natural11).   
 
I contend that law is one of the, “cultural strategies involved in [women’s] process of 
deviner” (or becoming) (Chunn and Lacombe, 2000:17).  My aim here is to explain 
the range of underlying approaches to equality in the three key judgments of White v. 
White [2001] 1 AC 596, Miller v. Miller; McFarlane v. McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 
and Radmacher v. Granatino [2011] 1 AC 534.  I am focusing on White because the 
Court sought in that case to set out, for the first time, the principled basis on which 
law demands the assessment of financial remedy.  I have selected Miller/ McFarlane 
because it provided the most significant clarification of the law post-White (which is 
still drawn on today), and Radmacher as it was the first case of this kind where it was 
the wife, rather than the husband, from whom the wealth originated.  These cases 
might all be classified as ‘big money’ cases, by which I mean that, “the assets 
available exceed the parties’ financial needs for housing and income” (White v. White, 
[2001] 1 AC 596, 600, per Lord Nicholls).  I am concentrating on such judgments in 
this chapter because they, having been decided by the most senior court in the land 
(formerly the House of Lords, now the Supreme Court), have shaped the law of 
financial relief.  Smaller money cases often do not make it to court and, where they 
do, the parties normally do not have the funds available to take their matter to the 
higher courts.  My focus in this respect may be considered problematic given that 
these cases arguably have only “passing relevance” to the small money case, which 
tends to be determined by “practicalities rather than legal doctrine” (Hitchings, 2010: 
104).   Nevertheless, big money matters have been identified as having been given 
some weight in the larger value everyday case, with principles such as ‘equality’ 
figuring more strongly (Hitchings, 2010).  Furthermore, I submit that these larger 
money cases are of interest, as legal actors are given a freer reign where the division 
of assets is not determined entirely by needs (although those needs may themselves be 
constructed in accordance with preconceptions). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See chapter 1. 
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I assert that the judiciary should be using their ability to convey social organising 
principles so as to target, and work to undercut, asymmetries of power within 
relationships.  However, what we see within the cases is equality being used a way 
that upholds a heterosexual binary of roles, with this evidencing the “danger” 
expressed by Harding (2015).  I proceed to consider whether the only currently 
reported case relating to financial relief on civil partnership dissolution, Lawrence v. 
Gallagher [2012] 1 FCR 557, signals any sort of disruption to this heteronormative 
framework.  In accordance with the discussion in chapter 1, this is due to the notion 
that civil partnerships, relatively lacking in pre-existing models, are conducted in a 
more egalitarian and creative manner than heterosexual marriage.  In revealing the 
potential difficulties of applying heteronormative assumptions to their relationships, 
same-sex couples may hold the capacity both to challenge these assumptions and to 
produce alternative “domains of intelligibility” (Butler, 1990).  I turn to Lawrence and 
examine whether there is any evidence of a transformative weakening of norms, or 
whether we merely see attempts to ‘map’ the identity politics specific to different-sex 
marriage onto same-sex couples (Leckey, 2013). 
 
White v. White: a yardstick of ‘equality’ 
Prior to White v. White, a needs-based approach had developed where wives were 
held only to be entitled to their ‘reasonable requirements’ on the dissolution of their 
marriage, regardless of the extensiveness of the assets (O’D v. O’D [1976] Fam 83).  
The House of Lords’ decision in White, which brought with it a, “sea-change in the 
law of ancillary relief”, imported the language of ‘equality’ for the first time (Cooke, 
2007: 99).  The case involved a 33-year marriage where the spouses were partners in 
a farming business and possessed net assets amounting to £4.6 million.  At first 
instance, Mr. Justice Holman awarded the wife £984,000 on the basis that her 
‘reasonable requirements’ should determine her award ([2001] 1 AC 596).  The Court 
of Appeal raised the wife’s award to £1.69 million, providing her with around 40% of 
the asset pot ([1998] 2 FLR 310).  Both parties appealed to the House of Lords, which 
upheld the award, but also set out a new approach that the courts were to adopt in 
deciding financial relief matters.  Lord Nicholls, delivering the leading judgment, 
asserted that there was no longer to be a, “place for discrimination between husband 
and wife and their respective roles” ([2001] 1 AC 596, 605).  There was, he said, to be 
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no, “bias in favour of the money-earner and against the homemaker and the child-
carer” (605).  In order to avoid gender-based discrimination, he directed judges to 
check their provisional views in financial matters against a ‘yardstick of equality’, 
which was only to be departed from in the existence of “good reason” (615). 
 
There may firstly be some debate as to whether the Lords adopted a formal or a 
substantive approach towards equality in this matter (Diduck and Kaganas, 2006).  
The decision does not comply with any notion of formal equality that dictates that 
women need conform to traditionally masculine characteristics and behaviour to 
receive financial benefits from a marriage.  However, the Court appears to have 
adopted an overtly difference-blind, sameness approach to the “marriage partnership” 
in contending that, “it matters not which of them earned the money and built up the 
assets” (605, per Lord Nicholls).  This idea of difference-blindness is further 
supported by the Lords’ description of the contributions of husbands and wives to the 
family as part of a “joint” endeavour, as well as Lord Nicholls’ introduction of the aid 
of the ‘yardstick’.  This term is used to refer to an arrangement whereby the assets are 
split 50/ 50% between husband and wife where they are surplus to needs.  Essentially, 
it aimed to implement something like a community of property approach, with scope 
for adjustments to achieve fairness. 
 
I argue that we might identify, as regards the ‘yardstick’, a nod towards Dworkin’s 
(2000) equality of resources.  This holds that people are treated as equal when the 
available resources have been distributed such that, “no further transfer would leave 
their shares of the total resources more equal” (Dworkin, 2000: 12).  Yet, a 50/ 50% 
division was significantly departed from on the facts of this particular case.  This was 
seemingly on the reasoning that the husband’s father had provided the couple with 
financial assistance some years previously (despite Lord Nicholls himself viewing 
this to be a contribution of minimal relevance).  In fact, Herring (2013) observed that 
it has subsequently been hard to find a case where there has been a straightforward 
50/ 50 split, given that, “most of the cases have involved rich husbands who have 
found many ways of persuading the courts they should be able to keep more than half 
of the assets”.  Whilst the Court’s approach to financial relief in White had aspects of 
formal equality about it, it still did not quite attain that position.  It is ultimately 
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unclear why, given that the Court of Appeal reached the same division on applying 
different principles. 
 
In other respects, the Lords’ judgments evince a substantive undertone.  Diduck 
(2001: 180-181) lays emphasis on the fact that the Court, “focuses not on treating 
presumptively equal individuals the same, but rather on the advantages and 
disadvantages which accrue to contextualised subjects”.  Looking at the judgments 
from this perspective, the type of equality being espoused can be explained through 
the writings of Fraser.  Fraser (2012) describes two theoretical views of injustice, one 
of which, “highlights socioeconomic inequities”, and the other of which stresses, 
“cultural or symbolic injustices”.  She asserts that the remedial strategies for the two 
could be categorised respectively as paradigms of ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ 
(Fraser, 1997; 2003).  Whereas redistribution entails “political-economic 
restructuring”, recognition broadly requires change that, “positively valoriz[es] 
cultural diversity” (Fraser, 2012).  Regarding ‘redistribution’, Lord Nicholls identified 
that women had historically been exploited in the home, as they had facilitated their 
husbands’ business successes but, on relationship breakdown, been confined to their 
‘reasonable requirements’ (and, consequently, deprivation).  The attribution of 
additional value to ‘homemaking’ work might be considered an initial step towards 
tackling such exploitation and, as a result, may be interpreted as (at least loosely) 
addressing gender-specific forms of distributive injustice. 
 
Lord Nicholls’ attempt to grapple with substantive equality must surely be considered 
a positive development, improving the position of women in terms of two key roles 
that Eekelaar (1984: 25) assigns for the law of financial remedy (namely, “adjusting 
the relationships between family members when family units break down” and 
“providing protection for individuals for possible harms suffered in the family”).  
Indeed, it might be argued that the Court in White could realistically do little else.  All 
the same, the judges missed out on the opportunity presented by the facts to convey a 
message relating to the social organisation of family living (this being that there are 
other ways of ‘doing family’ than the traditional ‘breadwinner’/ ‘homemaker’ model, 
particularly given that this was not the approach that the parties in White necessarily 
lived by).  Their judgments might likewise be criticised for falling short of the 
necessary measures prescribed by Hinton (2001) in order to achieve equality of status.  
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Hinton (2001: 80) takes issue with the, “social relations that empower one group to 
take systematic advantage of the work done by members of another”, and identifies as 
an illustration the pressure that is placed on women to remain in the home whilst men 
go out to work in the public sphere.  It is significant that the Court’s decision in White 
by no means alleviated this pressure.  In fact, Fraser’s ‘redistribution’ has been 
conceived of as incorporating “diverse social processes”, including (alongside 
redistributing income) reorganising the division of labour (Young, 1997).  This is not 
what happened here. 
 
As to Fraser’s (2003) paradigm of ‘recognition’, the suggestion is that we should be 
concerned with the hindering effects of hierarchy and unfavourable cultural 
evaluations.  In relation to this, we might consider that Lord Nicholls’ attempt to 
address the ‘breadwinner’/ ‘homemaker’ hierarchy, by instigating a revaluation of the 
traditional housewife role, went some way to tackle family law’s “institutionalised 
patterns of status inequality” that constitute women as inferior (Fraser, 2003: 29).  We 
might similarly regard the decision as falling in line with the fledgling concept of 
equality of dignity (which Honneth (2004) regarded also as being encompassed by 
Fraser’s ‘recognition’).  This entails that an individual or group feels “self-respect and 
self-worth”, and is harmed when individuals or groups are, “marginalized, ignored or 
devalued” (Law v. Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497, 530, per Iacobucci J).  It is arguable 
that Lord Nicholls attempted to bolster women’s “self-respect and self-worth” in this 
way by stressing the value of their non-financial contributions. 
 
What is most interesting about the judgments, though, is that they did nothing to 
facilitate the disruption of the heteronormative ‘breadwinner’/ ‘homemaker’ 
dichotomy.  In focusing on how to address the differential positions of women and 
men, a sort of “pattern[ing] of status” could be identified, with a particular gendered 
norm of family life being reinforced.  Close interrogation of the Court’s reasoning in 
White reveals that the parties, and (heterosexual) marriage as a whole, were presented 
in a way that centres around familial binary roles.  On the one hand, Lord Nicholls 
recognised, in the earlier part of his judgment, that the traditional arrangement of the 
husband earning the money and the wife looking after the home and children may no 
longer be, “the order of the day” (605).  Here, he seemed to deny any necessary 
correlation between sex and gender role, and the judge also acknowledged that, 
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“frequently, both parents work” (605).  Then again, his presentation of the modern-
day marriage predominantly corresponded with (hetero)normative ways of living, to 
the extent of one partner doing the ‘breadwinning’ and the other the ‘homemaking’, 
with both operating in “different spheres”.  This is reinforced where he (seemingly 
being careful to adopt gender-neutral terms) stated that an awareness had developed 
that, “one spouse’s business success” may have been enhanced by the, “family 
contribution of the other spouse” (606). 
 
Further into the judgment, Lord Nicholls slipped back into more overtly 
heteronormative understandings of family life.  He placed stress on the scenario 
where, “a husband and wife by their joint effort […] his directly in his business and 
hers at home, have built up a valuable business from scratch” (608).  It might, of 
course, be contended that this is simply a reflection of the ‘reality’ to which the law is 
required to respond.  Crucially, though, that scenario diverges from how the parties’ 
relationship was described in the case, given that the wife both brought up the 
children and worked on the farm.  Lord Nicholls arguably placed insufficient 
emphasis on the wife’s farming role (despite finding that her business partnership 
with her husband was a “reality”), and on her persisting with this sort of work going 
forward.  It was, of course, the Court of Appeal’s (larger) award that was upheld, and 
not that of Mr. Justice Holman, who considered Mrs. White’s wish to have enough 
money to purchase a farm not to fall within her ‘reasonable requirements’.  All the 
same, despite having described the couple as both having farming “in their blood”, 
Lord Nicholls proceeded to concentrate on the husband alone continuing to farm, with 
the wife having money “to invest or use […] as she pleases” (612).  In so doing, he 
seems (perhaps as a result of heteronormative constraints) to have been trying to ‘fit’ 
the case into a “heterosexual matrix”,12 and Mr. White was presented as the masculine 
money-earner, with Mrs. White as the feminine ‘homemaker’ (Butler, 1990). 
 
As such, general assumptions were employed, and the normative ‘ideal’ was imposed 
on a couple to whom it did not apply.  Lord Nicholls may have had a motivation for 
doing this, wishing to seize the opportunity that the case presented for introducing the 
new ‘yardstick’.  Nevertheless, heteronormativity was consequently reinforced 
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through the minimisation of the value of work performed by women in the economic 
sphere.  Whereas the judge could have used Mrs. White’s example to draw emphasis 
towards, and convey a message relating to, the valuable work that women are able to 
perform both in the domestic and economic spheres, he chose instead to present her 
predominantly in accordance with the traditional female stereotype.  Notably, Lord 
Cooke acknowledged the wife’s work as, “an active partner in the farming business” 
(615).  However, his assertion that she met the, “responsibilities of [a] wife” again 
makes it clear that he was approaching the matter based on underlying preconceptions 
about traditional gender roles (615). 
 
Therefore, there is abundant evidence in the early case of White of a judicial reliance 
on, and repetition of, dimorphic ideas about marital roles.  Whilst I clearly recognise 
that our society simply has not attained a gender-neutral utopian state, the law should 
be moving away from the use of crude stereotypes.  In spite of this, the decision must 
be lauded for giving direct value to work in the home.  I contend that this 
advancement for women was, though, only short lived.  A movement away from it 
was signalled in Miller/ McFarlane, where the principles underlying the court’s 
exercise of discretion were subsequently revisited. 
 
Miller v. Miller; McFarlane v. McFarlane: compensating for a gendered division 
of labour 
Miller/ McFarlane was a conjoined appeal concerning two rather different sets of 
circumstances.  Mr. and Mrs. Miller had had a short childless marriage, during which 
the former had generated considerable wealth.  Singer J awarded the wife £5 million 
at first instance, amounting to around one third of this wealth (M v. M (Short 
Marriage: Clean Break [2005] 2 FLR 533).  This award was upheld all the way on 
appeal.  Mr. and Mrs. McFarlane, in contrast, had had a 16-year marriage with three 
children, during which the wife had given up a successful career as a solicitor to 
perform a child-caring role.  Mrs. McFarlane was awarded half of the assets and 
periodical payments on a joint lives basis at first instance.  When she took the matter 
up to the Court of Appeal, the level of payments was increased, but the payments 
were limited to a term of five years (McFarlane v. McFarlane; Parlour v. Parlour 
[2005] Fam 171).  The House of Lords subsequently decided that a five-year term was 
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unlikely to be sufficient in order to achieve ‘fairness’.  The Lords, in their judgments, 
identified three criteria that an award should satisfy to be considered fair: the parties’ 
financial needs must be met; ‘compensation’ must be provided for a spouse (such as 
Mrs. McFarlane) who has suffered economic disadvantage as a result of the way that 
the relationship was conducted; and the assets of the partnership should be ‘shared’ 
(which links in with White’s ‘yardstick’). 
 
In contrast with what might be viewed to be the ambiguity of White, it is plain that, in 
this decision, the Court added a form of substantive equality into the financial remedy 
equation.  Lord Nicholls took the opportunity to emphasise that, “women […] suffer a 
disproportionate financial loss on the breakdown of a marriage because of their 
traditional role as homemaker and child-carer” ([2006] 2 AC 618, 632).  He asserted 
that the judiciary were able to draw on this new element of ‘compensation’ to redress 
such disparity.  Revisiting Fraser’s notion of redistribution, the judgment seemed to 
address the ‘homemaker’s’ iniquitous socioeconomic positioning, at least in a 
narrower sense, through facilitating the further adjustment of resources in their 
favour.  Conversely, it is important to note that the economic obligations created by 
care giving were quantified in terms of lost market opportunities.  The Court’s 
reasoning appears flawed to the extent that, in seeking to remedy the caregiver’s 
position, greater importance was simultaneously being placed on the traditionally 
masculine role of market-earning (Laufer-Ukeles, 2008).  It is arguable that this sort 
of financial undercurrent will necessarily be present where the proceedings relate 
directly to finances.  That said, in so doing, the judgments of the House of Lords 
might be viewed to have been sustaining structural disadvantage.  They appear to 
evince a form of “androcentrism”, which Fraser (1996) pits against the achievement 
of ‘recognition’, and which she defines as, “the authoritative construction of norms 
that privilege traits associated with masculinity and the pervasive devaluation and 
disparagement of things coded as ‘feminine’”.  In addition, whilst Cohen (1989: 916) 
explains that he considers the purpose of egalitarianism to be to “eliminate […] 
disadvantage […] for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible”, the Lords in 
Miller/ McFarlane were, in effect, reaffirming such disadvantage, attributing 
‘homemakers’ with secondary status. 
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With regard to ‘compensation’, I identify a paradox: were the courts not somehow to 
address women’s greater economic requirements and the difficulties experienced in 
meeting them whilst conducting childcare, they would be condemned for placing 
emphasis on formal equality within an unequal society.  It is appreciated that the 
judiciary must deal with the way that life is and, more specifically, that they are 
attempting to achieve ‘justice’ in the context of the facts before them.  Indeed, I am 
not suggesting that de facto sacrifice should be ignored, or disputing that the courts 
should seek to protect those women who are in an economically vulnerable position 
(especially where children are involved).  I acknowledge that it took a long time for 
women to obtain awards under the head of ‘compensation’, and that it would be 
patently unfair and inappropriate for a woman who has given up her career to care for 
children not to be given a substantial proportion of the marital assets on divorce.  This 
is particularly the case given that the operation of the status quo presumption is likely 
to mean that, if the children are still at home, the woman will be doing the bulk of the 
care for them going forward.  In the words of MacKinnon (1989: 200), a measure of 
this nature, whilst perhaps a little “patronizing”, is “necessary to avoid absurdity”. 
 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that family judges should be working to find a way to 
meet this end, whilst also respecting the parties’ decisions.  It is important that Mrs. 
McFarlane seems to have chosen to relinquish her career, and to fall into the 
traditional feminine gender role; she could have pursued an alternative lifestyle, but 
seems to have opted not to.  Even so, she would have been subject to subtle pressures.  
Fineman (2008) asserts that notions of individual choice are unhelpful in a society 
where discrimination and oppression has occurred historically, whilst West and 
Zimmerman (1987) identify that women’s responsibility for domestic work is central 
to the reproduction of gendered traditionalism, rather than this being a rational 
decision.  As such, we might wonder to what extent it was possible for Mrs. 
McFarlane to make an autonomous choice to stay at home, given that she was likely 
to have been constrained by structural issues in society. 
 
It seems that the law of financial relief might helpfully draw from Sen’s (1992) 
writings on capabilities, the focus of which is on what people are effectively able to 
do and be.  Under this approach, it is recognised that people’s relations with others, as 
well as with the state and other institutions, shape not only what they do (their 
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“functionings”), but also the possibilities of what they can do and be (their 
“capabilities”) (Sen, 1992).  The assertion is that we must consequently be mindful of 
our motivations for attributing value to certain lifestyles (Robeyns, 2003).  That said, 
Sen’s theorising may not be of particular assistance, in that he advocates only that 
“capabilities” should offer an evaluative space, and is vague as to how the capabilities 
should be selected and aggregated (Robeyns, 2003).  Nussbaum (1988) has contended 
that Sen must endorse a specific list of valuable capabilities to enable its application 
to social injustice and gender inequality.  Yet, the indications within Sen’s work are 
that the relevant community involved are intended to determine which capabilities to 
value, and how to understand and weigh them in relation to local beliefs (Crocker, 
2008).  Every evaluative assessment endorses further social theories, and divergent 
results can be achieved depending on which theories are added to the capability 
framework (Robeyns, 2003).  This poses the danger that, for instance, in a community 
that is broadly conservative, a conservative theory of gender relations is likely to be 
integrated within the capability approach.  In fact, a key feminist concern with the 
approach has been that it could be interpreted and applied in androcentric ways 
(Robeyns, 2003).  Not only this, but the capability approach does not put forward any 
distributive rules, simply suggesting that distribution should operate on the basis of 
what matters for people’s wellbeing (Robeyns, 2011). 
 
In any event, I suggest that it would be preferable for the Court to have placed direct 
value on Mrs. McFarlane’s ‘homemaking’/ care giving role, as occurs in White, as 
opposed to focusing (through ‘compensation’) on what she had lost in terms of her 
career.  Doing so would have proved advantageous in working to convey the message 
that such work is a legitimate, and valuable, pursuit in itself.  It is appreciated that the 
arguments being made may, at this point, appear to hit the courts from both sides, to 
the extent that I have previously criticised the Lords for having focused on the wife’s 
‘homemaking’ work.  However, the contention that I am making both in relation to 
White and to Miller/ McFarlane is a consistent one, it being that the courts should pay 
sufficient attention to what the wives before them actually did during their marriages. 
 
In relation to the way that marital life was presented in the case, it appears that the 
Court, once again, adopted a heteronormative lens.  Whilst we might be less critical in 
this respect than in the context of White, given the factual matrices of the cases that 
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they were dealing with, the judiciary must exercise care to avoid slipping blindly into 
the use of gendered stereotypes.  Baroness Hale began by declaring that familial roles 
had, “become more flexible […] with ‘breadwinning’ and ‘homemaking’ 
responsibilities being shared and changing over time” (655).  However, she continued 
to refer to ‘breadwinning’ and ‘homemaking’ as distinct roles and, like Lord Nicholls 
in White, soon started to fall back on traditional notions of masculinity and femininity.  
For example, she used gender-specific language in discussing the position where 
business assets have been generated solely by the efforts of one party whilst the other 
performed, “her […] contribution to the welfare of the family” (664).  Baroness Hale 
stated, in addition, that, “if the money-maker had not had the wife to look after him, 
no doubt he would have found others to do it for him” (664).  This implies that men 
are suited to economic activity alone, and that they are incapable of carrying out a 
feminine ‘looking after’ role, even if only for themselves. 
 
In what initially seems to be an alternative approach, Lord Mance, delivering his 
judgment, deviated from this dichotic picture in recognising that, “there can be 
marriages […] where both partners are and remain financially active” (670).  Despite 
this, though, he went on to state that, under such circumstances, “the wife might still 
have the particular additional burden of combining the bearing of and caring for 
children with work outside the home” (670).  In omitting to consider the possibility 
that the husband might instead conduct the childcare (or that it might be shared), he 
also reverted back to heteronormative assumptions about gender roles.  In fact, it must 
be noted that there was no mention by the Lords, either in Miller/ McFarlane or in 
White, as to whether the husbands performed any role at all in terms of the home or 
the children.  This echoes Collier and Sheldon’s (2008) suggestion that the ‘man of 
the law’ provides for his family by working in the public sphere, and that he omits to 
engage with childcare. 
 
Whilst the judgments hinted at an acknowledgment as to how heteronormativity 
shapes inequality in intimate relationships, the Court ultimately posed no challenge to 
it.  We might even accuse them of having helped to maintain its structural role, 
rewarding Mrs. McFarlane for her compliance with traditional femininity, and thereby 
working to “lock” women into a position that many wish to oppose (Minow, 1990).  It 
is recognised that, given that the circumstances at hand seemingly ‘fit’ neatly into the 
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heterosexual matrix, the judiciary were presented with limited opportunities for 
creativity.  Of course, it is hard to assess the extent of artificiality of the imposition of 
this framework on the parties, given that our knowledge originates from the ‘story’ 
that the judges and practitioners choose to tell.  In spite of this, the question was 
begged as to what the courts would do were they to be faced with circumstances to 
which the matrix was less readily applicable.  Such facts were to arise in the case of 
Radmacher. 
 
Radmacher v. Granatino: individual autonomy and sameness 
The wife, in this altogether more unusual scenario, belonged to a wealthy industrial 
family worth around £100 million.  The husband had been working as an investment 
banker at the time of the marriage (in 1998), earning several hundred thousand 
pounds.  By the time of the relationship breakdown, he had left banking and 
embarked on a research degree.  The parties had entered into an agreement prior to 
their marriage that stated that neither was to acquire any benefit from the property of 
the other, either during the marriage or on termination.  The question before the 
Supreme Court was whether or not this agreement should be given effect to, with the 
husband arguing that he should instead be granted provision for his long-term needs.  
The majority found that it should and, in so doing, ruled that pre-nuptial agreements 
ought to be given presumptive weight.  Their rationale was expressed to be that, “the 
court should accord respect to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in 
which their financial affairs should be regulated” ([2011] 1 AC 534, 564, per Lord 
Phillips). 
 
In the judgments themselves, it is clear that the Court were aware that they were 
adopting a, “different kind of equality” (590, per Baroness Hale).  Stress was placed 
on according respect to, “individual autonomy”.  As a result, so long as each party to 
a pre-nuptial agreement entered into this agreement, “of their own free will”, it was 
held that the decision should be respected by law (561, per Lord Phillips).  On the 
basis of such reasoning, a type of formal equality was adopted, where both husband 
and wife were presented and treated as decontextualised contracting parties.  This 
conception of sameness of treatment is different to the way that it was used in White, 
where the suggestion was that such equality entails a 50/ 50% asset split in the 
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financial relief context (albeit that that is not the division that was ultimately reached).  
This illustrates the courts’ inconsistency between cases, even where falling on the 
same side of the sameness/ difference debate. 
 
A sameness approach of the sort advocated in Radmacher might be considered 
problematic, given the existing inequalities and differential allocations of privilege 
that make autonomy “unrealistic and unrealisable” (Fineman, 2008).  Reifying 
individual choice under these circumstances may be argued to “mask” the role played 
by society in perpetuating de facto inequality, working on the erroneous basis that the 
state forms a “neutral” backdrop for a competition between two parties of the same 
social positioning (Fineman, 2008; 2011).  Furthermore, as is touched on above, 
adopting such a focus might be identified as ignoring or trivialising the injuries 
presently being suffered (West, 1988).  It is by reason of this that feminists such as 
Fineman (particularly in her earlier work) contend that affirmative measures are, in 
fact, a necessity.  Fineman (2004) asserts that autonomy is a “myth”, and certainly not 
a naturally occurring characteristic of the human condition.  It would only, she 
suggests, be feasible were individuals to be positioned so as to share the benefits and 
burdens of society, and were they to have the necessary resources to create their own 
options and make their own choices (Fineman, 2010; 2011).  Fineman (2008) 
contends that autonomy is an unhelpful notion in a society where discrimination and 
oppression has occurred historically, and where “webs” of interdependencies are 
inherent in our personal relationships.  Laying emphasis on it, such as occurs in 
Radmacher, arguably detracts from the goal of achieving equal access to 
“opportunity” (under which, individuals may succeed or fail purely on the basis of 
their own merits) (Fineman, 2004).  That said, it must be acknowledged that Fineman 
writes from America, where individuals are not provided with the same level of state 
assistance as they are in the UK. 
 
Baroness Hale, in her dissenting judgment, echoed Fineman’s concern with this kind 
of sameness of treatment by reason of current social injustice.  She highlighted that 
the purpose of pre-nuptial agreements was, “to deny the economically weaker spouse 
the provision to which she […] would otherwise be entitled” (577).  Despite this, she 
departed from Fineman as to who exactly experiences vulnerability in the context of a 
relationship.  Notwithstanding that the question in the case at hand related to whether 
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the agreement should be held against the husband, her concern, in fact, was the 
hardship that would be suffered by women should such agreements be accorded 
greater legal status.  Of course, where pre-nuptial agreements are enforced, fairness is 
judged at the point of entrance into the marriage, as opposed to several years later.  It 
seems that Baroness Hale’s disagreement with the majority was driven by what she 
perceived to be women’s vulnerability and dependence on men during a marriage, and 
the harsh implications that they would experience through the assessment being 
conducted at this earlier stage.  This, in itself, is a heteronormative argument, and it is 
interesting that she omitted to place importance on the vulnerability and dependency 
that may also conceivably be experienced by men in a marriage.  We might consider 
Baroness Hale’s underlying rationale in this respect to have been consistent with that 
of the rest of the Court, as their decision to adhere to the agreement may likewise be 
attributed to Mr. Granatino’s perceived lack of vulnerability.  It might, at least prima 
facie, seem difficult to argue that the husband was in any such position, given his 
evident intelligence and money earned in his own right.  That said, he could be 
regarded as vulnerable in terms of the making of the contract, given his lack of 
independent legal advice. 
 
The Court’s approach to vulnerability therefore ties in with the gendered aspects of 
heteronormative discourse that link ‘femaleness’ with vulnerability and ‘maleness’ 
with dominance (Butler, 1990; Ingraham, 1994).  Such discourse is incompatible with 
Fineman’s writings, which suggest that vulnerability and interdependencies are 
inevitable within the family, being an inherent aspect of the human condition 
(Fineman, 2004; 2008).  Fineman (2008: 20) advocates that equal regard should be 
given to the, “shared vulnerability of all individuals”, shared on account of our human 
fragility, interconnectedness and interdependence.  Yet, I argue that ‘vulnerability’ 
has been somewhat misused in the financial relief context, and that Fineman’s 
writings are of relatively little utility, in any event, in explaining how we might take 
this term forward as a mechanism to promote ‘genuine’ social equality.  Most 
significantly, she does not explain how we should go about developing a new 
understanding of the concept that disassociates it from its older, heteronormative, 
connotations (which are evident in Radmacher). 
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Returning more specifically to the case at hand, whilst doing so in a more complex 
and subtle manner that in the previous case law, it is arguable that the Supreme Court 
were still relying on heteronormative notions of gender.  Other instances might be 
identified to support this assertion: Lord Phillips (delivering the substantive 
judgment), seemingly in an attempt to emphasise the husband’s earning capacity, 
described him as “extremely able” and well qualified.  Thereafter, he appeared to 
adopt an almost accusatory approach towards the husband’s decision to leave a City 
career for academia, stating that this was, “not motivated by the demands of his 
family, but [that it] reflected his own preference” (573).  Lord Phillips seemed to be 
taking issue with Mr. Granatino having acted against his ‘natural’ masculinity.  In this 
way, whilst his decision to enter into the agreement was accorded with respect in this 
matter, the manner in which he chose subsequently to conduct his married life was 
not.  This conveyed the message that men are still expected to perform a 
‘breadwinning’ role.  It should be observed that Baroness Hale responded to these 
contentions, acknowledging that it could instead be argued that, “the decision to 
change job might have been for the benefit of the family” (on the basis that “happy 
parents make for happy children”) (595).  Any such career move by a wife would, 
most likely, be viewed by the courts in this manner, given the pervasive assumption 
of women’s association with children and childcare.  The judgment can, at this point, 
be identified as marking an initial step towards judicial recognition that husbands are 
able to carry out a role in relation to their children that extends beyond the merely 
financial.  Indeed, Baroness Hale appeared to go to some length to present a counter-
narrative in the case.  Despite this, she soon reverted back to referring to the 
“differing roles” adopted by parties in a marriage, somewhat harking back to the 
heteronormative binary. 
 
In relation to that binary, it is also notable that very little emphasis was placed by the 
judges on the fact that it was the wife that was the moneyed party.  It may be of 
relevance that the wife’s money was family wealth, as opposed to earned income.  In 
this way, the Court circumvented having to consider her as any sort of ‘breadwinner’.  
A case where the wife has earned the money through market work would be helpful in 
allowing for further elucidation as to the courts’ reasoning for giving effect to such a 
pre-nuptial agreement.  It could particularly work to enlighten us as to what extent the 
judges might be motivated by the notion that ‘family money’ should be protected (a 
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fairly uncontroversial suggestion for the moneyed classes).  Nevertheless, it is 
possible that their omission to deal fully with this detail of the case was at least 
partially motivated by the heteronormative assumption against associating women 
with (‘masculine’) finances.  In a similar vein, the majority of the Court’s apparent 
reluctance to recognise the clear subversive potential presented by the facts of the 
matter might be considered significant.  Through paying inadequate attention to the 
relative incompatibility of the relationship in Radmacher to the traditional gendered 
dichotomy, we might view the judges as having actively upheld this marital model. 
 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision to treat the husband the same as the wife might 
be explained on basis of Mr. Granatino’s lack of (the traditionally feminine-
associated) dependency and vulnerability, or his failure to fulfill his masculine ‘duty’ 
as a husband to maximise his earning potential.  Alternatively, we might view the 
Court as having recognised his autonomy to contract in a way that does not often 
occur in relation to female parties, despite his (arguable) actual vulnerability.  In any 
event, the suggestion may be that there is an inclination to take care more seriously 
where it is a woman providing the care (Monk, 2015).  The Court’s approach towards 
equality shows that, even where the circumstances of a case do not appear to ‘fit’ 
squarely into the heterosexual matrix, the Court still struggle to get past 
heteronormative ideas of gender roles in marriage.  The case of Lawrence v. 
Gallagher, concerning a civil partnership, takes us one step further again in testing 
this thesis. 
 
Lawrence v. Gallagher: playing it straight? 
The parties in this matter had been living together for 10 years prior to entering into a 
civil partnership in 2007.  The relationship was formally dissolved in 2009, and it was 
agreed that the case should be treated as though they had been in a civil partnership 
for nearly 12 years.  This was expressed to be on the basis that the option had not 
been available to the couple for most of the duration of their relationship, although the 
courts do now also take pre-marital cohabitation into account where there has been a 
“seamless” transition from cohabitation to marriage (GW v. RW (Financial Provision: 
Departure from Equality) [2003] 2 FLR 108).  Mr. Lawrence was an equity analyst at 
JP Morgan and Mr. Gallagher was an actor and, whilst both were working, the former 
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earned considerably more than the latter. The total assets amounted to around £4.2 
million and included two properties, two pension funds, some shares, and significant 
cash savings.  As such, the case shared the ‘big money’ focus of previous reported 
financial relief case law.  Of these assets, Mrs. Justice Parker awarded Mr. Gallagher 
around £1.6 million in the High Court (which equated to about 42% and included a 
£577,000 lump sum).  In addition, he was granted around 45% of the payments from a 
deferred payment scheme due to Mr. Lawrence from his employment when it became 
payable (estimated to be worth around £90,000).  Mr. Lawrence appealed to the Court 
of Appeal (on behalf of whom Lord Justice Thorpe delivered the main judgment), 
who reduced Mr. Gallagher’s lump sum by approximately £227,000 to a share of 
around 37% of the assets.  Moreover, they reversed the order relating to the deferred 
compensation scheme.  Their explanation for doing so was that this award would 
better reflect the Mr. Gallagher’s ‘needs’. 
 
It might have been predicted, prior to the handing down of the Court’s judgment, that 
a formal approach to equality would be adopted based on lack of gender difference.  
The fact that the parties are of the same gender, asserts Chan (2013), generates room 
to argue that the notion of ‘sharing’ may be “less powerful”.  One might have 
imagined that the Court would treat Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Gallagher as two 
individual men and, in this way, straightforwardly the same.  An examination of the 
decision, however, reveals some inconsistency in the Court’s approach towards 
sameness and difference in the civil partnership context.  On the one hand, it is 
arguable that the relationship was presented, at least in some respects, in the 
traditional dimorphic manner.  The parties’ roles were portrayed as different, to the 
extent that the partnership was not described as a dual career arrangement.  Mr. 
Lawrence was depicted as the money-earner, regardless of the fact that Mr. Gallagher 
had also been working.  Whilst this may simply be the Court’s way of describing the 
fact that the former was a high-flyer whilst the latter was not, it is also possible that 
they were constructing the problem (and, so the parties) so as replicate the 
heteronormative binary of ‘breadwinner’ and ‘non-breadwinner’. 
 
This idea is further affirmed by Lord Justice Thorpe’s discussion of the manner in 
which the parties’ two properties were to be divided.  Whilst he deemed it appropriate 
for Mr. Lawrence to retain one of these, on the basis that it was “necessary for his 
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work”, he asserted that Mr. Gallagher should have the other, “his pride and joy” 
([2012] 1 FCR 557, 566).  The judge appears, through emphasising an emotional 
attachment to the property, to have been presenting the latter compatibly with the role 
of the ‘homemaker’.  It may be that this portrayal originated from Mr. Gallagher’s 
legal representatives, who were quoted in the media as emphasising that he, “had 
played the major domestic and homemaking role”, and that he, “helped create and 
maintain a lovely home in the flat in various ways – soft furnishings, planting on 
balconies, improvement of the layout and fixtures, redecoration” (Gibb, 2012).  All 
the same, the emotionality conveyed in the judgment is reminiscent of the manner in 
which wives have been described in previous (heterosexual) financial relief cases.  
For example, Singer LJ in S v. S (Ancillary relief after lengthy separation) [2007] 1 
FCR 762, 779, noted how “very much” the home meant to the wife and how 
“devoted” she was to it.   The judge in Lawrence additionally placed stress on a desire 
expressed by Mr. Gallagher to open a bed and breakfast in the property.  This may be 
considered relevant, given that the running of such a business entails work in the 
home that bears resemblance to the traditional feminine role. 
 
On the contrary, we must note the lack of any discussion of Mr. Gallagher’s sacrifices 
in the relationship. Such detail is conspicuously absent, given the substantial coverage 
that this issue has received in previous heterosexual cases such as Miller/ McFarlane.  
Neither was there any mention of the ways in which Mr. Gallagher may have helped 
to develop and bolster Mr. Lawrence’s earning capacity.  Although there is no 
evidence of this on the facts as reported, I argue that this sort of issue would most 
likely be raised in the context of a (heterosexual) marriage.  We might deduce that the 
discussion did not arise because it would seem to be incongruous with traditional 
thinking about gender roles in intimate relationships.  In this respect, what the Court 
did not say might be considered to be more interesting than what it did.  The gaps and 
silences in the judgment suggest an inability to conceive of a relationship between 
two men as entailing interdependency and shared lives. 
 
In terms of asset division, it is significant that Mr. Lawrence failed in asserting that 
his pre-acquired property should not be brought into the equation.  His failure was 
expressed to be on the basis that, “the rule for property not acquired during the 
marriage carries the exception for the matrimonial home”, a rule identified as having 
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originated from Miller/ McFarlane (564).  We may perceive the Court’s conclusion in 
this respect as a nod of acknowledgment towards the parties’ shared lives.  In 
contrast, we might view there to be some relevance in the fact that the Court 
considered it necessary to reverse the order relating to deferred compensation.  Lord 
Justice Thorpe claimed (in my opinion, rather unpersuasively) that he could, “see no 
principled basis on which the respondent should be awarded 45% of that as though it 
were a present capital asset”, given that the bonuses were conditional on performance 
and “taxed at top rate”, and that half of them had been acquired post-separation (567).  
Nevertheless, it is questionable to what extent the exclusion of these assets from the 
‘sharing pot’ might, once more, signify a lack of recognition of the supporting role 
that Mr. Gallagher may have carried out.  A comparison can be drawn against the 
(heterosexual) matter of B v. B [2010] 2 FLR 1214, where the wife was awarded a 
sum equal to 15% of all sums received by the husband in respect of deferred bonus 
installments up to the year 2009, despite the parties having separated in 2007. 
 
In relation to the division itself, it is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal did not 
decide that each party should simply be entitled to what they had earned during the 
relationship, with Mr. Gallagher seemingly being awarded a greater share of the 
assets than he personally would have brought in.  Even so, the proportion of the assets 
that he was awarded was considerably below the 50% ‘yardstick’ (now a starting 
point principle in light of Charman v. Charman [2007] 1 FLR 1237).  Whilst it is true 
that there has been a trend in the heterosexual cases for some members of the senior 
judiciary to decide against the equal sharing of assets, perhaps most important here is 
the fact that the award is further from this 50/ 50 division than the High Court 
considered fair (George, 2012).  The Court omitted to express their decision in terms 
of a percentage share and, in fact, the award obtained by Mr. Gallagher was a needs-
based one bearing similarity to what wives tended to receive pre-White.  One wonders 
that a woman in his position might, nowadays, obtain a more substantial award.  That 
said, challenging the judgment in this way is somewhat problematic, given the 
complexity of predicting the outcome of financial claims on divorce (Monk, 2015). 
 
There is little rationale provided in the judgment in terms of justifying the departure 
from an equal division (Herring, 2012).  A number of interlinked explanations might 
be offered, all of which relate closely to heteronormativity.  Firstly, given that, under 
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the heterosexual matrix, sex and gender cohere, the Court may have measured and 
evaluated both parties according to their respective adherence to the traditional 
masculine role (with masculine identity being “inextricably linked to success as an 
income earner” (Arendell, 1995: 31)).  Indeed, Monk (2015: 193) suggests that what 
is “at stake” in Lawrence is “what it means to be a man”.  Assuming that the men 
were judged from a traditionally masculine perspective, this may go some way to 
account for the fact that Mr. Lawrence, who most closely replicated the ideal by 
reason of having a high-paying job, obtained a more favourable award than Mr. 
Gallagher.  In support of this assumption, it is relevant additionally to observe that no 
mention was made as to how household labour was conducted in the relationship.  
Such discussion is consistently present in the context of heterosexual couples 
(normally with reference to the wife).  This gap in the judgment would seem 
congruous both with Arendell’s (1995) suggestion that definitions about what is 
‘masculine’ come predominantly from men’s “non-familial roles”, and with his stress 
on their presumed disengagement with domestic labour. 
 
Secondly, we might explain the outcome reached by reverting back to the above 
discussion relating to vulnerability and dependency, which the Court may have 
viewed to be lacking here.  From one perspective, this case might be seen as 
signalling a change of approach in this respect, reflecting previous research findings 
of greater financial independence in same-sex relationships.13  Then again, there was 
no indication that the Court intended to do this in the judgment.  Moreover, given also 
the (albeit perhaps necessary) reliance on heterosexual cases within that judgment, it 
seems more likely that they were working on the stereotypical belief that vulnerability 
is a feminine affliction.  It is difficult to tell whether this thinking factored into the 
Court’s reasoning, given their lack of expressed rationale.  However, we might again 
draw significance from their silence; perhaps they did not consider the possibility that 
Mr. Gallagher might be in a vulnerable position on the basis that, as a man, he was 
able to go out and support himself.  By extension, we might be led to wonder whether 
or not, in fact, this was a submission that was made by counsel in the case.  It is 
recognised here that the issues raised by judges are usually driven in large part by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See chapter 1. 
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submissions of counsel, and that it is generally thought to be inappropriate to rely in 
judicial reasoning on ideas that were not discussed in argument. 
 
Thirdly, it might be contended that the ‘yardstick of equality’ was developed in the 
financial relief case law to redress perceived prejudice based on gender roles.  
Consistently with this idea, should the courts in cases such as White and Miller/ 
McFarlane have been drawing on such notions to make it up to women for their 
(heteronormative) confinement to the feminine role, they may well have concluded it 
unnecessary to do the same for Mr. Gallagher.  Given that he was, at least arguably, 
being treated as a ‘man’, and thereby being subjected to the same assumptions and 
expectations as Mr. Lawrence, there would appear to be no need to adjust for 
imbalance in the same way.  Nonetheless, the absence of children in this case was 
likely to have been a weighty factor in the Court’s rationale.  Were they to be faced 
with a civil partnership dissolution matter where children were present, the courts 
may be forced to reconsider the potential for imbalance in the same-sex relationship 
context. 
 
I ultimately assert that the High Court’s award to Mr. Gallagher should have been 
upheld, with it not having been in any way unreasonable.  The Court of Appeal’s 
reversion back to a focus on ‘needs’, and removal of the deferred compensation 
payments from the ‘pot’, only thinly veiled what appears to be an inability to conceive 
of interdependency in same-sex relationships.  My contention is bolstered by the gaps 
in the judgment where the parties’ relationship does not fall neatly in the binary 
model.  It is, of course, difficult to assess the extent of these gaps, given that we are 
entirely reliant on the judgment in order to ascertain the ‘facts’ at hand.  All the same, 
particularly given the silence relating to household labour (at least some of which 
must have been conducted by one or other, or indeed both, of the parties, and would 
have been discussed in the heterosexual context), it seems apparent that the Court’s 
thinking was still constrained by ideas about gender roles. 
 
Whilst care was taken to avoid making such suggestions in their discourse, there was 
little perceptible change in the case in relation to the Court’s underlying assumptions 
about masculinity.  There was somewhat less of a focus on depicting the same-sex 
parties in accordance with a binary model of familial roles.  Yet, in judging them on 
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the same (‘breadwinning’) basis for the purpose of reaching an equitable division, the 
parties were presented so as to be understandable on heteronormative terms (and a 
message was conveyed that men are expected to act accordingly).  In this regard, an 
interesting final point to note is that, considering that this was the first such case 
concerning a civil partnership, the Court of Appeal neglected to engage in any 
discussion as to whether there might be differences between civil partnership and 
marital dissolution (or the relationships themselves).  George (2012: 358) has 
commented that, “the Court of Appeal thinks it so obvious that there can be no 
difference between analogously placed married couples and civil partners that it is not 
even worth discussing the issue” and, strikingly, the fact that the claim arose from a 
civil partnership was described by them as being of “little moment”.  The Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 was mentioned just once and, thereafter, reference was made 
only to section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  A sameness approach 
appears to have been adopted, where civil partnerships are already being, “measured, 
proved and evaluated” by legal actors from the perspective of “straight” (Chambers, 
2003: 26).  The distinctive features of same-sex relationships are being ignored, thus 
diluting their radical potential (Barker, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
The courts in White, Miller/ McFarlane and Radmacher adopted a variety of 
approaches towards the fair division of assets, whilst simultaneously being unable to 
get past, and consequently relying heavily on, heteronormative assumptions about 
marital life.  In the former, the Court imposed an ‘ideal’ on a couple to whom it 
appeared to be inapplicable and, in Miller/ McFarlane, the rationale behind 
‘compensation’ worked to reaffirm the traditional hierarchy of gendered labour, 
omitting to give value to home work per se.  Furthermore, the decision in Radmacher 
seems to have been reached on one of the following bases: the husband’s failure to 
live up to his masculine earning potential; his lack of ‘feminine’ vulnerability; or in 
recognition of his autonomy (which less frequently occurs in relation to women).  
Whilst I realise that many of the arguments that I raise might be used to challenge the 
case outcomes, I do not necessarily consider it the place of this critique to argue that 
these matters should have been decided substantively differently.  This is both as a 
result of the acknowledged constraints of family law, and the necessity of a heavy 
reliance on the judgments alone for the facts.  My main focus is to highlight the 
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problematic nature of the judgments’ normative aspects, and the way that the 
assumptions and reasoning behind them (alongside the language used) might be 
identified as working to reinforce heteronormativity’s structural role.  There had been 
hopes that the case of Lawrence would present an opportunity to commence the 
project of subverting the courts’ repetition of this model of intimate relationships.  
However, what we actually see in the Court of Appeal’s judgment is the presentation 
of civil partners in a way that is still understandable under heteronormative ways of 
thinking. 
 
It seems that, at this early stage, civil partners are already being assimilated into the 
heterosexual norm, signalling “the triumph of hetero-patriarchy” (Heaphy et al, 2013: 
2).  This hinders the capacity of lesbian and gay relationships to interrupt, in wider 
society, “the logic that translates women’s labour into men’s material advantage” 
(Dunne, 1999: 194).  I ultimately contend that we must aim to, “keep open the 
possibilities of thinking of other futures”, and to move away from the stereotypes 
which preclude us from rethinking and redefining the societal roles of those within 
intimate relationships (Bottomley and Wong, 2006: 53).  My thesis, in this respect, 
draws influence from the notion of equality of condition.  By this, I am referring to 
the notion of people being able to exercise “real choices among real options”, and of 
people being similarly enabled and empowered (Baker et al, 2004: 34).  I recognise 
that such notions may seem utopian, and that trying to establish prefigurative 
communities within societies that are deeply unequal is difficult (Cooper, 2004).  
Still, it is preferable to have aspirational conceptions of power relations rather than 
simply to accept power inequalities, and I nevertheless assert that utopia is useful in 
exploring alternative visions of society (Baker, 2015; Harding, 2011). 
 
Equality of condition has been suggested to encompass five key dimensions: 
resources; respect and recognition; love, care and solidarity; working and learning; 
and power (Baker et al, 2004).  In the thesis, I am especially focused on the 
dimensions of respect and recognition (entailing, according to Baker et al (2004), the 
freedom to live one’s life without being the subject of contempt from the dominant 
culture); working and learning (meaning that it is ensured that everyone is able to 
develop their talents and abilities, and has a real choice amongst occupations that they 
find satisfying or fulfilling), and power (Baker et al, 2004).  Respect and recognition, 
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which has some overlap with Fraser’s (2003) above paradigm of ‘recognition’, is 
integral to this research.  It entails that we should celebrate individual and cultural 
differences whilst simultaneously engaging critically in dialogue with others, with our 
cultural assumptions being open to challenge (Baker, 2001).  As to working and 
learning, this understanding of equality requires that the benefits and burdens of work 
are more equally shared.  Specifically with reference to care work, it entails that work 
of this nature should be acknowledged and shared, with the implication being of a 
rebalancing of other work so that everyone is able to engage in it (Baker et al, 2004).  
Equality of working and learning also rejects discriminatory access to employment, 
and can be expressed as a criticism of “engrained divisions of labour” (Baker and 
Lewis, 2010).  Finally, Baker et al (2004) conceive of their dimension of power as 
challenging power inequalities in areas such as the family, which includes rejecting 
the power of husbands over wives (in favour of greater egalitarianism, democracy and 
cooperation). 
 
Adding to this, my work draws influence from Cooper’s (2000; 2004) contentions that 
all people should have the same capacity to impact on their environment, and her 
focus on the social and institutional support required for people to be able to 
participate economically, culturally and socially.  Cooper’s (2001) version of equal 
power encompasses technologies that currently allow some people to generate effects 
that others are denied, and it extends to the social world, as well as to the operation of 
the state’s power.  This is because, in order to attain a more equal society, we need to 
engage in processes of wider change and challenge to heteronormativity.  I argue that 
the narrow legal approaches adopted to equality in the cases that I have analysed are 
unhelpful, on the basis that, “social asymmetries […] cannot be tackled in isolation 
from normative-epistemological organising principles which naturalize and legitimate 
the status quo” (Cooper, 2000: 271).  Equality needs to be conceived of less as a 
“state of social being”, and more as a driving force for the examination of terrains 
across which social inequality plays out (Cooper, 2000: 272).  It is only as a result of 
such political engagement and struggle that legal actors, and society, might get past 
specific, inherited identity categories and consider the potential (and actual) diversity 
of the law’s subjects.  Such endeavours are necessary given that, as Fineman (2008: 
23) stresses, “equality must be a […] guarantee that is a benefit for all”. 
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However, case law, as Monk (2015: 184) emphasises, whilst providing, “a window 
into and an account of the lives of real people”, is in itself a weak source.  Case law is 
atypical, with very few conflicts ever reaching the appellate courts, and it is in this 
context that the significance of my work becomes apparent (Monk, 2015).  Through 
conducting empirical work with solicitors, I make an original contribution to 
knowledge by exploring in greater depth the extent to which legal actors are 
approaching same-sex financial relief matters with pre-existing assumptions and 
expectations in mind.  On top of this, through the use of interviews and an online 
questionnaire, I examine the compatibility of those assumptions with the lives and 
attitudes of modern day same-sex couples.  My findings carry the potential to impact 
wider issues such as child care arrangements, employment patterns, and the 
involvement of the welfare state in family life.  This is because the law of financial 
remedies speaks not only to what husbands and wives ought to do in relation to one 
another, but also to what functions they should perform in terms of society more 
broadly.  In the chapter that follows, I will explain the nature of my empirical project 
in further detail. 
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Chapter 3- Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I provide a critical overview of the methodological and analytical 
approaches that I use in the rest of my thesis.  In the first part, I explain my reasoning 
for using both quantitative and qualitative data collection phases in my project.  I use 
the term ‘qualitative’ to refer to those aspects of my work that principally use words 
as data, whereas ‘quantitative’ is employed to describe those aspects that focus on 
counts and measures (Gorard and Taylor, 2004).  I then proceed to describe the 
empirical components of my research, which consisted of an online questionnaire 
(301 respondents) and semi-structured interviews (with 14 solicitors and 10 people 
who had sought legal advice on civil partnership dissolution), before offering my 
methodological reflections.  I argue that the use of a mixed methods approach allows 
researchers not only to draw from the strengths of both methods, but also to establish 
a more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
 
Mixed methods research: adopting a pragmatic approach 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods in a single study 
has traditionally been discouraged.   This is due to the widespread application of 
Kuhn’s (1962) notion of the “paradigm”, which has been taken to mean, “a 
consensual set of beliefs and practices that guide a field” (Morgan, 2007: 49).  
Researchers have long considered qualitative and quantitative work as falling under 
two separate “paradigms” in social science methodology.  The ‘quantitative 
paradigm’ has been viewed as drawing heavily on positivism, this being the belief 
that objects’ existence stems from their measurement (Cook and Payne, 2002).  
Positivists conceive of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ as existing objectively, independent of 
human perception (Perlesz and Lindsay, 2003).  Hence, Durkheim (1966) argued that 
the concern of sociology should be the relationship between “social facts”, and that 
investigation into individuals’ subjective understandings was unnecessary.  As against 
this, the ‘qualitative paradigm’ has been linked to constructivism, which holds that 
there are multiple ‘truths’ depending on the way that one constructs ‘reality’ (Sale et 
al, 2002).  Constructivists argue that there is no access to ‘reality’ independent to our 
minds, and that all that research is able to generate is an interpretation of what is seen 
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by the researcher; research participants provide their own interpretations, which the 
researcher reinterprets (Smith, 1983; Gilbert, 2008).  They dispute the notion of a 
single, external referent against which claims of ‘truth’ can be compared, and deny 
the possibility of measuring and observing human behaviour in the way that we might 
phenomena in the natural world (Banakar and Travers, 2005). 
 
A divisive approach has been applied to the qualitative and quantitative research 
“paradigms”, with the “incompatibility thesis” (which posits that the two 
methodologies can, and must, not be mixed) having been adhered to by ‘purists’ from 
both camps (Howe, 1988).  One aspect of this thesis has been Kuhn’s (1962) idea of 
“incommensurability”, entailing that an acceptance of one paradigm necessitates a 
rejection of all others, and that knowledge is unable to pass between paradigms (as a 
consequence of communication barriers).  A result has been that two distinct 
subcultures have emerged, one of which praises their “hard”, generalisable data and 
dismisses the other as “naval-gazers”, whilst the other commends their own, “deep, 
rich” data and disparages number crunching (Sieber, 1973; Fielding and Fielding, 
1986).  Quantitative researchers have criticised qualitative techniques for lacking in 
precision, as well as for being “impressionistic” and subjective  (Bryman, 2012).  By 
this, they mean that such researchers place too much importance on the researcher’s 
unsystematic opinions of what is significant.  In opposition, those favouring the 
qualitative approach have viewed the use of “rigid” instruments, such as 
questionnaires, as, “a source of surface information which relates to the social 
scientist’s abstract categories” (Fielding and Fielding, 1986; Bryman, 1988: 104).  
Moreover, they have asserted that quantitative methods are lacking in the contextual 
detail needed to interpret findings (Carey, 1993).  Both camps have held that their 
underlying logic is so different that to merge the two methodological approaches 
would be a betrayal of their epistemological and ontological commitments (Rossman 
and Wilson, 1985).  Indeed, Guba (1987: 31) once suggested that, “the one precludes 
the other just as surely as the belief in a round world precludes belief in a flat one.”  
 
As against this, I adopt a middle ground.  On the one hand, I accept that the notion of 
a universal ‘truth’ is flawed, given that “life is complicated” (an idea that Williams 
(1991: 10) emphasises as being, “of great analytic importance”).  I also consider that 
people’s accounts are, at least to some extent, both socially constructed and context-
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dependent.  That said, I further hold that a feminist emancipatory project such as mine 
benefits from some notion of shared ‘reality’ or experience.  A level of more general 
‘knowledge’ is necessary alongside more local ‘knowledge’ to enable us to critique 
social convention.  Besides this, we need to have relatively stable grounds for 
asserting the ways in which same-sex relationships are conducted before we are able 
to make claims about their potential to bring about change.  With this in mind, I have 
adopted the approach that, “great advantages can be obtained by creatively combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods”, and that the two should not be considered an 
“either/ or” (Filstead, 1979: 42; Denscombe, 2007). 
 
I argue that methods should be used as a “tool” to answer the research questions at 
hand, rather than constricting the scope of possible enquiry (Beyer, 1992).  Therefore, 
I favour a ‘pragmatic approach’, under which it is stressed that a false dichotomy 
exists between the qualitative and quantitative approaches to research (Newman and 
Benz, 1998).  There would certainly seem to be some areas of overlap between the 
two.  Firstly, the view might be taken (although a statistician would be unlikely to 
agree) that all data collection methods are ultimately analysed in a qualitative manner.  
This is on the basis of the contention that, “the act of analysis is an interpretation, and 
therefore of necessity a selective rendering, of the “sense” of the available data” 
(Bryman, 1988: 12).  Secondly, it has been claimed that quantitative researchers make 
subjective research decisions which mean that their interpretations of the data 
obtained cannot be entirely objective (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007).  Additionally, 
it has been observed that most methods of analysis make at least some use of numbers 
(Gorard and Taylor, 2004).  Accordingly, the emphasis in ‘pragmatic’ research shifts 
to “shared meaning and joint action”, with any notion that there are limits to the 
meaningful communication that can take place between the different approaches 
being dismissed (Morgan, 2007: 67).  Pragmatists reject the idea that different 
investigative techniques are exclusive to any individual perspective (Gilbert, 2008).  
They recognise that it is possible to separate methods from their philosophical 
traditions, and the focus is drawn away from the theoretical debate, which has worked 
to conceal the different ways that methods are being combined in reality (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2003; Maxwell, 1990).  Instead, they adopt a problem-driven approach, 
mixing and matching design components to obtain the most useful data (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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Thus, my initial reason for choosing to conduct a mixed methods strategy is that I 
decided to pursue “what works” best for answering my research questions (Howe, 
1988).  I considered the use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods 
most suitable because I am examining a range of wider questions, relating to how 
same-sex relationships can help to challenge constructions of gender, and more 
specific ones, pertaining to the experiences of those who have sought legal advice on 
civil partnership dissolution.  However, I felt that adopting such an approach would 
also carry a number of “synergistic benefit[s]” (Gilbert, 2008).  Greene et al (1989) 
have suggested that the use of a variety of methods facilitates the following: 
triangulation (referring to the practice of viewing things from more than one 
perspective in order to seek convergence and corroboration of the results); 
complementarity (entailing that the researcher enhances the results from one method 
with those of another); and expansion.  All three of these factored, to some degree, 
into my decision to employ both qualitative and quantitative investigative techniques. 
 
Turning to the more precise notion of triangulation as an exercise of testing findings 
against one another, there was intended to be an element of this to my research: the 
ways in which the clients presented their lives in the qualitative aspect of my study 
were to be checked against the responses received through the questionnaire.  
Nevertheless, I had anticipated from the beginning that these sources of data might 
offer different accounts.  This prediction was based on the fact that, whilst the clients 
would be in middle (or in the wake) of seeking a dissolution, the questionnaire 
respondents would be at a variety of different life stages.  Therefore, the purpose of 
examining the consistency of the data in my study was not necessarily to conduct a 
validation exercise, as has been traditionally associated with triangulation.  
Alternatively, it had the purpose of investigating how the potentially distorted reports 
of the clients compared against those whose circumstances were likely to be more 
stable.  In this way, I was using the comparison to explore the extent to which my 
results were divergent, an approach that does not seem compliant with ‘triangulation’ 
in the sense used by Greene et al (1989). 
 
That said, it might be argued that the term has been widely misinterpreted; where 
‘triangulation’ is used in navigation, the second bearing is not employed to verify the 
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first (Erzberger and Kelle, 2003).  Instead, the two complement one another.  In 
accordance with this, Gorard and Taylor (2004) have contended that, if triangulation 
is to be of any use in the social sciences, it is for this purpose of complementarity.  
The idea here is that qualitative and quantitative investigative techniques are used to 
measure similar, but different, aspects of the same phenomenon, resulting in an 
“enriched, elaborated” understanding (Greene et al, 1989).  On a pragmatic note, the 
complementarity mixed methods approach most closely describes the way that I chose 
to conduct this project given that, for example, whilst my client interviews covered 
the issue of the division of labour, my questionnaire asked more specific questions as 
to who conducted certain tasks in the respondents’ relationship.  Conversely, my 
questionnaire did not ask anything about the respondents’ experiences of seeking 
legal advice, whereas this was a key discussion topic in my interviews.   
 
My approach moreover drew on a wider notion of complementarity to the extent that 
it used the strengths of one method to enhance another (Sale et al, 2002).  
Particularly, the use of quantitative investigative techniques allowed me to “zoom 
out” to a greater scope by enabling me to generate findings on a macro level, whilst 
also offering precision where the qualitative work had provided ambiguity (Willems 
and Raush, 1969).  The employment of the two methods similarly permitted me to 
combine two separate emphases in a complementary fashion, namely my own 
concerns and the voices of my participants (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007).  More 
importantly, however, the complementarity mixed methods approach would seem to 
be in keeping with my position that there is not necessarily a unitary ‘truth’ but, 
rather, that it is informative to consider a range of perspectives (Brannen, 2005).  It 
appears beneficial to use qualitative and quantitative approaches in tandem should we 
accept, on the basis of complementarity, that there is inherent value in different data 
being produced by different collection methods.  I argue that mixed methods research 
encourages the juxtaposition of data to generate, “insights that together create a bigger 
picture” (Brannen, 2005: 12). 
 
The final benefit of pursuing a mixed methods research project identified by Greene 
et al (1989) was that of enabling ‘expansion’.  This involves the extension of the 
breadth of the research through the use of a variety of methods.  The manner in which 
I chose to conduct my project reflected an element of this: I was aiming to obtain 
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responses from a range of stakeholders to attain a broader and more comprehensive 
understanding of my research topic (Gilbert, 2008).  It is acknowledged that the 
qualitative and quantitative methods were perhaps not employed in my study in 
compliance with ‘expansion’ as envisaged by the aforementioned scholars.  This is in 
the sense that they were not strictly used to assess different components, with there 
being some degree of commonality.  Nevertheless, my work took influence from the 
notion on the basis that the two approaches (and a number of perspectives) were 
considered necessary to enable me to tell the ‘full story’.  It was intended that the use 
of qualitative methods (which provide thick description of complex phenomena) 
would help to build upon the relationships identified in my questionnaire data, and to 
illustrate how the patterns found applied in specific cases.  I argue that the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative investigative techniques provides a depth of insight into 
the meaning of research findings that would not be possible to achieve through the 
adoption of a mono-method approach.  Ultimately, as has been observed by Friedman 
(2009: 55), “neither stands on its own very well”.  I shall now proceed to explore the 
two phases of my empirical project in further detail. 
 
Quantitative methods 
For the initial phase, I decided to conduct an online questionnaire concerning the 
division of household labour and money earning/ financial management.  These topics 
were selected because the home has been described as a “gender factory”, and 
because money serves as a. “cultural symbol” of “power, control” and, conversely, 
“dependency” (Berk, 1985; Vogler, 2005: 3).  Not only this, but I assert that it is 
possible for everyday practices, in themselves, to be a political act.  I chose to focus 
my attention on lesbian and gay respondents due to the abundant data that already 
exists relating to the division of labour in different-sex couples.14  No exclusion 
criteria were used in terms of who was permitted to complete the questionnaire, 
although it was specified on the opening page that responses were particularly sought 
from those currently in a same-sex cohabiting relationship. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See chapter 4. 
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The questionnaire 
It is acknowledged that questionnaire use has been criticised for generating only a, 
“snapshot of how things are at the specific time at which the data are collected” 
(Denscombe, 2007: 7).  Furthermore, the use of quantitative methods has been 
considered problematic in feminist research, with such methods being viewed as, 
“value-neutral, […] dispassionate, disinterested, [...] protected from political interests, 
goals and desires” (Harding, 1987: 182).  Quantitative scholars have been disparaged 
for omitting to look critically at the processes through which research is produced and 
how the research process might reflect social inequality (Harding, 1987).  Yet, 
quantitative analysis has performed an important role in helping us to, “understand 
and challenge systems of inequality in many of its varied forms” and, in any event, 
“some feminist questions [simply] demand quantitative answers” (Harnois, 2013: 7; 
Risman et al, 1993: 608).  I opted for the use of a (predominantly) quantitative 
method because it was to provide a level of generality that was perhaps lacking from 
my interview research (Morgan, 2007).  It was to have the added benefits of not 
requiring me to take into account in the same way the impact of my own personal 
presence on the creation of the data, and of generating standardised answers (which 
would be comparable). 
 
I chose to use the Bristol Online Surveys service to conduct my questionnaire.  It was 
appreciated that opting for an Internet-based form of data collection posed the risk of 
under-representing certain groups, given that access to the Internet is greater amongst 
younger people and those from higher income brackets (Dutton et al, 2005).  The use 
of an Internet-based questionnaire has also been identified as tending to result in an 
over-representation of better qualified, more technically oriented respondents 
(Harding and Peel, 2007: 282).  That said, the questionnaire in respect to which that 
observation was made was conducted in 2004, and the Internet has changed 
significantly since then, as has access to it from across different social groups.  Even 
so, it would be difficult to claim that the data obtained through this kind of project 
could be representative, given that the extent of the population that are currently (or 
have previously been) in a form of same-sex cohabiting relationship is unknown to 
any degree of accuracy (Harding and Peel, 2007).  Data from the 2001 census 
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revealed that 78,522 people disclosed living in same-sex couples in England and 
Wales, whereas five times as many disclosed the same in the 2011 census (Office for 
National Statistics, 2004; Office for National Statistics, 2013b).  Whilst the 2011 
census data may present a more accurate picture, due to the lower level of stigma by 
that point, this does not mean that the numbers are now accurate.  As Weeks et al 
(1999: 45) acknowledge, achieving statistical representativeness amongst non-
heterosexuals is, “a notoriously elusive goal at the best of times”.  The achievement of 
a representative sample using an online questionnaire such as mine might seem 
particularly unattainable, as a result of the respondent population being self-selecting.  
Having not chosen participants at random from a defined population, it is not possible 
to make positivist empiricist claims relating to the ‘truth’ of my data (although, as 
previously set out, I do not necessarily conceive of the existence of a simple ‘truth’).  
However, it was felt that making use of the Internet would prove helpful, because it 
allows access to a broad sample (Gilbert, 2008).  Online questionnaire completion 
may additionally be considered advantageous from the respondent’s perspective, as it 
allows them anonymity and confidentiality (Harding, 2006). 
 
The questionnaire (see appendix A) was piloted by ten friends and colleagues, who 
checked the questions, and amendments were made prior to its launch.  In terms of 
structure, it consisted of three distinct parts.  It began with a set of ‘attribute’ 
questions, which dealt with such matters as the respondents’ and their partners’ 
gender, their ethnicity, their religion, their sexual orientation, their country of 
residence, their social class, their political views, their relationship status, and their 
and their partners’ occupation and level of education.  The second part of my 
questionnaire addressed the respondents’ behaviour.  It questioned who conducted the 
following tasks: childcare (if applicable); caring for a sick family member; car 
maintenance; cooking; dishwashing; DIY; gardening; general cleaning; grocery 
shopping; vacuuming; and ironing (1 = always me; 5 = always my partner).  
Participants were also asked whether they employed any help within the home, and 
how the household finances were conducted within their relationships.  The latter 
questions addressed such issues as bill paying, financial decision-making, what the 
gross annual household income amounted to, who the respondent considered the 
‘main earner’ to be, and whether the partners had joint and separate bank accounts.   
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The third part contained what Gilbert (2008) describes as “attitude” questions.  These 
were considered beneficial, as they allowed me to compare the respondents’ actions 
against their perceptions and views.  The questions in this third part were formulated 
as statements that the respondents could react to by selecting a point on a Likert scale.  
These ordinal scales assume that the strength or intensity of experience is linear 
(Rattray and Jones, 2007).  The questions asked participants to respond to statements 
that included the following: ‘my partner and I share household tasks equally’; ‘my 
partner and I always discuss major financial decisions’; and ‘my partner and I are 
financially independent’ (1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree). 
Whilst Likert scales are normally made up of five points, mine consisted of seven 
(incorporating ‘slightly agree’ and ‘slightly disagree’ options) as a result of feedback 
that I received at pilot stage.  I felt that adopting this expanded scale would provide 
more nuance, and that it may remove some of the potential for neutral responses.  At 
the end of the questionnaire, there was a web link to a separate questionnaire that 
allowed respondents to submit their e-mail address for the purpose of receiving a lay 
summary of the findings.  The fact that these addresses were kept separate from the 
questionnaire data meant that respondents could rest assured that they could not be 
linked up with their responses. 
 
The majority of the questions on the main questionnaire were formulated in a ‘tick 
box’ style, which meant that it was quick to fill in, and this was likely to have 
encouraged completion.  That said, I was aware that the use of fixed categories of 
answers can work to bias a questionnaire’s findings towards the researcher’s 
hypotheses, “channel[ing] responses away from the respondent’s perception of 
matters” (Denscombe, 2007: 171).  I attempted to overcome this difficulty by 
providing an ‘other’ category, and free text boxes, where appropriate.  These allowed 
participants to elaborate, whilst facilitating an expansion of the scope of the possible 
data generated beyond what I had envisaged at the earlier stages of my project (and 
the data were subsequently coded both inductively and deductively).  In this way, 
whilst most of my questions were aimed towards producing quantitative data, there 
were also qualitative portions of my questionnaire.  This went some distance to 
address the relative superficiality and intrinsic bias of data collected by questionnaires 
(although it still did not allow for the provision of detail concerning the “subtleties of 
social life” to the same extent as interviewing (Denscombe, 2007: 312)).  As 
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Friedman (2009: 55) suggests, “numbers are meaningless unless you flesh them out 
with some statement about how they relate to actual people and actual events”. 
 
My questionnaire was live online between the months of July and October 2013.  My 
quantitative data collection phase was over, for the most part, by the time that I began 
interviewing in September 2013, so the data emanating from my questionnaire was 
not really used to influence the way that my interviews were conducted.  Moreover, 
ethical approval for both phases was sought at the same time, meaning that the 
interview schedules and questionnaire were designed at the same time.  This might 
appear to go against the notion of complementarity, which would suggest an element 
of interactivity between the qualitative and quantitative aspects.  It was, though, a 
product of the time constraints of a doctoral project.  I recruited participants for this 
aspect of my study through a number of strategies, drawing on strategic opportunistic 
and snowball sampling approaches: e-mailing 71 lesbian and gay organisations, 
mailing lists and publications that might potentially take an interest (I found those by 
conducting Internet searches for the phrases ‘LGBT network’, ‘LGBT group’ and 
‘LGBT magazine’, as well using the term ‘LGBT’ combined with the names of a 
number of major cities); using Twitter to ‘tweet’ 116 individuals and groups, and 
making use of ‘hash tags’ such as ‘#LGBT’, ‘#LGBTQ’ and ‘#LGBTfamilies’; and 
posting on the notice boards of two online forums (pertaining to ‘rainbow families’ 
and ‘relationships’, as well as ‘discussion, chat and gossip’).  I sent further e-mails to 
four academic contacts, asking them to forward on the details of the project to people 
that they thought might be willing to participate.  I felt that I was more able to draw 
on personal contacts in this context, as confidentiality was not quite such a concern 
here as it was in my interviewing phase.  Besides this, I sought to encourage my 
contacts to ‘share’ a recruitment advertisement on Facebook. 
 
It is, of course, difficult to comment on the ultimate success of any particular one of 
these tactics, given that I am unable to ascertain where each of the questionnaire 
respondents obtained the details of my study.  Nonetheless, 301 people answered my 
questionnaire who were in a same-sex relationship, a number that greatly exceeded 
my initial target of 150 respondents.  I classified ‘same-sex’ as being where the 
respondent provided identical responses for their own and their partner’s gender.  
Therefore, I included in my analysis respondents that classified both themselves and 
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their partner as ‘genderqueer’, and that referred to them both as ‘transgender’. I also 
included two responses where the participant had specified that they did not presently 
have a partner, but where they had subsequently answered that they identified as gay.  
An additional 57 people responded who were in a different-sex relationship.  
However, I will not be using their data for this project, as I have chosen to focus on 
same-sex couples, and in any event I am not intending to engage in a direct 
comparative exercise between same and different-sex relationships.  Of those 
respondents that reported being in a different-sex couple, 7 were bisexual. Their data 
were not included in my analysis on this occasion, as they may have answered with 
respect to their current relationship.  In total, 138 people expressed an interest in 
receiving a summary of my findings. 
 
Table 3.1 provides outline demographic information for the 301 same-sex 
participants.  The majority of respondents were women (n = 211, 70.1%), which 
might be accounted for by the fact that my recruitment advertisement featured in a 
lesbian publication with a large readership, and on the notice boards of a popular 
lesbian chat forum.  Of these women, 167 (79.1%) classified themselves as being a 
lesbian, 20 (9.5%) as bisexual and 14 (6.6%) as gay.  Of the 87 male respondents, 79 
(90.8%) considered themselves gay and three (3.4%) bisexual.  In terms of sexuality, 
an ‘other’ response was offered, in relation to which 11 respondents in total specified 
that they were queer, two that they were pansexual, two that they did not assign a 
label to themselves, and one that they were non-heterosexual.   Participants were 
overwhelmingly white (n = 283, 94%), with a large proportion answering that they 
were of no religion (n = 211, 70.1%) and that they had no disability (n = 267, 88.7%).  
A majority lived in England (n = 236, 78.4%) and self-defined as middle class (n = 
210, 69.8%).  Respondents most commonly described themselves as cohabiting (n = 
156, 51.8%), with fewer having entered into a civil partnership or marriage (n = 132, 
43.8%). 
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Table 3.1. Questionnaire demographics for respondents currently, or previously, in same-sex relationships 
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* Where totals do not add to n = 301/ 100%, this is due to missing responses 
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Methodological reflections: questionnaire use 
The first, and most substantial, problem encountered during this phase of my research 
was that, at the point at which I was using Bristol Online Surveys, it was not possible 
to amend a questionnaire subsequent to having launched it.  The fixed nature of a 
questionnaire might be contrasted against methods such as interviewing, where the 
researcher is able to develop their enquiries (Genn, 2009).  It proved to be particularly 
frustrating, as an error was made in translating the questionnaire across from Word, 
and a question concerning the respondents’ age did not feature in the final version.  
Unfortunately, this error was not picked up whilst the questionnaire was being piloted 
and, by the time that I had discovered it, I was unable to correct it.  This was because 
I had already obtained a number of responses to the original questionnaire, and I had 
sent out the relevant link to a number of organisations (meaning that I would have 
needed to have launched a new questionnaire with a different web address in order to 
rectify the omission).  The occurrence had limiting effects when it came to analysing 
the data, as it meant that I was unable to investigate the influence of age as a factor. 
 
A second practical issue to which the participants alerted me was the lack of a ‘back’ 
button on my questionnaire (given that Bristol Online Surveys did not offer such a 
facility).  A few respondents contacted me to report that they had either accidentally 
skipped ahead by unintentionally clicking to proceed, or that they had planned to 
return to a question and subsequently found themselves unable to do so.  I am unsure 
of the extent to which this impacted on my data, given that I am unable to distinguish 
between purposeful and accidental missing responses.  Thirdly, there were also some 
ambiguities in the questions that had not become apparent at pilot stage.  These were 
problematic because questionnaires work on the assumption that, “the researcher and 
respondents share underlying assumptions about language”, and interpret question 
wording similarly  (Rattray and Jones, 2007: 235).  For example, whilst participants 
were provided with the option to answer that they were either ‘widowed’ or 
‘cohabiting’, the question was later raised as to what response should be provided 
where the respondent had previously been widowed but had subsequently proceeded 
to cohabit. 
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Fourthly, as is touched on above, I appreciated from the outset that the respondents 
may have felt restricted in completing my questionnaire, given that they were required 
to answer the questions that I had formulated using the answers that I had provided 
(Gilbert, 2008).  In this respect, the participants did occasionally express 
dissatisfaction that they were unable to provide the detail that they had considered 
important.  For instance, in the space offered for supplying details of equal division, 
one participant made the point that, “you haven’t asked how long we’ve been together 
– 15 years”.  Another e-mailed to explain that she had felt unable to set out her 
personal motives for dividing household labour in the way that she had (given that the 
questionnaire specifically asked for elaboration as to how household tasks were 
equally shared).  This reinforces a previously made criticism that the employment of 
such research methods, “rules out the possibility of understanding the process by 
which people come to adopt particular values of behaviours” (May, 2001: 112).  
Statistics are descriptive, and they tend not to enable you to answer questions as to 
“why”.  I explained to the participant that I was additionally planning to conduct 
qualitative work, and that this would enable me to develop a greater understanding of 
people’s perspectives, social process and context. 
 
Once the data had been collected, they were imported onto IBM SPSS Statistics 
version 21, and chi-square and t-tests were conducted.  It is recognised that I may 
have had a more substantial impact on my data at this stage, given that I recoded some 
of the responses to gain valid outcomes for the statistical tests.  For example, I 
recoded household income into deciles and contracted some of my Likert responses.  
Whilst it was essential to do so in order to work around the constraints of my data, I 
was simultaneously imposing my own structure on them (although, of course, this is 
the case with all statistical data).  Consequently, a qualitative phase to the project was 
further considered necessary, given its greater potential to allow my respondents’ 
concerns to come to the fore. 
 
Qualitative methods 
The qualitative aspect of my research concentrated on family solicitors and their 
clients.  Therefore, I decided to focus both on the “dispossessed” and the “locally 
powerful” (termed as such by Herman (1994) and Smart (1984)).  My gaze was 
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turned towards the lawyers, as well as towards the parties, in dissolution matters 
because I am seeking to examine whether advice practices are working to reproduce 
the dominant family structure.  I chose to look at solicitors (rather than barristers or 
judges) given that financial issues on relationship breakdown will tend to be resolved 
without entering into contested proceedings (Hitchings et al, 2013).  On top of this, as 
Smart (1984: 149) emphasises, the law, “is not exclusively encompassed by case law 
and the discourse of high-ranking judges”, but is also, “what fairly low-ranking 
solicitors do every day”.  My choice of focus was motivated by a recognition of the 
key role performed by solicitors in financial relief matters, as part of which they 
“translate personal conflicts into legally recognisable categories of dispute” (Smart, 
1984: 160).  They form a central part of the “interpretive community’ that control, 
“the forms of closure that define the legal field as a domain of expert knowledge and 
practice” (Baker et al, 2004: 120). 
 
Interviews 
The reasoning behind my choice to conduct interviews was to obtain multiple 
perspectives on the dealings between legal professionals and their clients.  I 
considered it important to hear how things are working ‘on the ground’, as opposed to 
conducting library-based research, as that would best enable the gathering of 
information about how dissolution matters are playing out in practice.  I opted to 
conduct in-depth, face-to-face interviewing (where possible) because it would provide 
me with the opportunity to explore the solicitors’ and clients’ experiences and 
thoughts in detail (May, 2001).  In my interviews, I utilised a semi-structured 
interview schedule (see appendices D and E), which meant that I had identified 
beforehand the issues that I wished to address.  The idea behind this was to provide a 
greater structure for comparability than one would tend to have if conducting an 
unstructured interview (May, 2001).  However, I was prepared to be flexible in order 
to probe beyond my respondents’ answers, enabling me to explore the meaning 
contexts of their utterances (Lee, 1993).  This flexibility was further intended to give 
my respondents the opportunity to develop their ideas and explain their views 
(Gilbert, 2008).  This was important as, given that my research concentrates on the 
potential imposition of heteronormative structures, I sought not to impose structures 
of my own.  I asked the participants broad questions (encouraging them to, “tell me a 
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bit about your experience of…?”), the purpose of which was to allow them to answer 
on their own terms.  The approach sought to ensure that my research questions were 
addressed, whilst providing scope for the emergence of unanticipated issues 
(Hitchings, 2010). 
 
Prior to pursuing my interviewing phase, I obtained ethical approval from the 
Birmingham Research Ethics committee (and the same is true of my questionnaire, 
although there I foresaw no significant risks to the questionnaire participants).  
Appendices to the application included the participant information sheet relating to 
my solicitor and client interviews (see appendix C for an example), my interview 
schedules (see appendices D and E), the demographic information form for the 
interviews (see appendix F), and the consent forms (see appendix G for an example), 
alongside the questionnaire itself (see appendix A), and the participant information 
sheet for the same (see appendix B).  A particular issue flagged up in response to the 
application was the degree of risk to which I was exposed when attending clients’ 
homes to interview.  To minimise this, I agreed to inform a friend of the address that I 
would be attending, and to contact them afterwards confirming my safety.  I 
additionally explained in the form that I would respect the anonymity of respondents 
and the confidentiality of information supplied, although adding that confidentiality 
could only be preserved so far as the law permits.  I identified the possibility that 
professional malpractice might come to light within the solicitor interviews, in which 
case I was to raise this matter internally with the solicitor’s employers (this was not 
something that ultimately occurred).  In terms of the clients, given that I was seeking 
to interview these people at a difficult time in their lives, I agreed to bring contact 
details for support organisations. 
 
As to the recruitment strategies utilised, whilst seeking solicitors to participate in this 
aspect of my research, I expanded my search further afield than Birmingham.  This 
was due to the small size of the city’s LGBT community, and the consequent risk of 
identification.  I selected firms to contact through conducting an Internet search for 
the term ‘civil partnership dissolution solicitor’.  I felt that e-mailing individual 
solicitors would be most effective, as it would enable me to bypass administrative 
staff and managers.  For this reason, I examined the firms’ websites to establish 
whether any of the solicitors’ individual profiles specified that they had experience of 
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advising on civil partnership dissolution.  Where I was unable to locate this 
information, I e-mailed the heads of the firms’ family departments.  In the event that 
no more specific contact information was available on the websites, I telephoned the 
firms’ offices.  In total, I contacted 291 solicitors’ firms, of which 14 solicitors from 
10 different firms agreed to participate in one or more element of my research.  
Whilst I did manage to exceed my aim of interviewing a total of 10 solicitors, this is a 
fairly low response rate.  My experience in this respect complied with Bell’s (1978) 
account of the problems of ‘studying up’ the powerful.  In relation particularly to 
legal practitioners, Macauley (2009: 19) emphasises that, “lawyers are busy, and they 
always feel pressed for time.”  This was confirmed by the responses that I received 
from several solicitors informing me that they would be unable to engage in the 
research due to a confluence of hearings. 
 
In addition to this, though, it soon became clear that many of the firms that I 
contacted had not conducted many civil partnership matters to date.  This is, perhaps, 
somewhat unsurprising, given that the first dissolutions of recognised civil 
partnerships happened in quarter 2 of 2007, and that only 3,466 dissolutions had taken 
place in the UK by the end of 2013 (with 66,730 civil partnerships having formed up 
to the same point) (Office for National Statistics, 2015).  The figure represents a small 
proportion of relationship breakdown matters over that timespan, with 719,075 
divorces having been recorded between 2007-2012 in England and Wales alone 
(Office for National Statistics, 2014b).  Accordingly, some solicitors were unwilling 
to participate by reason of their lack of exposure to this type of matter.  I had also 
hoped to obtain, through the solicitors, introductions to their civil partner clients in 
order to recruit client interview participants (as did Sarat and Felstiner (2009) in their 
study on divorce lawyers and their clients).  However, even where the solicitors 
themselves were willing to participate in my study, a number displayed a reluctance 
to grant me access to their clients.  Furthermore, even where the solicitors did 
encourage their clients to partake, the clients were often still not forthcoming.  As 
Auchmuty (2013) acknowledged, people are “disillusioned” by dissolution, preferring 
to talk about the celebratory aspect of civil partnership.  As a result, I was only able to 
‘match up’ the first two clients with their solicitors in terms of interviewing. 
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In consequence, I found it necessary to adopt an alternative strategy to recruit client 
interviewees.  Plans for this eventuality were included in my application for ethical 
approval.  I initially e-mailed an advertisement to 217 lesbian and gay organisations, 
mailing lists and publications with a potential interest in the subject.  This was the 
most fruitful tactic that I used to generate participants, especially when my e-mail was 
circulated around a number of trade union LGBT groups.  I subsequently used Twitter 
to ‘tweet’ the details of the project, and directly ‘tweeted’ 87 people and organisations 
asking them to ‘retweet’.  I made use of relevant ‘hash tags’, such as ‘#LGBT’, 
‘#LGBTQ’ and ‘#LGBTfamilies’, to ensure that my ‘tweet’ would come up in the 
results of relevant searches, and ‘tweeted’ the link of a project blog that I set up on 
‘Wordpress’.  Besides this, I either sent, or delivered in person, posters advertising my 
research to 13 lesbian and gay centres and venues, and wrote on the notice boards of 
two online forums (pertaining to ‘rainbow families’ and ‘relationships’, as well as 
‘discussion, chat and gossip’).  I had planned to use Facebook too, although 
established that it would not be possible to access the majority of these groups 
without becoming a member. 
 
Whilst the use of this combination of strategies generated the further eight 
participants that I needed to reach my client target of 10, access was a concern for a 
significant portion of the nine-month interviewing phase.  That said, perhaps this was 
only to be expected, given that I was seeking to reach such a small portion of the 
population: those who had experienced civil partnership dissolution, had sought legal 
advice, and were willing to engage in an interview.  Although, in the earlier stages, I 
had planned only to interview people who had sought legal advice in the past two 
years (given that their reports would be likely to be most reflective of recent 
practices), I proceeded to widen this out to anyone who had sought legal advice.  This 
was so as not to unrealistically narrow down my potential respondent pool.  
Nevertheless, it is recognised that the sample obtained was relatively small.  Whilst it 
must be stressed that I conducted the research alone on a limited timescale, this 
element of my work risks the accusation of being too local and specific (May, 2001).  
It might be felt important for my data to be generalisable if it is accepted that the 
purpose of empirical socio-legal research is to help us to better understand society.  
Yet, I argue that, despite their limitations, the recruitment and sampling processes 
followed in this research can be understood, at least, as offering some enlightenment 
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as to contemporary discourse around civil partnership dissolution for clients and 
solicitors. 
 
Table 3.2. Interview demographics 
 Solicitors (14) Clients (10) 
Gender 
           Female 








           20-29 years 
           30-39 years 
           40-49 years 
           50-59 years 













           White British 







           Reported disability 








           No religion 
           Christian 
           Hindu 
           Jewish 











           Bisexual 
           Gay 
           Heterosexual 
           Lesbian 












Self-defined social class 
           Middle class 
           Working class 









           Conservative 
           Liberal Democrat 
           Labour 
           Other 













Table 3.2 provides outline demographic information for my interview participants.  I 
interviewed five male and nine female solicitors, and 11 of these identified as 
heterosexual, two as lesbian and one as gay.  The solicitors ranged from 28 to 59 
years of age and, whilst twelve were white and two were Asian in ethnicity, six 
considered themselves Christians, five had no religion, one was a Hindu, one was 
Jewish, and one a Sikh.  The solicitors were located in the Southwest and Southeast of 
England, Greater London and the Midlands.  Unfortunately, no Northern English or 
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Welsh solicitors volunteered to be interviewed.  I sought to recruit rural solicitors as 
well as city ones, although none of my interviewees would ultimately be considered 
as working in a particularly rural practice (this may be because the rural firms have 
dealt with fewer civil partnership matters).  I interviewed 12 of the solicitors in their 
offices, one in a coffee shop, and one over the telephone.  They dealt with cases 
concerning a range of assets, from modest amounts to multi-million pound ‘big 
money’ matters, and, although one estimated having advised on 50 civil partnership 
cases, one had no direct experience of a dissolution. 
 
In terms of the clients, I interviewed six men and four women.  It is interesting that 
more men than women should have come forward, given that a greater proportion of 
female civil partnerships have broken down than males (8.4%, as against 4.5%, by the 
end of 2013 (Office for National Statistics, 2015)).  This might be because men are, 
on average, wealthier than women, and so may be more likely to seek legal advice on 
relationship breakdown (Auchmuty, 2015).  Of the clients that I interviewed, six 
identified as gay, two as lesbians, one as both, and one as bisexual.  They ranged from 
38 to 54 years of age, with a mean age of 45 (falling on the older side of the average 
age at dissolution, which was 39.4 years in England and Wales in 2013 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2015)).  Six considered themselves middle class, and four thought 
of themselves as working class.  All of the clients were white, and seven answered 
that they were of no religion, whilst three identified as Christians.  Two had a 
disability, and the clients resided in locations across Greater London and the 
Midlands.  Their assets ranged from very little to significant (see appendix H for basic 
relationship details) and, whilst three were in the process of dissolution and asset 
division, seven had completed this process. Of those seven, one had had their matter 
resolved by the courts, three had settled through the use of solicitors, and three had 
settled between themselves, having received initial legal advice.  The partners’ 
relationships varied in length: whilst one client had been with her partner for 25 years, 
a further one spent only a week living with her civil partner, with there having been a 
prior year of cohabitation.   Two were interviewed at their solicitor’s offices, three 
were interviewed in a meeting room at their workplace, three at their home, one in a 
hotel lounge, and one over the telephone. 
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Methodological reflections: interviewing 
As with the questionnaire, a number of practical difficulties arose during the course of 
my interviewing phase.  Turning to the professional interviews, firstly, the flexibility 
of my interviewing approach resulted in the solicitors frequently trying to push their 
own interests and agendas, rather than answering the question at hand.  I found that I 
was trying to achieve the difficult balance of steering the conversation back ‘on-
track’, whilst not making the participant feel that I was not interested in what they had 
to say.  Secondly, I felt that, on occasion, the solicitors were making somewhat 
homophobic comments.  Whilst I did not wish to endorse those, I also did not want to 
discourage them from speaking, so I would seek to respond to them in a non-
committal fashion (such as saying, “mmm”).  Thirdly, quite a few of the solicitors 
asked me for my opinions, alongside what my research findings had been to date.  
Under those circumstances, I emphasised that the purpose of the interview was for me 
to elicit their views and that, whilst I could not comment on my data as it had not yet 
been analysed, I would send them a summary in due course.  Fourthly, I was aware of 
the fact that, in the context of this artificial discursive environment, people like to 
“entertain you” (Macauley, 2009).  As a consequence, they often choose to tell you, 
“the best story that they’ve got”, as opposed to what they consider to be an accurate 
account of events and experiences (Macauley, 2009: 22).  This, of course, posed a 
further limitation in terms of the representativeness of the data gathered. 
 
Fifthly, the practitioners (and, to a lesser extent, the clients) seemed, at times, to be 
trying to second-guess what I was ‘getting at’ through asking any particular question.  
This fits in with Denscombe’s (2007) observation that interview respondents may feel 
under pressure to supply answers to “fit in” with what they believe the interviewer 
expects of them, and to tailor their answers to comply with what they believe the 
researcher’s point of view to be.  Where I considered this to be the case, I sought to 
assure them that I was not specifically ‘getting at’ anything, and that I was genuinely 
interested in obtaining their thoughts.  Sixthly, I perceived that the solicitors might 
have been made to feel “under the microscope” whilst being interviewed, as though 
being somehow scrutinised or tested (Denscombe, 2007: 206).  I was aware that, as 
professionals, they may have wanted to answer the questions in a way that reflected 
favourably on themselves and their practice (Durand and Chantler, 2014).  Finally, 
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one solicitor had to ask me to cut the interview short, and to return another time, due 
to a court commitment.  This return date ended up taking place over a month later 
and, whilst I re-listened to the first part of the interview beforehand to refresh my 
memory, the break interrupted the ‘flow’ of the conversation.  On a related note, there 
was a problem of recall more generally, as the solicitors could often not remember the 
details of cases that they had previously worked on (given that they had since, for 
example, been on maternity leave, or moved firm). 
 
As to the clients, the most challenging obstacle faced was the participants’ emotional 
state (similarly identified by Brannen (1988) in exploring topics such as relationship 
difficulties).  This meant not only that they were they sometimes unwilling to answer 
my questions, but also that they were likely to have perceived themselves as having 
performed a more substantial role in the relationship than if they were reflecting at 
another point in time.  On top of this, some clients expressed embarrassment about 
discussing private matters such as money (correspondingly reported by Bennett, 
2013).  Where this happened, I was careful to emphasise that they were not obliged to 
answer anything that they did not wish to.  A further difficulty was that a few of the 
clients expressed a wish for me to offer them legal advice.  In that event, I stressed 
that I did not have ethical approval to offer such advice and, as an upshot of me doing 
so, one potential interviewee withdrew her consent to participate.  Added to this, the 
audio recordings were sometimes not as clear as I had hoped, as a result of 
background noise having been picked up by my device.  That was a particular concern 
during the interview that took place in the hotel (as well as during the solicitor 
interview held in the coffee shop).  Lastly, in terms of the telephone interview that I 
conducted, I found this challenging to the extent that it was much more difficult to 
gauge the emotions of the client than it was face-to-face.  A problem posed was my 
inability to see the participant’s body language and facial expressions.  Moreover, it 
was tricky to work out whether the client was simply pausing, or whether they had 
finished answering the question.  This meant that I unintentionally interrupted my 
interviewee at times (which similarly occurred in the solicitor interview that took 
place over the telephone, although less so). 
 
On completion of the interviews, I transcribed them myself verbatim, removing 
identifying information.  This had the advantage of allowing me to become familiar 
	   80	  
with the data.  Participants were given pseudonyms, with clients being assigned first 
names and practitioners surnames.  My decision to do this was by no means to 
suggest that the solicitors carry more authority, but instead to allow readers of my 
research to distinguish between the two bodies of interviewees (and to avoid the use 
of codes, which can become clunky).  The transcripts were imported onto NVivo 10, 
and this software was used to assist me in conducting thematic analysis, which entails 
searching across a data set to find “repeated patterns of meaning” (Braun and Clarke, 
2006: 86).  Codes were generated both inductively and deductively.  NVivo proved a 
useful tool for analysis, given the way in which it invites the user to think about 
themes as ‘trees’ of interrelated ideas (see appendix I, which sets out the node trees 
that I created for my project).  This facilitates the consideration of possible hierarchies 
between codes at an early stage.  Not only this, but the way in which the programme 
groups together all text pertaining to a particular theme enables data to be quickly 
located.  However, one also needs to be aware of the risk that using NVivo poses with 
regard to decontextualising data, given that it encourages its users to focus on chunks 
of coded text rather than the entirety of the transcripts (Fielding and Lee, 1998).  
Furthermore, whereas the software operates to encourage analysis that is increasingly 
more finely grained, a researcher will tend to want to begin with finely grained codes 
and subsequently to work towards developing over-arching themes.  I often resorted 
to using pen and paper to work out which codes worked together. 
 
In analysing the data, I was cognisant that the statements of interview respondents can 
be impacted both by the context of the interview and by the personal identity of the 
interviewer.  I anticipated from the outset that what was most likely to be of relevance 
here, especially in relation to the client respondents, was my impact as a heterosexual 
interviewer.  I was mindful that the data that I would obtain would be unique, and that 
it might differ from that which might have been acquired by a lesbian interviewer 
(who may have been able to engage the research participants more easily (Dwyer and 
Buckle, 2009)).  This notion is supported by Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) assertion that 
qualitative research findings are mutually generated as a result of the interactive link 
between the investigator and participant.  In fact, I found myself in an interesting 
position in this aspect of my research, because I might be classified an “outsider” with 
respect to my sexuality, whilst simultaneously being an “insider” amongst the family 
lawyers (having qualified as a family solicitor).  Given my “insider” status, it might 
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have been considered difficult for me to study the solicitors as a neutral, detached 
observer to the same extent as my client interviewees (Merton, 1972).   Conversely, 
whilst it was to be less problematic for me to separate my personal experiences from 
those of my client participants, it might be perceived hard for me to truly understand 
their situations and experiences without having also experienced them first-hand 
(Kanuha, 2000). 
 
In terms my status as an “outsider”, I am aware that Herman (1994) suggested that her 
lesbian and gay interview respondents trusted her partly as a consequence of her being 
able to present herself as “a lesbian”.   It is notable that none of my interviewees 
actually posed a question concerning my sexuality.  This experience contrasts against 
Oakley’s (1981) report on her study on motherhood, where she explains that her 
participants asked her questions back (and, similarly, against the practitioner 
interviews, where I was sometimes asked about my professional background).  My 
client interviewees did, though, appear to make their own assumptions, which are 
likely to have impacted their answers.  I noticed, amongst the lesbian interviewees, 
that they referred to “us” (as to which, I felt that they might have been including me), 
whilst one of the male participants reported that:  
 
What I found difficult was relaying, umm, you know […] quite a personal 
conversation and, kind of, personal events within out relationship with a – no 
disrespect – but, a straight woman (Isaac).   
 
I realise that my heterosexual identity may have caused my interviewees to view me 
as what Herman (1994) terms “one of those” in relation to my sexuality, adding to the 
hostility that they may already have felt towards me as “one of those” academics.  It 
might, likewise, have caused them to view our interviewer-interviewee relationship as 
a hierarchical (and ‘unequal’) one, given that I do not share my participants’ 
subordinated position in a society in which heterosexuality dominates.  Oakley (1981) 
has argued that such a relationship is not conducive to successfully finding out 
information about people, and my respondents may felt a lack of shared identification 
to such an extent as to effect their fullness in presenting their lives to me.  I was 
reluctant to disclose my heterosexuality, in case it made them feel obliged to tailor 
their accounts so as to be more compliant with heteronormativity. 
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It was apparent, as a result of such consideration, that I, as the interviewer, had the 
potential to impact my interview data.  Yet, the idea of the stark “insider/ outsider” 
dichotomy may be an oversimplification.  Dwyer and Buckle (2009) set out how, 
because of the interviewer’s role as a researcher, it is difficult for them to qualify as 
“complete insiders” in any event.  Similarly, they argue that, “the intimacy of 
qualitative research no longer allows us to remain true outsiders to the experience 
under study” (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 61).  In fact, Dwyer and Buckle (2009: 61) 
contend that an aspect that qualitative research adds to quantitative work is the way in 
which, in the former, researchers are, “firmly in all aspects of the research process and 
essential to it”. 
 
Conclusion 
The use of a mixed methods approach has traditionally been criticised from an 
epistemological perspective.  In addition to the problems associated with each method 
employed, adopting a combination poses organisational and intellectual challenges for 
the researcher.  Mixed methods not only involves a greater volume of data (which are 
time-consuming to collect and to analyse), but it requires the researcher to navigate, 
and become proficient at using, twice the amount of software.  Nonetheless, I argue 
that mixed methods research offers strengths that counterbalance the weaknesses of 
quantitative and qualitative methods alone, and generates more comprehensive 
evidence to assist in the answering of research questions.  Moreover, I assert that the 
use of such an approach is desirable in socio-legal projects that seek to study the 
complexities of our social world.  I contend that researchers that limit themselves to 
one method alone risk missing, “whole dimensions of social experience because their 
methodological repertoire or tradition limits their view” (Mason, 2006: 13).  On the 
contrary, choosing to generate data through a variety of methods enables the 
researcher to view this social world through different “windows”, or perspectives, as a 
result of which they are able to develop different types of understanding (Gilbert, 
2008).  I now proceed, in the next four chapters, to explore the responses offered by 
the participants to the questionnaire (chapter 4), before analysing the data obtained 
from my qualitative interviews (chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
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Chapter 4- Greater familial ‘equality’: domestic division in same-sex 
relationships 
 
In chapter 2, I outlined how the courts, in financial relief matters, have been unable to 
transcend prevailing models that derive from understandings of men and women 
taking on separate, gendered roles in intimate relationships.  In chapter 3, I set out my 
mixed methods approach to research.  This chapter is the first of four empirically 
grounded chapters situating lesbian and gay lives in relation to the heteronormative 
assumptions made by the law.  It explores the results of my online questionnaire into 
the division of care and household labour and the conduct of finances in same-sex 
relationships.15  It focuses on the home as a space where socially acceptable types of 
behaviour can be normalised or, indeed, contested (Baydar, 2012). 
 
As has previously been acknowledged, legal actors can be restricted by the facts of 
the matters before them, and current social norms feed into family law as practitioners 
and judges are exposed to them.  As to the nature of these norms, Ellison et al (2009: 
34) reported that over three quarters of mothers in their UK study stated that they 
have primary responsibility for childcare.  Likewise, the British Social Attitudes 
Survey (BSAS) tells us that women are over seven times more likely to care alone for 
a sick family member than men (Scott and Clery, 2013: 128).  The same survey 
described how women perform 70% of the laundry, 56% of household cleaning, and 
55% of cooking (Scott and Clery, 2013: 128).  The position is one of a traditional 
dichotomy, where women are ‘naturally’ associated with housework, and men with 
earning in the workplace (and, within the home, with DIY-type tasks alone).  This 
arguably holds the law back and helps to reinforce stereotypes. 
 
I contend, however, that such models of domestic life are not reflective of the lived 
‘realities’ of many couples, and my questionnaire results highlight the difficulties of 
relying on them in relation to same-sex partners.  This chapter presents the data 
obtained from the questionnaire to examine how cohabiting lesbian and gay partners 
understand and negotiate their familial roles.  I turn to my respondents’ accounts and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The format of this questionnaire was discussed in chapter 3. 
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in addressing my initial research question, highlight ways in which same-sex 
relationships hold the capacity to challenge ideas of gender complementarity, and 
heteronormative discourses around housework and childcare.  For the full set of data 
tables generated, see appendices J (chi-squares) and K (t-tests).  Amongst the 
participants’ reports, there was little to indicate that tasks were being apportioned out 
along ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ lines.  Moreover, the arrangements were often 
unaffected by factors such as gender, relationship status, income, social class, and 
disparity (or similarity) in the partners’ workforce status, which have been used to 
explain the division of labour in different-sex couples.  In this way, the research raises 
new questions around what we commonly understand to be ‘truths’ about the 
organisation of intimate relationships, so as potentially to have a transformative 
impact.  The data suggest that the participants experienced relative equality of 
condition (Baker et al, 2004).  This is to the extent that (in terms of working and 
learning) they more commonly shared both caring and domestic work and 
employment within the wider economy, and had choice amongst occupations that 
they found satisfying. 
 
I proceed, in the chapter, to consider the respondents’ descriptions of their financial 
behaviour, which featured accounts of relative financial independence and, again, the 
sharing of tasks.  Financial decisions were perceived to be discussed between 
partners, as was the case with housework.  In this respect, conforming with notions of 
equality of power, the participants were able to influence the decisions that affected 
their lives, with there being high levels of negotiation, democracy and cooperation 
(Baker et al, 2004).  This is in contrast to heterosexual relationships, where the female 
partner’s identity, “remains profoundly shaped by an ideology of domesticity” alone, 
and where preferences are shaped by the context in which they are made (Crompton, 
2006: 202).   
 
Workforce status 
In terms initially of the participants’ workforce status, a large number described both 
themselves and their partner as working full-time (n = 157, 54.7%).  This is notable, 
as Britain has been suggested to have a large proportion of what Moen (2003) 
describes as “neo-traditional” households (where the man works over 40 hours a week 
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and the woman works less, typically part-time) (Crompton and Lyonette, 2005).  It 
also indicates relative equality of working and learning, with both partners having 
access to employment (Baker et al, 2004).  Few respondents were in a relationship 
where one or more of the partners was not working (n = 36, 12.4%).  That finding 
accords with previous suggestions that same-sex relationships tend to be ‘dual-earner’ 
ones, arguably as a result of the comparative insignificance of prescribed gender roles 
(Blumstein and Schwartz, 1983; Dunne, 1997).  The proportion of male participants 
who reported that they and their partner were working full-time (n = 44, 54.3%) was 
similar to that for the females (n = 111, 54.7%).  The result relating to the females is 
interesting, given that 172 (82.3%) respondents were working full or part-time, by 
comparison to a 67% employment rate for women across the UK population (Office 
for National Statistics, 2013a: 1). 
 
Yet, my workforce status findings might be unsurprising, given that the sample were 
also well qualified.  Whilst the 2011 census found that 27% of the population had 
completed an undergraduate degree or higher, 244 (81.9%) of my respondents 
reported having attained that level, with 118 (39.6%) having a Master’s degree or a 
PhD (Office for National Statistics, 2012).  Gender did not impact in this respect, with 
81.6% (n = 71) of men and 82.2% (n = 171) of women being educated to university 
level.  Likewise, 221 (75.2%) respondents said that their partners held at least an 
undergraduate degree.  This might at least partially be because my sample was biased 
by my recruitment strategy.  For instance, it is probable that the academics that I 
asked to forward on the details of the study sent them to similarly educated people. 
 
As to the partners’ occupations, self-defined social class did not influence whether or 
not the partners adopted the same status.  This is striking, as Crompton (2006: 46) 
asserted that combinations of employment statuses varied by class in different-sex 
households.  However, I found the presence or absence of children to be of impact (x2 
= 8.960, df = 1, p = 0.003).  As is shown by table 4.1, of the respondents that had 
children, a greater proportion (n = 35, 51.5%) had a different workforce status to their 
partner than those without (n = 70, 31.5%).  This trend has also been identified 
amongst the population as a whole; couples with dependent children have been found 
less likely (68%) to be dual-earners than those without (72%) (Walling, 2005: 277).  
The reasoning would presumably be to enable the lesser-working partner to take 
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greater responsibility for childcare.  We will now turn to an in-depth discussion of this 
type of labour. 
 
Table 4.1. Whether the respondent and their partner had the same occupational status by whether or not there are 
children present in the respondent’s household 
   
Children present Children not present Total 





































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 8.960 1 0.003 
 
Childcare 
71 (23.6%) of the participants said that they both had, and lived with, children.  
Whilst there are no available percentage statistics for the proportion of UK same-sex 
couples raising children, my sample reflects American estimates of around one in five 
doing so (Gates, 2013: 1).  In terms of how the care of these children was 
apportioned, as can be seen in figure 4.1, whilst 27 people (39.1% of those responding 
to the question) described themselves as the majority carer, 18 (26.1%) answered that 
their partner conducted this work, and 24 (34.8%) that it was shared.  It is 
acknowledged that the percentage of responses answering that childcare was shared is 
relatively small.  My figure for equal caring is, on the one hand, only a little higher 
than that provided by Ellison et al (2009: 35) for (predominantly heterosexual) men’s 
perception of childcare.  Of the responses gathered in that study as to whether 
childcare was shared, 31% of males stated that it was.  That said, the female 
respondents did not agree.  Only 14% of Ellison et al’s (2009) women participants 
reported shared childcare, which is markedly lower than the result that I obtained. 
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Who conducts the childcare? 
 
 
My findings are likely to be reflective of ongoing difficulties within this domain 
relating to structural impediments, particularly within the workplace.  Lesbian and 
gay relationships do not exist in a “power-free zone”, and paid work opportunities are 
structured in a way that omits to recognise parents’ responsibilities outside of work 
(Heaphy et al, 1999; Dunne, 1999).  Even so, the findings would indicate that 
childcare is shared more equally within my same-sex sample than it is across the 
wider population.  In this way, they are more compatible with Baker et al’s (2004) 
‘working and learning’ aspect of equality of condition.  My observation corresponds 
with Sullivan’s (1996) assertion of a commitment to “equity” in lesbian parenting 
practices, and Chan et al’s (1998) finding, in their study of 46 American families, that 
the lesbian parents adopted a more egalitarian division of childcare labour than the 
heterosexuals.   
 
As to the factors that influenced the division of childcare, it is difficult to comment 
meaningfully on the impact of gender, as there were insufficient cases of male 
respondents with children (n = 5, 5.8%) to enable further investigation.  However, 
chi-square analysis investigating the influence of the level of gross household income 
revealed no significant associations.  This is noteworthy, as it is commonly assumed 
that this factor accounts for heterosexual division of labour (although Saad (2012) 
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disputes that mothers who perform a greater caring role are largely privileged, as 
household income will tend to be lower where the mother does not work).  
Nevertheless, a significant association was identified relating to the identity of the 
‘main earner’ (x2 = 11.232, df = 4, p = 0.024).  The relationship observed was that the 
respondents who answered that their partner was the ‘main earner’ were more likely 
(n = 14, 48.3%) to perform the majority of the childcare.  Conversely, where they 
themselves were the ‘main earner’, they were more likely (n = 11, 47.8%) to report 
that their partner conducts the majority of the caring.  This sits in contrast with 
different-sex couples, given that where a woman is the family ‘breadwinner’, she will 
still typically take on the larger share of the childcare (Rampell, 2013).  That said, the 
statistic for the equal sharing of childcare did not vary a great deal according to the 
identity of the ‘main earner’.  As is evident from figure 4.2, 34.8% (n = 8) of ‘main 
earner’ respondents considered childcare to be shared equally, whilst 37.9% (n = 11) 
of those whose partner was the ‘main earner’ adopted the same view, alongside 33.3% 
(n = 5) where neither were classified in this way. 
 

































Who conducts the childcare? 
I am the 'main earner' 
Neither of us is the 'main earner' 
My partner is the 'main earner' 
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Caring for a sick family member 
Still with reference to caring, the results of my questionnaire as to who cares for a 
sick family member featured sharing more prominently, thereby signalling even 
greater equality of working and learning (Baker et al (2004)).  This carries with it 
transgressive possibilities, given that Crompton (1999: 205) identifies that a dual-
caring model, “is the most likely to generate less traditional gender relations” and to 
“deconstruct” the gendered division of labour.  As is shown by figure 4.3, a total of 
121 respondents (65.8%) answered that they shared this work with their partner.  This 
statistic is markedly higher than those generated by Henz (2009) based on the British 
General Household Survey.  The range for the receipt of care from both spouses was 
found to be from 39-47% in that instance, with the former referring to the percentage 
of wives’ fathers cared for in such a way, and the latter the husbands’ parents (Henz, 
2009: 149). 
 



























Who cares for a sick family member? 
 
 
There were insufficient cases in my data to investigate the impact of other variables 
on the division of this type of caring work whilst utilising a fivefold scale (always me; 
always my partner).  Yet, on having reclassified the participants’ responses into ‘me’, 
‘my partner’ and ‘equally shared’, I was unable to prove the influence of gender.  This 
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finding is relevant, given that earlier studies (see Tennstedt et al, 1989) have 
identified that daughters tend to be more involved than sons in caring for their elderly 
parents.  The fact that males in same-sex relationships may be more likely to get 
involved in this work corresponds with stereotypes of gay men having closer 
relationships with their mothers (LaSala, 2011).  
 

































Who cares for a sick family member?"
I am the 'main 
earner' 
Neither of us is 
the 'main earner' 




A statistically significant relationship was again observed between the identity of the 
‘main earner’ and how this type of labour is apportioned (x2 = 11.144, df = 4, p = 
0.025).  As can be seen in figure 4.4, where the respondent was the ‘main earner’, 
they were more likely (n = 11, 16.2%) to say that their partner cares for a sick family 
member than where their partner was the ‘main earner’ (n = 2, 3%).  Similarly, those 
whose partner was the ‘main earner’ were more likely (n = 22, 32.8%) to be the 
majority carer than those considering themselves the ‘main earner’ (n = 11, 16.2%).  
In any event, though, equal caring was the most popular response.  The arrangements 
were described in this way by 67.6% (n = 46) of ‘main earner’ respondents, 64.2% (n 
= 43) of those who perceived their partner in such a way, and 71.4% (n = 30) who 
considered neither themselves nor their partner to be the ‘main earner’. 
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As was also the case with childcare, whether or not the partners were of the same 
occupational status was not found to influence who cared for a sick family member.  
The suggestion is that it is not the fact that both partners may be working full-time 
that makes a difference, but the implications of one partner having a higher status 
occupation than the other (such as needing to work longer hours and having less 
flexible working arrangements). 
 
Housework 
Descriptions of equality featured commonly in relation to the variety of other 
household chores referred to in the questionnaire.  This works to suggest that lesbians 
and gay men might help to break down the heteronormative (binary) roles frequently 
assumed to be ‘natural’ within different-sex couples (and, in undermining “engrained 
divisions of labour”, can assist in attaining greater equality of working and learning 
(Baker and Lewis, 2010)).  I explore the extent to which tasks were expressed as 
being shared in response to the quantitative-style questions, before examining the 
participants’ (qualitative) accounts of what this ‘equality’ entailed, the factors that 
influenced how ‘equally’ labour was apportioned, and the employment of household 
help.  I observe that tasks have often been negotiated within the respondents’ same-
sex relationships and that, even where there has been role specialisation, household 




A calculation of the average score (where 1 = always me; and 5 = always my partner) 
of all of the results relating to housework (with the exception of care) generated a 
figure of 2.88.  Those tasks focused more outside of the home (car maintenance, DIY, 
gardening and grocery shopping) came out slightly lower, with an average of 2.87, 
whereas those based in the home (cooking, dishwashing, general cleaning, 
vacuuming, ironing, and laundry) came out higher, at 2.89.  However, there was little 
observable difference between the two types of work.  This is important, as Kan and 
Gershuny (2010) identified the in-home, more routine, tasks as being more associated 
with women in different-sex couples, given that they have less potential for 
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adjustment according to work schedule.  We might account for the numbers falling 
slightly on the side of the respondent conducting the tasks on the basis that we are 
more likely to be aware of the tasks that we conduct ourselves than to keep track of 
what others are doing.  Nonetheless, all of the averages are close to a score of 3, 
which signifies equal sharing.  The result is compatible with a finding that the vast 
majority (n = 214, 72.8%) of participants agreed (on a scale of slightly agree to 
strongly agree) with a statement that they and their partner share household tasks 
equally.  Similarly, it sits comfortably with a finding that the majority (n = 204, 
69.4%) disagreed (from slightly disagree to strongly disagree) that most household 
tasks were done by them. 
 























































Mostly my partner 
Always my partner 
 
 
As can be seen in figure 4.5, those tasks within the home that received the highest 
number of responses affirming equal sharing were general cleaning (n = 135, 46.4%) 
and dishwashing (n = 133, 44.8%).  The ‘out of home’ task most commonly described 
in that way was grocery shopping (n = 134, 45%) (see figure 4.6).  In relation to all 
three tasks, the combined number of responses for either partner conducting them 
alone was lower than that for equal sharing.  The figures are of particular note 
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because cleaning and dishwashing have been identified as “routine” housework 
associated with women’s feminine identities in different-sex couples (DeVault, 1990).  
Not only this, but findings from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the 
BSAS suggest that the statistics for the equal sharing within my sample are higher 
than those for the UK population as a whole.  The BHPS found that 39.7% of 
respondents to a question about grocery shopping answered that this task was shared 
(Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2009).  Moreover, it reported that 28.3% 
described the cleaning and vacuuming as being divided equally, whilst the BSAS 
provided a 29% figure for the equal sharing of cleaning (Scott and Clery, 2013: 128).  
My own finding relating to vacuuming was that 33.8% (n = 95) of participants 
answered that this work was shared. 
 












































Mostly my partner 
Always my partner 
 
 
The result within my sample in terms of the equal sharing of cooking (n = 99, 33%) 
was also greater than those supplied by the BHPS (26.9%) and BSAS (27%), as was 
the case with laundry.  20.1% of BHPS respondents described laundry as being shared 
(defining it as including both washing and ironing).  Likewise, 20% of BSAS 
participants said the same, and a stark difference was reported between the two 
genders (with women conducting 70% of this work (Scott and Clery, 2013: 128)).  As 
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against this, 38% (n = 112) of my respondents that answered the relevant question 
said that laundry (separated off from ironing in my questionnaire) was equally shared.  
In addition, 31.2% (n = 79) said that ironing was apportioned out equally.  This 
finding as to the greater sharing of laundry amongst same-sex couples was similarly 
observed in Matos’s (2015: 4) study of American dual-earner couples (44%, as 
against 31% for different-sex partners). 
 
With reference to the remaining tasks that the participants were asked about, an 
arrangement of equal sharing was the most popular answer concerning who performs 
gardening (n = 79, 30.9%) and car maintenance (n = 63, 26.6%).  Even with respect to 
DIY, the figure of 28.4% (n = 82) for the sharing of this work was much higher than 
the 10% statistic reported by the BSAS (which found that this labour is usually 
conducted by men (Scott and Clery, 2013: 128)). 
 
Qualitative explanations 
As to how the respondents described the division of domestic tasks in the qualitative 
portion of the questionnaire, there was evidence of Kurdek’s (1993) “equality” and 
“balance” patterns.  The former pattern refers to an arrangement where one party is 
just as likely as another to conduct housework.  The “balance” pattern means that 
each partner is responsible for an equal number of household tasks, but that their tasks 
are different (and, in this respect, Ryan-Flood (2009) stressed that a 50/ 50 division of 
labour does not necessarily mean that both partners participate in every household 
task).  Both patterns might be contrasted with the “segregation pattern”, under which 
one partner does the bulk of housework labour (Kurdek, 1993).  This is the pattern 
that heterosexual couples have traditionally been more likely to adopt (see, for 
example, Blair and Lichter, 1991). 
 
Turning initially to the “equality” pattern, there were indications of three trends 
within my results that fall under this umbrella term.  Firstly, there was a great deal of 
use of the language of “togetherness” in relation to housework, suggesting the 
conduct of the same tasks simultaneously.  Most commonly, couples reported 
cleaning at the same time, and cooking and going grocery shopping with one another.  
Secondly, a number of respondents discussed taking it in turns to conduct tasks, either 
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on a daily/ weekly basis, or dividing according to who performed that task on the last 
occasion.  Cooking again featured regularly as something that the partners might 
alternate, as did dishwashing.  Thirdly, some participants reported a fairly ad hoc 
arrangement to housework, under which the partners both conducted it but according 
to no particular pre-set division (adopting a “take it as it comes” attitude (R90)).  This 
might be contrasted against the more defined apportionment under the “balanced” 
approach, or taking chores in turn.  Under this more unplanned, informal 
arrangement, the responses suggested that who conducted the tasks would often be 
determined by who spotted that they needed doing, or by the person who was the 
most available at that point.  In terms of this time-related explanation, one respondent 
set out how the division of labour, “depends who is busiest with their work” (R11).  
With reference to all three arrangements falling under the “equality” pattern, there 
was crossover, to the extent that there were occasions where it was reported that: 
 
 We either do the task together or, more often, take it in turns (R194).   
 
Likewise, participants described a combination of the “equality” and “balance” 
patterns: 
 
We take turns to do chores and we share according to preference (R115). 
 
This latter description fits particularly well with the ‘working and learning’ dimension 
of equality of condition, under which there is real choice to be made amongst 
satisfying occupations (Baker et al, 2004). 
 
In relation to the more ‘divide and conquer’ type “balance” pattern, there was some 
evidence of role specialisation.  In many of the respondents’ relationships, housework 
was apportioned on the basis of personal inclination (as was previously identified by 
McWhirter and Mattison, 1984; Kurdek, 2007).  For instance, it was explained by one 
participant that:  
 
I hate washing dishes so my partner usually does those, while he hates 
cooking so I usually do that (R207). 
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Alternatively (or sometimes additionally), participants answered that tasks were 
assigned according to, “talent” and “skill”.  In this way, they were being conducted by 
the party to whom they were most suited.  As one participant expressed it: 
 
We just do what we are best at (R76). 
 
Crucially, though, even where the apportionment was approached in this way, there 
was little to suggest that labour was divided out along traditionally gendered lines.  
For example, one participant described how her partner would do the vacuuming 
whilst she cleaned, and another explained that the two of them shared the decorating 
and DIY.  The accounts here accord with Cooper’s (2000) notion of equal power, as 
the respondents were living outside of, and disrupting, the constraints of social 
positioning dictated by heteronormative family structures (which have allowed some 
people to generate effects or outcomes that will be denied to others). 
 
A further key feature of the qualitative accounts was that the respondents highlighted 
a tendency to discuss with their partner the apportionment of household labour.  It is 
through conscious decision-making in this way that same-sex partners distance 
themselves from prescriptive gender scripts.  This element of negotiation was 
previously observed by Weeks (2007), Barrett (2015), and in Matos’s (2015) study 
(where communication within same-sex couples was found to be better).  It would, as 
well, seem to fit with notions of equality of power, given that both partners are able to 
influence household decision-making.  Cooper (2004) explains how this type of 
equality stresses the importance of having greater capacity to shape the world as a 
social decision-maker (and of undermining organising principles, such as gender, 
which currently deny this).  Baker et al (2004) also consider equality of power to be 
about a more egalitarian, participatory politics, and the extension of democratic 
principles to all areas of society, particularly the economy and the family. An 
exception to this element of negotiation within my sample can perhaps be found in the 
more ad hoc approach, where there were suggestions that, “it just works out that way” 
(R4), and that the partners, “just do things as needed” (R222).  Those descriptions 
more closely match the responses of Stocks et al’s (2007) different-sex partner 
interviewees concerning how their domestic arrangements were reached.  However, 
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the trend, on the whole, tallies with the broader way in which the respondents’ 
accounts depicted the partners working with, and assisting, one another. 
 
That said, one might also identify hints of individualism.  A few respondents 
described how they and their partner conducted their own ironing and cooking (with 
the latter being explained on the basis that the partners had different diets).  Such an 
arrangement is more unusual, given that the ironing of, and food provision for, both 
partners would tend to be dealt with together, albeit perhaps by one partner.  The 
accounts might appear relevant given that, as one respondent clarified: 
 
I would consider [ironing] to be shared equally because we each do our own 
(R40). 
 
The indication here is that a more nuanced conception of equality may be adopted 
than a straightforward 50/ 50 split of tasks. 
 
Influences on ‘equal’ division 
For the purpose of investigating whether there were any particular influences on the 
way that household labour was apportioned, chi-square tests were run against a 
selection of variables.  In this respect, it could not be proved that gender impacted 
labour division (apart from in relation to laundry (x2 = 9.785, df = 4, p = 0.044)).  This 
is interesting, given that the female respondents (M = 3.02, SD 1.424) were more 
likely to agree (t = 2.746, df = 289, two-tailed p = 0.006) than the males (M = 3.54, 
SD = 1.524) with a statement that same-sex couples share household tasks more 
equally than different-sex couples.  It may be that women have a heightened 
awareness of the societal expectations placed upon them in a different-sex couple 
(given the ties drawn between traditional femininity and the home).  Such a 
supposition is reinforced by Dunne (1997: 187), who described her lesbian interview 
respondents as being sensitive to, “circumstances which supported relations of 
domination”.  Women may therefore be more conscious of experiencing a lesser 
burden where they share domestic labour with a partner of the same sex. 
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On top of this, with respect to the majority of tasks, it could not be proved that the 
parties’ apportionment of domestic work was influenced by the presence or absence 
of children (with dishwashing being an exception (x2 = 12.291, df = 4, p = 0.015)).  
This chimes with Patterson’s (1995) assertion that lesbian couples maintain a 
relatively egalitarian division of household responsibilities even under child rearing 
pressures.  Yet, the finding contrasts with Pahl’s (1984) observation that the presence 
of young children produces a segregated pattern of household labour in different-sex 
couples, and an increased burden for women (and Crompton et al’s (2005: 220) 
suggestion that having a child decreases the likelihood of an egalitarian division of 
domestic work). 
 




































The tests produced an invalid result for grocery shopping whilst using the original 
fivefold scale (always me; always my partner), so the responses were recoded into 
‘me’, ‘my partner’ and ‘equally shared’, at which point I established a statistically 
significant relationship (x2 = 7.798, df = 2, p = 0.020).  This was that the participants 
without children were more likely (n = 112, 49.8%) to share grocery shopping 
equally, whereas those with children were more likely to do the grocery shopping 
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themselves (n = 30, 42.3%) (as can be seen in figure 4.7).  That is perhaps because 
supermarket shopping is more straightforward where children are absent.  Where 
there were children present, it additionally appears that such unequal apportionment, 
where it occurred, entailed a more active choice between the partners.  Those without 
children (M = 5.09, SD = 1.795) were more likely to disagree (t = -2.262, df = 291, 
two-tailed p = 0.024) with a statement that a conscious decision had been made as a 
couple to share household tasks unequally than those with (M = 4.54, SD = 1.811).  
That said, this was a difference of degree, as both groups disagreed with the 
statement. 
 
On the whole, it could not be proved that whether or not the participants were in a 
legally recognised relationship was of impact on labour division.  This finding is of 
importance, given that previous studies have identified that being married tends to 
mean less housework for men and more for women (Coltrane, 2000: 1222; Crompton, 
2006: 141).  The one exception where a significant association was found again 
related to grocery shopping (x2 = 12.183, df = 4, p = 0.016).  This was shared much 
more equally amongst cohabiting couples (n = 83, 53.9%) than it was amongst those 
in a civil partnership or a marriage (n = 46, 35.1%).  This finding seems easily 
reconcilable with the result relating to the presence (or absence) of children, as those 
respondents in a legally recognised relationship were more likely (n = 56, 42.4%) to 
have children than those who were not (n = 15, 9.6%).  That this should be the case 
may be because a civil partnership is required for access to parental status for children 
conceived with a known donor (Harding, 2011). 
 
Turning to factors such as social class and gross household income, no statistically 
significant relationships were established concerning the apportionment of 
housework.  The former finding is striking, given that Barnes (2013) argues that 
gendered inequalities can more easily be avoided amongst those that are middle class 
(and have security and flexibility in their finances).  As to income, it has, in fact, been 
suggested that the identity of the spouse with the greatest earnings is of most 
influence.  Aldous et al (1998: 810) explained that, “usually the husband […] will 
have greater power to avoid doing household tasks”.  With this borne in mind, tests 
were run to explore whether there were any associations between whether the partners 
were of the same occupational status and who the ‘main earner’ was, on the one hand, 
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and who conducted the various household tasks on the other.  Firstly, regarding the 
partners’ occupational statuses, it could not be proved that this impacted domestic 
division, apart from in relation to grocery shopping, cooking and vacuuming.  The 
nature of the relationship observed (x2 = 11.750, df = 4, p = 0.019) for grocery 
shopping was that it was more likely (n = 88, 48.4%) to be shared where the partners 
were of the same occupational status than where they were not (n = 41, 39%).  Similar 
associations were identified in relation to cooking (x2 = 10.570, df = 4, p = 0.032) and 
vacuuming (x2 = 9.598, df = 4, p = 0.048).  However, the fact that the remaining tasks 
were not found to be influenced goes some way to counter Carrington’s (1999) 
argument that same-sex partners’ apportionment of domestic labour is determined by 
their relative paid work. 
 
In relation to the ‘main earner’, the suggestion emerged that an imbalance in earnings 
between partners did not provide the higher earner with the same power to avoid 
conducting domestic tasks as has been identified in previous (different-sex) research.  
This is consistent with Matos’s (2015) study, where the relative income of the lesbian 
and gay partners was not found to determine how they divided household 
responsibilities (as against the different-sex couples, where it was).  The only 
significant association that I found using the fivefold scale was in the context of 
vacuuming (x2 = 25.781, df = 8, p = 0.001).  The nature of the relationship was that 
those participants who considered there not to be a ‘main earner’ within their 
relationship were more likely (n = 35, 49.3%) to say that vacuuming was equally 
shared (as against 35.1% (n = 34) who said that they were the ‘main earner’ and 
21.2% (n = 22) who said that their partner was).  Moreover, a greater proportion (n = 
49, 47.1%) who described their partner as the ‘main earner’ reported that the 
vacuuming was conducted by them than that this work was conducted by their partner 
(n = 33, 31.7%), and vice versa. 
 
As to general cleaning, statistical tests produced an invalid result when I investigated 
the influence of the identity of the ‘main earner’ using the fivefold scale.  The 
responses were recoded into the threefold scale, at which point I established that 
general cleaning varied significantly by the identity of the ‘main earner’ (x2 = 16.209, 
df = 4, p = 0.003).  As can be seen in table 4.2, those that answered that they were the 
‘main earner’ were more likely (n = 33, 33%) to say that their partner performed 
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general cleaning duties than those whose partner was the ‘main earner’ (n = 21, 
19.3%).  Contrariwise, those who said that their partner was the ‘main earner’ were 
more likely (n = 43, 39.4%) to answer that they carried out general cleaning duties 
than that their partner did (n = 21, 21%).  Additionally, those participants who 
considered neither partner to be the ‘main earner’ reported the highest amount of 
sharing (n = 43, 58.9%).  This corresponds with Harry’s (1984) assertion that 
egalitarianism emerges where there is only a small income difference between 
partners.  Even so, the description of equal sharing was the most popular across all 
three scenarios (amounting to 47.5% (n = 134) of the overall responses). 
 
Table 4.2. Who conducts the general cleaning by who the ‘main earner’ is in the respondent’s household 
   
I am the ‘main 
earner’ 
My partner is 
the ‘main 
earner’ 
Neither of us 
is the ‘main 
earner’ 
Total 




























































 Value Df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 16.209 4 0.003 
 
The use of household help 
A final point of relevance was that a high proportion answered that they employed 
domestic assistance.  60 participants did so (20.3% of valid responses), as against 
12% of Britons as a whole (Churchill, 2011).  In response to a subsequent question 
enabling qualitative expansion, 41 people reported employing a cleaner, alongside 4 
seeking assistance with ironing and 5 with gardening.  As against this, the BHPS 
found that 3.1% of cleaning and vacuuming was conducted by paid help, alongside 
0.8% of washing and ironing (Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2009).  On 
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the running of statistical tests to investigate the factors that might influence such an 
arrangement, it is unsurprising that I found a significant relationship relating to 
household income (x2 = 26.117, df = 1, p = 0.000).  Respondents were more likely (n 
= 49, 33.8%) to call on this kind of assistance where their income fell within the tenth 
decile (set by the Office for National Statistics, 2013c) than where it fell within the 
ninth or lower (n = 7, 6.6%).  This reflects Carrington’s (1999) suggestion that 
wealthier lesbian and gay families will more often purchase domesticity in the 
marketplace.  The result is also consistent with a finding that the participants’ social 
class impacts their likelihood to employ such assistance (x2 = 12.240, df = 1, p = 
0.000).  Those who considered themselves middle class were much more likely (n = 
51, 24.9%) to employ domestic help than those identifying as working class (n = 4, 
5.6%). 
 
Tests run further established a significant association regarding the presence (or 
absence) of children (x2 = 17.891, df = 1, p = 0.000).  Those with children were found 
to be more likely (n = 27, 38%) to employ such support than those without (n = 33, 
14.8%), which might be explained on a twofold basis: firstly, that those with children 
are likely to have less time available to undertake such chores; and, secondly, that 
they are likely to have more domestic work that requires addressing.  A corresponding 
significant relationship was found between whether the partners were in a legally 
recognised relationship and the employment of household help (x2 = 4.846, df = 1, p = 
0.028).  Participants who were in such a relationship were more likely (n = 34, 26.2%) 
to employ this kind of assistance than those who were cohabiting (n = 24, 15.6%).  
Interestingly, it could not be proved that resorting to domestic assistance impacted 
how equally household labour was perceived to be apportioned.  That finding works 
somewhat against Henz’s (2010: 150) assertion (albeit in the context of care) that 
there may be greater sharing of the remainder of the work where external help is 
sought. 
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Summary of domestic results 
Whilst the law of financial relief has developed around stereotypes of men and 
women’s work,16 the respondents in my sample reported household arrangements that 
looked different to that stark dimorphic picture.  Their descriptions indicated a more 
‘equal’ approach towards the division of domestic labour, according with previous 
assertions of lesbian and gay egalitarianism (see, for example, Burns et al, 2008; 
Kurdek, 1993).  This was often the case regardless of various factors drawn on to 
rationalise the heteronormative organisation of intimate relationships.  Whilst having 
a ‘main earner’ had an impact on the distribution of caring, vacuuming and general 
cleaning, we might still draw a contrast against different-sex couples.  This because 
women, on the whole, will do most of the domestic work even where they are the 
‘main earner’, thereby bearing a “dual burden” (Harkness, 2008; European Social 
Survey, 2013).  Shifts in the amount of unpaid work that is performed by men have 
been slow (Scott et al, 2010).  Consequently, the claim has been made that, “women 
bring home the bacon, then fry it” (Cooper, 2013). 
 

































'The division of household tasks in my relationship is unfair' 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See chapter 2. 
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In terms of what ‘equality’ means, it is a subjective term which cannot necessarily be 
reduced to a 50/ 50 split (Weston, 1997; Downing and Goldberg, 2011).  Nonetheless, 
the positioning of the ‘equality’ option at the midpoint of the scales used in my 
questionnaire might be viewed to suggest more of a 50/ 50 type of arrangement 
(whether this be by taking tasks in turns, performing tasks together, or otherwise).  A 
perception of the ‘fairness’ of this more evenhanded arrangement was widespread, 
with 79.3% (n = 234) disagreeing (on a scale from slightly disagree to strongly 
disagree) with a later statement that the division of tasks within their relationship was 
unfair (as is evident from figure 4.8).  The participants’ approach seems to comply 
with what Piña and Bengtson (1993) label “equity theory”, under which people will 
see as most ‘fair’ those situations in which they are neither over nor under-benefitted.  
It is of note that these lesbians and gay men, being less subject to heterosexual norms, 
should choose to embrace egalitarian ideals in this way.  Through not apportioning 
housework in the traditionally gendered fashion, the respondents’ behaviour holds the 
potential to interrupt the perpetuation of heteronormative understandings about such 
labour being ‘women’s work’.  Likewise, given the vast proportion of the participants 
who reported that both they and their partner work full-time, my findings challenge, 
and hold the potential to transform, the prevailing notion of the financially dominant, 
money-earning partner.  To this end, I shall now explore the participants’ financial 
arrangements in greater detail. 
 
The conduct of household finances 
By way of an initial observation concerning finances, my respondents’ gross 
household income was, overall, remarkably high.  147 (57.9%) participants fell within 
the top 10% of the population, having provided a figure greater than £48,496 (the 
uppermost decile point set by the Office for National Statistics, 2013c).  This is by 
comparison to the 18 (7.2%) respondents that fell within the bottom 50%.  The results 
might seem, at least prima facie, to correspond with the image of lesbian and gay 
luxury and wealth propagated by the religious right (Gluckman and Reed, 1997).  
This image has frequently been used as a “weapon” to rationalise the marginalisation 
of LGBT people, and particularly gay men (Friess, 1998; Maulbeck, 2013).  My 
findings do, however, go some way to counter what has been argued in that respect.  
It has been suggested that same-sex couples are richer, given that they do not tend to 
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have children (Flandez, 2013).  Nonetheless, at least in terms of income, no 
significant association was observed within my data relating to the presence (or 
absence) of children.  Furthermore, I did not observe gender to be of influence.  That 
said, my findings cannot be considered representative, given the bias of my sample in 
terms of educational qualifications. 
 
A second point to bear in mind is that, when asked whether there was a ‘main earner’ 
in their relationship, the majority of respondents (n = 215, 73.6%) did consider there 
to be such a party.  To that extent, it seems that there was somewhat of an imbalance 
in earnings between the partners, even if not in occupational status.  This is reflected 
in the participants’ responses to a statement that they and their partner share equally 
in money earning.  A total of 46.8% (n = 137) agreed with this (on a scale from 
slightly agree to strongly agree), whilst 47.8% (n = 140) disagreed (from slightly 
disagree to strongly disagree).  Even so, where the respondents answered that neither 
they nor their partner were the ‘main earner’, they were subsequently enabled to 
provide details of their arrangements, and the language of “equality”, “sameness” and 
“similarity” abounded.  In addition, nine participants described how the position had 
varied throughout the relationship, signifying there to be no constant ‘breadwinner’ in 
their household. 
 
It is within this context that I look more specifically at the financial behaviour of my 
questionnaire respondents.  I consider the ways in which their money was held, before 
moving on to examine the ways in which they described the performance of financial 
tasks.  Whilst patterns of dependency have typified patriarchal marriage, I argue that 
there was a lesser use of joint accounts, and greater financial independence, amongst 
my sample than has been the case amongst different-sex partners.  In addition, as 
against heteronormative notions associating men with financial dominance, there 
were widespread accounts of the sharing of bill paying and financial decision-making.  
This, once more, supports the notion of there being greater equality of power, which 
may be transformative to the extent that Cooper (2000) views this type of equality as 
undoing relations of domination and hierarchy. 
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The use of joint/ separate accounts 
In terms of joint accounts, the majority of participants (158, 55.2%) answered that 
they and their partner had such an account.  That said, just 9.8% (n = 28) had a joint 
account alone, without also having the use of separate accounts (as against different-
sex couples, where this is more common (Vogler et al, 2006)).  Statistical tests 
identified gender to be of influence in this respect (x2 = 8.375, df = 1, p = 0.004), with 
women being more likely (n = 123, 60.9%) to have a joint account than men (n = 34, 
42%).  This is as against Clarke et al’s (2005) assertion that it is especially true that 
lesbian couples keep their finances more separate than heterosexual partners.  Yet, the 
result seems compatible with another association found (x2 = 4.875, df = 1, p = 0.027), 
in that those couples who had children were more likely (n = 45, 67.2%) to have a 
joint account than those who did not (n =113, 51.8%).  Burgoyne and Kirchler (2008: 
144) identified that starting a family may prompt financial merging (because caring 
responsibilities can cause greater financial dependence (Dunne, 1999)), and women 
accounted for a vast proportion of those with children in my sample (n = 65, 92.9%). 
 
The level of gross household income was also found to influence whether or not the 
respondent had a joint account with their partner (x2 = 19.802, df = 1, p = 0.000).  The 
relationship there was that those reporting their income as falling within the 
uppermost decile were more likely (n = 99, 69.7%) to have such an account than those 
reporting it to be lower (n = 43, 41.3%).  This could be because those who are 
wealthier may be more willing to undergo credit checks, or may be more likely to 
pass such checks, than those with lesser funds.  It would seem, additionally, to tie in 
with an association identified in relation to social class (x2 = 18.108, df = 1, p = 
0.000).  The nature of this was that middle class participants were more likely (n = 
126, 62.7%) to have a joint account than those who were working class (n = 22, 
32.8%). 
 
A final factor of impact in relation to joint accounts was whether or not the partners 
were in a legally recognised relationship (x2 = 37.106, df = 1, p = 0.000).  Those 
participants who were married or in a civil partnership were more likely (n = 96, 
76.2%) to have such an account than those who were cohabiting (n = 60, 39.7%) (and 
Elizabeth (2001) similarly observed a trend towards more separate finances amongst 
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cohabiting couples).  This supports Heaphy et al’s (2013: 14) suggestion that, 
“entering into a civil partnership did seem to be a platform for combining aspects of 
the couples’ finances”.  It might be that those choosing to enter into a formalised 
relationship may open a joint account as a symbolic gesture of their togetherness.  
Indeed, international studies on different-sex couples have also identified that married 
couples are more likely than those cohabiting to operate as a single economic unit 
(see, for example, Heimdal and Houseknecht, 2003).  Then again, only 17.5% (n = 
22) of those within such a relationship had a joint account alone, as against nearly half 
of UK heterosexual married couples having previously been found to hold nearly all 
of their household income in a joint account (Laurie and Rose, 1994).  There seems to 
have been a greater desire, amongst my sample, to keep at least some of their finances 
separate from their partner’s. 
 
These results correspond with Burgoyne et al’s (2011) assertion that same-sex 
couples merge their finances less than is typical of heterosexual married couples.  
This is relevant, as evidence has shown that joint finances often conceal unequal 
access, providing a cover for one partner’s spending to be privileged (Nyman and 
Dema, 2007).  That said, there is a lack of recent larger scale data on how different-
sex couples hold their finances, and there have been suggestions of a wider move 
towards separateness in couple finances (Lewis, 2001; Pahl, 2008).  Alliance and 
Leicester (2004) reported that 34% of their sample of 1001 (married and cohabiting) 
British couples managed their finances through a joint account alone.  More recently, 
27.5% of valid responses to a question posed as part of Understanding Society’s 
Innovation Panel reported ‘joint only’ assets (Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, 2013).  However, those particular results grouped together not only deposit 
accounts and savings (with Ashby and Burgoyne (2008: 466) claiming the latter to be 
more, “subject to individual decision-making” than earnings), but also a variety of 
investments.  Kan and Laurie (2010) identified a downward trend in the joint holding 
of investments (and debts) with reference to BHPS respondents. 
 
The findings concerning the relative financial independence of my sample were 
congruous with the responses obtained to a statement that the participant and their 
partner were financially independent.  A total of 54.4% (n = 160) agreed with this (on 
a scale from slightly agree to strongly agree), whilst only 32.2% (n = 95) disagreed 
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(from slightly disagree to strongly disagree).  This sits well with Heaphy et al (2013) 
and Dunne’s (1999) earlier observations as to the relative rarity of same-sex partners 
being financially dependent on one another.  That said, when statistical tests were run, 
it was identified that those in a relationship where both partners were working full-
time (M = 3.10, SD = 1.804) were more likely to agree (t = -3.497, df = 267.783, two-
tailed p = 0.001) with the statement than those who were not (M = 3.89, SD = 2.012).  
This is presumably on the basis that each of the partners would be more able to 
support themselves than if this were not the case.  Furthermore, and compatibly with 
the results pertaining to joint accounts, it was found that those without children (M = 
3.22, SD = 1.907) were more likely to agree (t = 3.974, df = 291, two-tailed p = 
0.000) that they and their partner were financially independent than those with (M = 
4.24, SD = 1.821).  This is reflective of Fleming’s (1997) contention that the arrival 
of children often leads to changes in money arrangements.  Similarly, those 
respondents who were cohabiting (M = 3.11, SD = 1.800) were more likely to agree (t 
= 3.659, df = 283, two-tailed p = 0.000) than those who were in a civil partnership or 
married (M = 3.93, SD = 1.985). 
 
In terms of this notion of cohabiting couples keeping their financial lives more 
distinct from one another, a significant association was found between relationship 
status and the retention of separate accounts (x2 = 13.226, df = 1, p = 0.000).  The 
nature of the relationship was that those who were cohabiting were more likely (n = 
145, 96%) to have such accounts than those in a civil partnership or a marriage (n = 
107, 82.9%).  That finding concurs with Singh and Lindsay’s (1996) assertion (albeit 
in the Australian heterosexual context) that, for cohabiting couples, money tends to be 
more “individual” and less “nebulous”.  Even so, the fact that the figures were so high 
in both categories corresponds with the idea of separate financial lives, and of an 
“ethic of co-independence” being a common feature of same-sex relationships 
(Weeks et al, 2001: 100).  In this respect, it is notable that 44.2% (n = 126) of the 
participants had separate accounts alone.  This is as against the 28% of couples found 
by Alliance and Leicester (2004) to have maintained totally separate financial 
arrangements.  There were further clear descriptions, within the qualitative accounts, 
of financial independence: 
 
We have separate bank accounts and control our own money (R235). 
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We both have control over our own income.  This gives us both a reasonable 
amount of financial independence to spend money when and how we want 
(R273). 
 
The former respondent, interestingly, still perceived bill paying as being ‘equally 
shared’ within her relationship, and it is to such discussion that we will now turn. 
 
The performance of financial tasks 
As to their financial behaviour, 33.9% (n = 101) of the participants considered that 
they paid the bills, and 22.1% (n = 66) said that that their partner did.  This outcome 
clearly weighed towards one or other of the partners performing this task, as opposed 
to it being shared (with that description accounting for the remaining 44% (n = 131)).  
The figure for equal sharing fell below the 49% finding of Burgoyne et al (2011: 699) 
relating to bill paying in same-sex couples.  However, it was higher than the 35.9% 
statistic provided by Skogrand et al (2011: 30) for neither spouse taking charge of this 
task in different-sex relationships, as well as the 31% figure set out by Pahl (1989: 
81).  Pahl (1989: 81) reported that 40% of bills were paid by the husband, which fits 
with Solomon et al’s (2005: 562) assertion that, “men pay for more items”.  That said, 
Pahl (1989) also recognised that, where a husband controls finances, he will usually 
“delegate” parts of money management to his wife, and Dema-Moreno (2009) 
identified that those tasks can become an extension of the household chores.  In this 
respect, we might make a distinction between the day-to-day expenditure and the 
more gendered “strategic” control over money (as does Vogler, 1998).  In fact, a 
recent report by Lloyds TSB (2012) suggested that women aged under 45 are now 
handling most (54%) of everyday financial management, such as bill payment. 
 
Regarding bill paying in my sample, no association could be proved in relation to 
gender, and neither could it be established with reference to the level of gross 
household income.  The latter is relevant, given that women have been identified as 
taking greater control over bill paying in low-income households (Rake and 
Jayatilaka, 2002; Goode et al, 1998).  There was, though, a statistically significant 
relationship found concerning the identity of the ‘main earner’ (x2 = 47.185, df = 8, p 
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= 0.000).  This was that those who did not classify either partner in such a way were 
more likely (n = 41, 54.7%) to share bill paying equally (as against 48.2% (n = 53) of 
those whose partner was the ‘main earner’, and 31.7% (n = 33) who answered that 
they were).  Another relationship was identified concerning social class (x2 = 10.038, 
df = 4, p = 0.040), this being that the higher the participants’ class, the more likely 
they were to share bill paying.  As can be seen in figure 4.9, whilst 48.8% (n = 102) 
of middle class respondents answered that bill paying was apportioned in this way, 
the same was true of only 29.6% (n = 21) of working class participants.  That appears 
to tie in with my above findings relating to joint accounts. 
 







































Participants were subsequently asked to describe how they and their partner shared 
household income and expenditure.  Four common descriptions emerged from the 
qualitative accounts, these being applicable both to the lesbian and gay respondents.  
Firstly, the language of “50/ 50”, and “splitting” in “half” featured strongly, with one 
participant describing how: 
 
We calculated monthly debits and arranged to settle them half each (R131). 
 
	   111	  
Similarly, the terminology of “equal sharing” was once more relied on heavily, with 
respondents clarifying that they meant “straight down the middle” (R251).  Secondly, 
by way of an alternative approach, respondents described dividing the bills 
proportionately between them, based on their earnings (a trend that was identified by 
Burns et al, 2008): 
 
[We] pay [a] relative percentage of income as outgoings, e.g. I earn 2/ 5 of 
income and pay 2/ 5 of outcome (R3). 
 
She makes 55% of our gross, and I make 45%, and we split our shared 
expenses (food, rent, car payments, etc.) in a 55: 45 split (R233). 
 
Regarding these first two methods of bill division, 86 respondents referred to 
payments having been made through a joint account.  The indication was that, where 
there was a joint account, household bills would tend to be paid out of that (with any 
separate accounts being used for personal expenditure, savings, and the holding of 
family inheritance money).  Whilst some set out how, “all income goes to a joint 
account” (R188), the majority said that: 
 
We both pay an agreed amount into the shared account to cover monthly bills, 
mortgage, etc. (R232). 
 
A third system of bill payment, described by 14 participants, was that one partner 
took charge of certain expenses, and the other was responsible for others (it is 
acknowledged that this might also be set up to fit within either a 50/ 50 or a 
proportional type of arrangement).  For example, it was stated that: 
 
She has all of the fixed costs (mortgage, water, electric, TV license and gas), I 
 do all of the flexible costs (phone, broadband, food, petrol, car) (R68).   
 
We have two of the four utilities each and we have a large payment each going 
out of our accounts – mine is the car and associated costs, his is the mortgage 
(R135). 
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Such behaviour, tending to work through the use of separate bank accounts, evinces a 
form of what Pahl (1983) terms, ‘independent management’.  Burgoyne (2004: 166) 
previously suggested that less than 2% of married different-sex couples use a form of 
‘independent management’.  A fourth, and additional, arrangement was of one partner 
paying for the bills, and the other making a transfer to that partner.  In one answer, for 
example, it was explained how: 
 
Usually, I pay and, at the end of the month, my partner transfers her share 
(R20). 
 
Finally, although only in two instances, the partners had taken it in turns to pay for 
their expenses. 
 

























Who makes the financial decisions? 
 
 
The respondents were further questioned as to who makes the financial decisions 
within their relationship (a key aspect of what Edwards (1981) terms financial 
“control”).  I envisaged that they would have in mind the purchase of larger items 
(such as a television or a car), or decisions relating to the investment of money, 
although I appreciate that participants may have interpreted this question in different 
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ways.  As can be seen in figure 4.10, of those that answered the question, 66% (n = 
198) said that they and their partner made such decisions equally, with only 20.3% (n 
= 61) suggesting that financial decisions were mostly or always conducted by them, 
and 13.6% (n = 41) that they were made by their partner.  A contrast might be drawn 
between this result and Pahl’s (1989) finding that men tend to have a greater say as to 
how money will be used in different-sex relationships.  There, it was observed that the 
husbands were the dominant decision-making partner in 44% of the couples 
interviewed, by comparison to 37% making such decisions equally (Pahl, 1989: 173).  
That said, there have been suggestions of younger women now taking charge of the 
majority (52%) of choices relating to long-term financial planning (Lloyds TSB, 
2012).  Statistical tests were again run to investigate which factors might be impacting 
my respondents’ behaviour in this respect, and significant associations were likewise 
identified relating to social class (x2 = 9.518, df = 4, p = 0.049) and to the identity of 
the ‘main earner’ (x2 = 41.854, df = 4, p = 0.000).  As to the former, the relationship 
was that respondents who viewed themselves to be middle class were more likely (n = 
147, 70.3%) to describe the equal sharing of financial decisions than those 
considering themselves working class (n = 38, 53.5%). 
 
With respect to the identity of the ‘main earner’, the association was established upon 
me having subsequently recoded the data into a threefold scale (me; my partner).  The 
nature of the relationship was that respondents were more likely (n = 59, 76.6%) to 
share this task where there was no ‘main earner’ (as against 70% (n = 77) where the 
participant’s partner was the ‘main earner’, and 53.8% (n = 56) where they were).  
Moreover, a greater number of respondents (n = 40, 38.5%) that answered that they 
were the ‘main earner’ said that they made the financial decisions than we might 
expect were there no difference between the categories, and fewer (n = 8, 7.7%) 
responded that their partners made these decisions (and vice versa).  What this 
indicates is that, where one partner earns more than another, that partner is more 
likely to make the financial decisions.  Therefore, there is some evidence of the 
“patterns of dominance that cohere around the role and status afforded the higher 
earner”, even in same-sex couples (Burns et al, 2008: 499).  The pattern hints at 
Blood and Wolfe’s (1960: 29) “resource theory” of power, under which the balance of 
power may be determined by, “the comparative resourcefulness of the two partners” 
(an observation also made by Rowlingson and Joseph, 2010).  Yet, contrary to that 
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theory, female ‘breadwinning’ has not necessarily meant control over household 
income in different-sex couples (Sonnenberg, 2008). 
 
In the participants’ descriptive accounts, a stress was placed on how: 
 
We […] would not make an extravagant purchase without talking to [one 
another] (R40). 
 
This accords with responses to a later statement that they and their partner always 
discussed major financial decisions.  As can be seen in figure 4.11, the majority of 
respondents (n = 164, 55.6%) strongly agreed with this statement, with just 15 (5.1%) 
disagreeing (from slightly disagree to strongly disagree).  This finding again sits well 
with the democracy and cooperation that characterises Baker et al‘s (2004) equality of 
power.  Those with children living in their household (M = 1.52, SD = 0.876) were 
more likely to agree (t = -2.124, df = 172.125, two-tailed p = 0.035) that they and 
their partner engaged in such discussion than those without (M = 1.81, SD = 1.278).  
Similarly, those in a legally recognised relationship (M = 1.54, SD = 1.040) were 
more likely to agree (t = -2.468, df = 284, two-tailed p = 0.014) that they and their 
partner discussed such decisions than those cohabiting (M = 1.89, SD = 1.302).   
 















Strongly agree Agree Slightly agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 













'My partner and I always discuss financial decisions' 
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Tying the various threads together in relation to the respondents’ financial 
arrangements, it seems that, in the absence of gendered ‘scripts’ as to how they 
‘should’ behave, a position of relative independence has been adopted.  This is 
evinced by the wide retention of separate accounts and the lesser use of joint 
accounts, by comparison to existing data on different-sex couples.  The results 
suggest that models of heterosexual behaviour such as money sharing may not 
necessarily be reflective of the lived experiences of same-sex couples.  Furthermore, 
there was a relative absence of financially dominant behaviour by one partner in terms 
of the family finances (in contrast to what has tended to occur within different-sex 
relationships), indicating greater equality of power (Cooper, 2000).  Participants 
described bill paying and financial decision-making as being conducted more 
‘equally’, with the average score for the two tasks amounting to 2.85.  This figure, 
whilst weighing slightly more towards the respondents’ side than the figure obtained 
for housework, is still close to the value of 3 (amounting to equal division).  Such 
results appear, once again, to work against heteronormative suppositions of the male 
‘breadwinning’ versus female ‘homemaking’ scenario that forms the basis of our 
current regime for financial remedy, raising the possibility of transformation. 
 
Conclusion 
The law of financial relief seems to assume a level of homogeneity amongst its 
subjects.17  However, my findings signal that, in terms of how household tasks and 
financial responsibilities are divided, same-sex partners may live in an altogether 
more ‘equal’ and balanced manner than different-sex couples.  Being shared, 
negotiated, discussed and chosen by the partners on a more level ‘playing field’, 
rather than dictated by gendered restrictions and constraints, the participants’ roles 
evince a higher level of equality of working and learning, and of power (as conceived 
of by Cooper (2000) and Baker et al (2004)).  This being the case, the property rules 
that have been made available to same-sex partners on relationship dissolution may 
not be suited to these relationships (Leckey, 2013).  The different ways in which the 
relationships have been conducted, as discussed in this chapter, indicate that we need 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As was demonstrated in chapter 2. 
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to think again about how to go about implementing LGBT ‘equality’, as against 
adopting a straightforward focus on formal equality. 
 
More broadly (and in helping to answer my first research question), I assert that the 
results set out in this chapter help to raise new challenges and ways of thinking about 
what gender means in relationships, so as to bring about a shift in our conceptual 
understandings.  This is particularly the case given the contention made by, for 
instance, Heaphy et al (2013) that developments in heterosexual and same-sex 
relationships can be “intrinsically interlinked”.  My findings suggest, as has 
previously been argued by Hunter (1991), that lesbian and gay partners hold the 
capacity to expose and denaturalise the historical construction of gender that marriage 
centres around.  On the basis of the notion that gender is something that people do, 
the results reveal the ability of subsisting same-sex couples to ‘undo’ gender 
difference.  The predominant focus of this particular project is, of course, on what 
happens when lesbian and gay couples come to ‘law’, and the knock-on effect of them 
doing so could potentially be to enable law to get past inherited notions of identity (as 
the facts before the legal actors will no longer replicate heteronormativity).  This 
would open up new possibilities for the law to consider the multiplicity of its subjects, 
and to achieve greater equality of respect and recognition (under which differences 
are celebrated (Baker, 2001)).  I will move on to consider the degree to which this 
potential is being realised in the three chapters to follow, where I analyse interview 
data obtained from practising family solicitors and clients. 
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Chapter 5- The making and breaking of civil partnerships 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the interview participants and to 
interrogate the clients’ accounts of entering into civil partnerships, alongside the 
reasoning behind their relationships breaking down (and the solicitors’ perceptions of 
the same).  In respect of civil partnership formation, I return to some of the reasons 
for seeking formalised relationships identified in chapter 1.  I argue that the clients’ 
accounts drew on discourses of romance and recognition, although more practical, 
rights-based, explanations featured most frequently.  This may be because, as was 
highlighted by Richman (2014: xix), “almost all of the […] political maneuvering to 
gain the right to same-sex marriage was framed as an issue of equal rights, and 
included a refrain about the […] legal and financial benefits [that had been] denied” 
to couples unable to marry.  I then move on to discuss the causes of dissolution.  Both 
the client and solicitor accounts stressed a desire for sameness of treatment in terms of 
the possibility of petitioning on the basis of adultery.  In contrast, I observe that the 
legislative framework positions gay and lesbian couples outside of, and ‘other’ to, 
(traditionally heterosexual) monogamy, due to cultural stereotypes about their sexual 
relationships.  There were indications within the client interviews, though, in favour 
of rethinking the ways in which we conceive of adultery, moving away from the 
common law’s focus on an archaic heterosexual definition. 
 
Why opt for civil partnership? 
In this section, I consider the motivations described by my interviewees for 
embarking on civil partnership, and test their discourse against the existing academic 
arguments.  I make a distinction between those explanations centring around “the 
ideal of marriage for love” and those that were more practical (Bourassa, 2004: 61).  
Pragmatic rationales featured most commonly amongst the partners’ explanations, 
which is interesting given that only three of the 39 different-sex partners interviewed 
in Eekelaar’s (2007) study reported having married for “pragmatic ends”.  The lack of 
importance placed on ‘love’ amongst the clients might appear to carry potential for 
transformation, given the link made by Rich (1983) between idealised romance and 
naturalised gender roles and domestic subordination. 
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On the other hand, as was set out in chapter 1, rights-based reasoning can be criticised 
for entailing that lesbians and gay men seek inclusion into institutions rooted in 
heteronormativity.  In fact, I observe a relative lack of desire for social and legal 
recognition through civil partnership, which may seem striking given the disparities 
found between same and different-sex partners in chapter 4.  Not only this but, in the 
context of a broader stress on formal equality, there was some use by the clients of the 
terminology of ‘sameness’ to marriage, and of identical language.  Notably, the 
solicitors rationalised the actions of same-sex partners on heteronormative terms to a 
greater extent, and this assists in beginning to answer my second research question 
(marking the start of the wider discourse of formal equality discussed in chapters 6 
and 7).  There also seemed to be a common lack of intention amongst the clients to 
take on, through civil partnership, the same financial obligations as attach to marriage.  




Turning initially to the more romantic reasons that can lie behind civil partnership, 
consider the accounts of Bill and Heather: 
 
I thought, ‘oh, we’re good… you know, if we’ve stood… we’ve been through 
all of this […] we’re meant for each other’, and that was my thing, and I 
thought, ‘let’s make it… let’s make it official’ […] Ever since civil 
partnerships came about, 2005, he was, you know, every now and again he 
would say about putting a ring on my finger, and all of this sort of thing […] 
To me, it was a formal commitment for life, recognised in law, for me to be 
with that person (Bill). 
 
It’s ultimately about two people who love each other, that want to spend their 
lives together, umm, committing to a relationship (Heather). 
 
These explanations evoke the sentiment of “forever” that “characterises traditional 
ideas of romantic love” (Donovan et al, 1999: 695).  Peel and Harding (2004: 591) are 
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critical of such discourse, contending that it is “awash with heterosexuality”.  Even 
so, it is perhaps to be predicted that at least some of the clients should have spoken in 
these terms, given that lesbians and gay men are, “socialized within the dominant 
heteronormative discourses of romantic love” (Green, 2010: 428). 
 
From a slightly different perspective, Edward (the youngest client in my sample) 
resorted to the “rituals of heterosexual romance” in describing the day that he had 
entered into his civil partnership (Peel and Harding, 2004: 591): 
 
We had, umm, a registry office ceremony, followed by a, sort of, family-based 
lunch, followed by, umm, a wedding… so, a Church of England blessing, and 
we had about 200 people at that […] and that was a big commitment to both of 
us.  In fact, in many ways, that service and the public nature of that was almost 
bigger than the private ceremony, and I think that we both felt that that gave 
such a strong message to so many people about the things that we believed, 
and how proud we were to have the whole thing (Edward). 
 
The client hinted at having used the occasion as a way of achieving social 
acknowledgment from, for instance, families of origin (and a desire to attain this has 
previously been cited as important by Barker (2012)). 
 
Seven of the solicitors repeated the partners’ romantic sentiment, placing even 
stronger emphasis on it.  It was particularly evident in the narrative of Bill’s solicitor, 
Mr. Kennedy (who was working on his second civil partnership matter to date).  This 
might be viewed in two ways: firstly, that he was simply reflecting the feelings that 
his client had expressed about his relationship; or secondly, that he and the client had 
recently discussed presenting the case in such (heteronormative) terms at the 
impending court proceedings.  In any event, when asked why he considered that Bill 
had opted to formalise the relationship, Mr. Kennedy highlighted that: 
 
There was clearly no element of him thinking, ‘I’m entering into this civil 
partnership as a way of regulating my relationship with my partner’.  It was 
his way of showing that he was committed and that he loved his partner (Mr. 
Kennedy). 
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The solicitor made the assertion that lesbians and gay men enter into civil partnerships 
to show commitment, and that idea was expressed more widely.  For instance, it was 
stated that: 
 
They’re leading with their heart […] Emotional stability, emotional security, 
and knowing that you are saying, ‘we’re going to stay together’.  I think that 
that’s why they do it (Ms Irvine). 
 
It is almost showing a commitment to each other and showing that you intend 
to- as with marriage- […] be bound together as one unit.  So, I think that it’s 
[…] wanting to show that you love each other and, actually, you want to be 
committed, legally as well as emotionally (Ms Main). 
 
The fact that Ms Main stresses sameness between marriage and civil partnership 
indicates that heterosexuality remains the unspoken norm against which people are 
measured (Herman, 1994).  The drawing of parallels between same and different-sex 
couples notably featured in a number of other solicitor accounts as to why people 
enter into civil partnerships, including those of Ms Boyce (who had conducted one 
dissolution matter and dealt with a number of enquiries) and Mr. Arnold (who had 
conducted 10): 
 
I would imagine that it is, you know, really similar reasons to the reasons that 
people get married.  You know, this wish to sort of show everybody, you 
know, ‘we are now this couple who are doing this’, and having some stability, 
you know… an expression of love […] and [they] think that it is a romantic 
thing to do, probably (Ms Boyce). 
 
Mr. Arnold: I think that gay couples marry for the same reasons as straight 
couples, it’s all of that soppy sentimental stuff, which really surprised me 
actually.  I mean, when civil partnership first came out I was, sort of, thinking, 
oh, you know, ‘gay couples, […] they’ll go into it with their eyes open...’ 
Interviewer: Not so much? 
Mr. Arnold: No [laughs]. 
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The practitioners’ narratives chime with arguments made in favour of same-sex 
marriage in the recent Parliamentary debates, in which parliamentarians emphasised 
that marriage was about ‘love’ (Harding, 2015). 
 
Conversely, two of the solicitors did recognise a difference in attitude amongst 
lesbians and gay men towards formalised relationships: 
 
I think that perhaps the, sort of, pragmatic, practical issues… same-sex 
partners were more alive to them.  Whereas, you know, the dream of 
heterosexual marriage, you know, it’s rose tinted spectacles, ‘this is it’ (Mr. 
Derrick). 
 
I’ve got friends who are doing it and don’t want anyone to know, because you 
didn’t become a feminist to get married, and you certainly didn’t become a 
bloody lesbian [to do so] (Ms Field). 
  
Whilst Ms Field (who had had the most experience of these matters in my sample) 
reported older lesbians as rejecting the potentially romantic aspect of civil 
partnerships, she did not consider this to be true of the younger generation.  She 
viewed that marriage is fashionable, and felt that young lesbians and gay men would 
wish to formalise their relationships to ‘keep up’ with their heterosexual 
contemporaries. 
 
Amongst the clients that I interviewed, however, it was not only the older lesbian 
feminists that eschewed the heteronormative idealising of formalised relationships.  
Debbie, who was in her forties, set out how: 
 
I said to her, ‘I am not marrying you because I need to show you how much I 
love you’ […] I didn’t make any bones about, you know, saying that it was a 
love thing.  ‘I think that [from] the fact that I’ve been with you for this amount 
of years […] you should know that anyway’ (Debbie). 
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It is striking that Debbie should reject the notion of romance whilst, at the same time, 
drawing on the traditional language of ‘marriage’.  In this way, in just one sentence, 
she indicated both elements of assimilation into, and of resistance against, the 
heteronorm.  The denial of romance may be surprising, seemingly working against 
Solomon et al's (2005: 565) finding that a majority (93.7%) of their American 
participants cited ‘love’ as the reason behind their civil union.  That said, the 
participants in that study were still in their formalised relationship, and the same is 
true of Heaphy et al‘s (2013: 13) respondents (in their early twenties and thirties) who 
reported that, “decisions to marry were most often cast in the language of love”.  It 
may be the case that people whose relationships have broken down, such as my 
interview participants, may not be so keen on the ‘love’ discourse.  On top of this, 
Clarke et al (2007) observed a minimal emphasis on such reasoning amongst their 
long-term same-sex partner participants in the context of a broader study focusing on 
finances.  Their suggestion was that this focus may have directed concentration 
towards material concerns, and the same point might be made with respect to my own 
project.  Indeed, Debbie ultimately set out how her civil partnership had been 
embarked on for “practical reasons”, and such factors were cited more widely across 
the client accounts.  This was occasionally in conjunction with romantic discourse, 
revealing the “multilayered experience” of formalising relationships (Richman, 2014).  
I will proceed to examine these rationales, and especially those centring around rights 
rhetoric, in greater detail. 
 
Rights driven? 
That the partners should place greater weight on the pragmatic motivations for 
entering into a civil partnership may seem transformative, deviating from the 
heteronormative romantic ‘ideal’.  The rationalising notably deviates in this way 
because its focus is on protecting partners at the end of a relationship due to illness or 
death, rather than on the continuing nature of the partnership.  Even so, there are still 
some features that resonate with hegemonic notions of the family.  This is particularly 
the case in terms of the significance placed by a number of clients on ‘kinship’, and 
on the desire for healthcare workers to acknowledge their partner, which resonates 
with traditional concepts of familial care and responsibility.  The participants’ 
responses echo a previously employed pro-marriage argument focusing on the 
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injustice of one partner in LGBT couples being denied access to the other during a 
medical emergency, and being denied the right to make decisions on their partner’s 
behalf (Polikoff, 2008; Barker, 2012).  The issue of medical treatment was also a 
strategy employed by Stonewall (2004) and, once again, by Members of Parliament 
during the debates that preceded the 2004 Act.  For instance, David Borrow (HC 
Hansard, 12 October 2004: col. 210), MP for South Ribble, referred to the, “well-
documented cases of the partners of people who have died or become ill being 
completely excluded from consideration”.  In fact, there is no law in England and 
Wales governing who can visit a person in hospital, and nobody has the right to 
consent to another adult’s medical treatment, meaning that this problem is more social 
than legal (Auchmuty, 2004).  Nevertheless, several of the clients expressed their 
concern: 
 
In the event that something terrible were to happen, I would want my wishes 
to be carried out, i.e. pull the plug, as harsh as that might sound.  The person 
who should make that decision should be my partner (Anthony).   
 
If something, umm, had rendered either of us, umm, in hospital, we knew that 
neither of us would be treated as next of kin.  And, that was something that 
neither of us could tolerate, because although we now have very good 
relationships with parents and things, umm, it wasn’t appropriate in our 
relationship for those to be the main people who had a say (Jennifer). 
 
Dickens et al (2009) identified a similar emphasis in their earlier study on the impact 
of civil partnership on the lives of same-sex couples, whilst Thomas (2012: 212) 
found that his same-sex partner interviewees, “expressed a kind of vulnerability” 
around next of kin rights.  Yet, the point was picked up in just one of the solicitor 
interviews.  When asked why she perceived that people choose to enter into a civil 
partnership, Ms Field stressed that: 
 
It’s about what happens if you have dementia […] I think that it’s wanting to 
make sure that… you know, that you can’t be excluded, umm, from your 
partner’s life (Ms Field). 
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As a lesbian herself, Ms Field was probably able to reflect from more of an ‘insider’ 
perspective, as well as on her experience in practice.   
 
The clients’ interview data evinced a desire to be included within aspects of 
citizenship long reserved for heterosexual married partners.  This sits well with Clarke 
et al’s (2007) finding that rights were considered “paramount” amongst their 
participants, and links back to the rights-based arguments set out in chapter 1.  Of 
course, the approach is subject to the same criticism as I set out at that point, that 
being that rationalising in this way may reduce the radical potential of formalised 
lesbian and gay relationships.  However, a wish was expressed to be treated the same, 
and we might anticipate this, given the awareness of the lack of formal equality still 
attributed to same-sex partners in many jurisdictions.  Jennifer specifically voiced the 
rights-based argument: 
 
When I got civilly partnered, it was mostly to do with, ‘I, as a tax-paying 
citizen, want the same rights as the next person, and if I’m getting less then 
it’s… you know, it’s not right’.  It can’t be done in a civilised society 
(Jennifer). 
 
Jennifer’s point ties in with Harding’s (2006: 529) finding that her respondents 
stressed having, “fulfill[ed] their part of the bargain by being good citizens” in a tax-
paying sense, and that they should therefore be treated as “full citizens”. 
 
With that notion in mind, and continuing with the concept of ‘kin’, my participants 
also rationalised their decisions to formalise their relationship on the basis of 
obtaining inheritance rights.  Debbie detailed having seen the film ‘If These Walls 
Could Talk 2’, which operated as a powerful representation of the lack of kinship 
recognition (Kane, 2000).  She set out how, within it, one party to a lesbian couple 
had died intestate and: 
 
The family came and basically took everything, and this woman is now left 
grieving for her partner that she’d been with for maybe thirty years, and pretty 
much homeless, furnitureless… and that, sort of, was obviously something 
that was in my head (Debbie). 
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Heather additionally explained how her ex-partner had sought protection of this 
nature, although she personally had been: 
 
Relatively happy to stay as we were, living together.  We’d got wills set up so 
that, if anything happened to either of us, we were both protected.  Umm, she 
was stated on my pension as the benefactor if anything happened to me.  So, 
from that point of view, we’d sort of tried to set things in place prior to civil 
partnerships being available (Heather). 
 
Weeks et al (1999b) and Monk (2011) previously observed such safeguards as having 
been put in place in lesbian and gay relationships, given that the intestacy rules are 
more likely to reflect the wishes of heterosexuals.  Nonetheless, the wills created 
would, of course, have been automatically revoked on entering into a civil 
partnership. 
 
On a note related to this issue of inheritance, Anthony explained his decision to 
embark on civil partnership as being driven, at least in part, by the tax implications.  
Anthony was the wealthiest participant in my project, and he highlighted that the 
assets held during the relationship had exceeded the inheritance tax threshold.  He 
objected to the consequences of this, describing them as “crazy”, and Ms Field echoed 
his view: 
 
They were some of the worst injustices before civil partnerships: people 
having to sell their homes, umm, you know, to pay the inheritance tax (Ms 
Field). 
 
The payment of tax for property transferred on the death of a partner was highlighted 
as a worry for same-sex couples prior to civil partnerships having become available 
(see Women and Equality Unit, 2003, although it has been suggested to be of most 
relevance to men (Auchmuty, 2015)).  The point was additionally raised by Shipman 
and Smart (2007) in relation to the interviews that they conducted with same-sex 
couples that had opted for a commitment ceremony.  The introduction of civil 
partnerships appears to have provided a mechanism for same-sex partners to protect 
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themselves from this kind of unfavourable outcome. 
 
The notion of there being such practical reasons behind lesbians’ and gay men’s 
choices to enter into the institution featured in other practitioner accounts.  Consider 
these explanations: 
 
On death, of course, it’s terribly important.  You know, if I were to die, 
everything goes to [partner], without any fuss or bother.  She can sort out the 
funeral, she can have everything and the properties, you know (Ms James). 
 
Some people […] might have more of a practical, financial approach, as with 
marriage.  More to do with wealth planning, rather than an emotional level 
(Ms Main). 
 
This suggestion of “wealth planning” is supported by the discussion below of the use 
of pre-civil partnership agreements.  Once more, Ms Main is making contentions of 
sameness to different-sex couples, although existing data seems to dispute this.  In 
Eekelaar’s (2007) study, a greater number of participants referred to their marriage as 
having been an external manifestation of an internal state, or a source of confirmation 
of their sense of commitment. 
 
The solicitors identified further motivations centring around the social benefits 
enjoyed by married couples (which were highlighted as concerns for same-sex 
partners by Donovan et al, 1999).  In this respect, Cooper (2001) has notably 
emphasised that the ability of lesbians and gay men to access some of the same 
benefits as heterosexuals can be seen as “progressive” from the perspective of 
equality of power.  This is given that they are now able to generate effects that were 
previously denied to them.  The specific motivations raised within the interviews 
related to pension rights on the death of a partner and to immigration.  The issue of 
pensions was not evident in the clients’ explanations, although Ms Field described 
having come across immigration issues in a case where there had been a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ between a British man in his fifties and a 30-year-old foreign national.  
Immigration-related reasons were cited as a key impetus by George as well, who 
stated that he had embarked on civil partnership because his partner was not a British 
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citizen, and they had feared that he might be sent home. 
 
Recognition driven? 
A third broad rationale that arose concerned the importance of achieving a form of 
social and legal recognition through civil partnership.  That notion draws back to the 
works of Fraser (and that of Baker et al (2004) on respect and recognition).18  Fraser’s 
(1997; 2003; 2012) use of the word ‘recognition’ seems to encompass the possibility 
of entering into a civil partnership to combat the “cultural” devaluation of 
homosexuality.  Isaac spoke specifically in terms of ‘recognition’, although 
perceiving this to be something brought about more by marriage than by civil 
partnership.  He explained how he and his new partner intended to get married 
because they planned to adopt, feeling that it was, “quite a large tick box” as far as 
social workers were concerned.  This reiterated the sentiment of two of Heaphy et al’s 
(2013: 98) male respondents as to their prospects of being considered as adoptive 
parents, as well as that of a number of MacIntosh et al’s (2010) Canadian lesbian and 
gay participants.  Not only this, but Isaac referred to a friend’s experience of passing 
through immigration in another country, where: 
 
He goes into what people call the ‘brown room’ […] where they put people 
from ethnic backgrounds […] and, umm, his partner asked if he could be with 
him in the room, err, and he was told, err, ‘well, are you together?’, and he 
said, ‘yes, we are together, he’s my partner’, and, err, he said, well, umm, ‘do 
you share a surname?’, and he said, ‘no, we don’t’.  Err, and immigration was 
like, ‘well, you’re not together in the eyes of our law’ (Isaac). 
 
Isaac believed that entering into a marriage would be a way of avoiding such a 
situation occurring between himself and his partner (although, of course, the true 
situation is that same-sex marriage is legally recognised in some jurisdictions and not 
in others).  His response here resonates with Finlay et al’s (2003) assertion of lesbians 
and gay men viewing marriage as a route to obtaining recognition by the state.  It was, 
nevertheless, highlighted in chapter 1 that obtaining such recognition can entail a 
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trade-off, as, “one’s public and recognizable sense of personhood [may become] 
fundamentally dependent on the lexicon of that legitimation” (Butler, 2002: 17). 
 
That said, whilst I am mindful that my sample is not representative, notions of 
recognition received a broader lack of emphasis and enthusiasm in the client 
interviews.  Anthony, for instance, explained that: 
 
When [civil partnership] became possible it wasn’t like, ‘great, here’s my flag, 
I’ll wave it, and aren’t we great and pioneering’, it was more around the… 
okay, there are some practicalities of it (Anthony). 
 
This may be on the basis that, as Butler (1998) has argued, the oppression of lesbians 
and gay men has been situated in the economic or material sphere as much as in the 
structure of cultural valuation.  Butler (1998) contends that the production of ‘family’ 
life, and particularly of the heterosexual normative family, has been an essential 
component of how society produces what it needs.  Indeed, the family has become 
increasingly important in light of an ideological shift favouring the notion of marriage 
and the private household being the ‘proper’ place to provide social support (with 
there being less of a collective sense of responsibility for individuals in need) 
(Duggan, 2003).  The ‘holy family’ has consequently constrained the routes by which 
property interests are regulated, and Butler (1998) cited as an example of this the 
inability of lesbians and gay men to receive the property of a deceased partner.  
Whilst that inability has now been addressed by the 2004 Act (and, as is discussed 
above, my interviewees considered this significant), it may have come at a cost.  This 
is because with the incorporation of lesbians and gay men into formalised 
relationships has arguably instigated the, “domestication of deviant sexualities within 
a safe and recognizable framework that is useful to capitalism” (Boyd, 1999: 45).   
Accordingly, it may be that same-sex partners have been pushed towards acting as, 
“good families […] i.e. families that have a certain kind of economic status”, thus 
reinforcing existing norms (Kandaswamy, quoted in Dettmer, 2010: 34).19 
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Despite their overall lack of focus on the need for recognition, there was also a lack of 
subversive discourse in the clients’ responses.  Whereas I have identified that a body 
of feminists historically saw same-sex marriage as having transgressive possibilities,20 
much of that literature is now dated, and the attitude was largely absent the partners’ 
discourses.  This is possibly to be expected, given the wider emphasis on formal 
equality.  It did, though, feature in a couple of the solicitor accounts; whilst Mr. Henry 
touched on the attitude of being “gay and proud”, Ms James’s description of her own 
civil partnership ceremony harked back to Weeks’s (2004) point about same-sex lives 
being an “experiment”.  Notably, Ms James was only moderately younger than the 
‘50 years plus’ age group suggested by Auchmuty (2013) to enter into civil 
partnerships as a “political gesture”.  Ms James explained how, on the day of her civil 
partnership ceremony:  
 
We had a do, and we went up to [location name], a very nice restaurant […] 
and, at 5 ‘o’ clock, [partner] said to me, ‘why are they all still here?’, and I 
said, ‘oh, we’re supposed to go, aren’t we?’ (Ms James). 
 
Subsequently, she stressed that lesbians and gay men are still “making it up”, feeling 
little connection with heterosexual conventions.  Ms James opined that her clients had 
been aware that: 
 
The institution doesn’t ape the patriarchal… you know, all of that taking the 
name of the man, being given away by your father, and that shit.  None of that 
happens, or it doesn’t have to happen, umm, and it’s been different (Ms 
James). 
 
More commonly, however, the solicitors placed a greater emphasis than the clients on 
the perceived desire for same-sex relationship recognition.  That said, their stress 
tended to focus less on the acknowledgment of the potential differences in lesbian and 
gay family lives (and so, on achieving ‘recognition’ in Fraser’s (2012) sense of 
“positively valorizing […] diversity”), and more straightforwardly on the partners’ 
integration within ‘society’.  For instance, Ms Ennis claimed that: 
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They want it more concrete for stability, and for society to accept them.  And 
it gives them, you know, it gives it… to make it more legalised, it makes them 
more confident as a person (Ms Ennis). 
 
Ms Ennis’s response repeats the recurring theme of “acceptance” deployed within the 
political rhetoric in support of the 2004 Act (Barker, 2006).  Ms Gale, who had 
worked on three civil partnership cases, likewise contended that same-sex partners 
might be seeking acknowledgment, especially where one or more partner has resided 
in a country where there is no such relationship recognition available.  Ms Irvine, 
taking the idea further, said that she believed that people opted for civil partnership as 




The clients and solicitors also took somewhat different views on whether same-sex 
partners have borne in mind the financial implications of their formalised relationship 
‘going wrong’.  On the one hand, three solicitors considered that there had been a 
level of cognisance: 
 
Their intentions were to really show to the other person that they were serious 
about them, and the way that they were serious was that they were entering 
into a legal arrangement or partnership that meant that the starting point, in 
law, was an entitlement to claim against each other’s assets (Ms Gale). 
 
You would think that people would look into it before they did enter into civil 
partnership (Ms Main). 
 
Ms Main was making an assumption, having had no direct experience of dissolution 
(although having assisted on one case as a trainee).  Ms James (who had been 
involved in twenty civil partnership cases) additionally considered that there had been 
awareness, amongst her gay male clients, of the obligations that would arise were 
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their relationship to break down.  Conversely, she described the women as being 
more, “we’re going to stay together”. 
 
In fact, Ms Irvine, who reported working on approximately two dissolution matters a 
year, observed a wider lack of forethought as to what would happen if the civil 
partnership were to fail.  This point was reflected elsewhere in my solicitor interview 
data: 
 
One bloke said to me in the beginning, ‘err, I didn’t realise that it was almost 
the same as getting married’, ‘well, what did you think that you were doing?’  
‘Do I really have to go to court to get out of this?’ (Ms Field). 
 
The indication was that there has been a lesser degree of understanding of the legal 
and financial implications of entering into a civil partnership than those of entering 
into a marriage.  Ms Field considered there to have initially been a “surprising” level 
of “ignorance” in this respect amongst civil partners, and she expressed uncertainty as 
to the level of comprehension, even to date, of the monetary obligations that arise.  In 
agreement with this, it was commented that: 
 
A woman that I’m advising on a civil partnership dissolution at the moment, 
she is the one with the money and she had no idea, she said, when she 
registered the civil partnership that she was getting into the, sort of, financial 
obligations that I’m now telling her that she’s got (Mr. Arnold). 
 
People don’t consider the financial implications, and the arising of potential 
claims, when they enter into a civil partnership.  But, I presume that that is 
down to the fact that we haven’t seen […] a huge amount of civil partnership 
clients.  And, as a result, umm, we can only assume that there hasn’t been a 
huge amount in the area.  Umm, and so, there are not many people who’ve 
experienced the arising of claims as a result of a civil partnership, when you 
compare that to the amount of people who have been through, or know 
somebody that has been through, for example, err, a divorce (Mr. Kennedy). 
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In relation to his own client, Bill, Mr. Kennedy proceeded to claim that the financial 
consequences were not taken into account at all. 
 
Bill’s own account supported his solicitor’s suggestion, describing how, at the point 
of embarking on civil partnership: 
 
We’d been a couple for fifteen years, we’d lived in the house for thirteen years 
[…] I would never have believed that we’d be in this situation now (Bill). 
 
Notably, Bill and his partner had entered into an agreement when purchasing their 
property that set out how that property should be determined were their relationship to 
break down.  The case being run on Bill’s behalf was that entering into this agreement 
constituted ‘conduct’ for the purpose of the legislation, and that there was no reason 
why it should not still stand.  This, it was being asserted, was particularly given that 
the subsequent civil partnership had, at least arguably, been entered into for emotional 
reasons (rather than because the parties were seeking financial regulation of their 
relationship).  The outcome of that argument is unknown, given that the interviews 
were conducted immediately prior to the commencement of legal proceedings.  Yet, it 
is interesting that Mr. Kennedy should appear to be picking and choosing which 
aspects of traditional heterosexuality he sought to draw on, emphasising romantic 
love whilst, at the same time, rejecting the conventional pooling and asset sharing that 
tends to be associated with formalised relationships. 
 
The optimistic attitude of Bill (aged 54) as to the prospects for his partnership 
resonates with Auchmuty’s (2013) contention that older people tend to believe that 
their relationships will not break down (although that contention, tying into Ms 
James’s above suggestion, more specifically applied to women).  This belief may be 
held on the basis that, given that their relationships have often been of some length, it 
must be difficult to foresee a change in the status quo.  Even so, an observable 
confidence that their relationships would endure, and a resulting lack of forethought 
of what the impact of dissolution would be, were common features across my sample.  
For instance, it was also reported (by three clients in their forties) that: 
 
We’d been together for twelve years, not had a problem, and had a, you know, 
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good life together.  And, there was never really a hint that there would be any 
issues […] It hadn’t really entered my head that I would be in the position that 
I was in (Heather). 
 
People often think about all of the nice things in a civil partnership, umm, but 
they don’t think about what it means in law and what you may have to do if 
you need to back out of it (Isaac). 
 
When you get civil partnered, you don’t think about the awful truth of what 
might happen (Freddie). 
 
Such remarks reveal that, whilst seeking the rights already conferred on married 
couples, same-sex partners have not simultaneously wished to take on the full legal 
implications, and consequent economic responsibilities, associated with formalised 
heterosexual relationship breakdown.21  I recognise that there have been assertions 
that different-sex couples do not understand the legal implications of divorce either 
(see, for example, Clarke, 2014), and that such implications rarely figure in decisions 
to enter into a first-time (heterosexual) marriage (Barlow, 2009).  Nevertheless, the 
solicitors observed this to be a more striking feature amongst their dissolution cases.  
The only real exception to this in my sample was Anthony (in his mid-forties), who 
accounted for his decision to enter into a civil partnership partially by reason of the 
asymmetry in his and his partner’s financial earnings.  All the same, whilst having 
anticipated what would happen to the assets, Anthony highlighted that he had not 
considered the possibility of having to pay ongoing maintenance.22 
 
It must further be highlighted that the solicitors interviewed reported having worked 
on a number of pre-civil partnership agreements.  This suggests that those who have 
grasped the financial consequences of civil partnership breakdown have regularly 
chosen to opt out of them.  It might, in some respects, seem remarkable that this 
should be the case, given the notionally more ‘equal’ economic positions of same-sex 
partners (although there were indications that these agreements may sometimes be 
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used to ring-fence inherited wealth).  Indeed, amongst my client participants, only 
Isaac reported having considered entering into one, ultimately deciding against it 
because he viewed them still to be a “bit flaky” (despite this being subsequent to 
Radmacher, where the weight attributed to pre-nuptial agreements was strengthened). 
 
However, contrary to Isaac’s decision, Ms James considered that gay men were more 
likely to enter into such agreements than heterosexual couples.  In terms of the types 
of cases where this occurred, both she and Mr. Arnold were in agreement: 
 
Gay guy from abroad comes over here, pre-nup… I do lots of those (Ms 
James). 
 
I get a lot of pre-nups… pre-civil partnership agreements from this practice, 
and there seem to be an awful lot of these middle aged men who are entering 
into a civil partnership with, you know, a twenty-something Brazilian (Mr. 
Arnold). 
 
Mr. Arnold’s response might appear to reflect Ross et al’s (2011) claim that age 
differences are more common in male partnerships than female.  It additionally 
signals that ‘green card marriages’ may have been an issue amongst civil partners.  As 
to why else a greater number of men may have sought agreements, this could be 
because they tend to have more extensive assets than women, and thus have greater 
need for protection (Trades Union Congress, 2013).  That said, more generally, Ms 
Field considered that a favourable attitude towards agreements was “trickling 
through” amongst same-sex partners.  Mr. Derrick similarly observed the popularity 
of pre-civil partnership agreements, explaining this on the basis that: 
  
A lot of the objections that we’d seen historically from the courts around 
prenuptial agreements in heterosexual marriage were the whole issue around 
being against public policy […] whereas […] because there was no religious 
element, initially, under the CPA, and it was a partnership, then actually, 
because it was a contractual arrangement tantamount to any contractual 
arrangement, you should be able to make some planning around it (Mr. 
Derrick). 
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This view of civil partnership amounting to a contract is most likely due to the fact 
that the legal mechanism of civil partnership is signing the register, rather than 
speaking vows.  Nonetheless, the question is also raised as to whether it is easier to 
see same-sex relationships in such a light because they will less frequently have 
children.  There are hints of this attitude having been adopted in Quebec, where 
couples without children are able to dissolve their civil unions extra-judicially by 
signing a joint declaration in front of a notary.23 
 
The contract-based perspective was, though, not often expressly located in the client 
accounts.  Whilst that may be because those interviewed were not fully aware of what 
they were entering into, it could also allude to a lack of perception of a sharp 
distinction between civil partnership and marriage-like status.  Whereas contracts are 
entered into by, “rational, self-interested actors for mercenary reasons”, it is possible 
that the clients viewed their relationship as rising above, “the banalities of contract” 
(Stychin, 2006a: 910).  This point necessarily leads into an interrogation of how 
exactly the civil partners conceived of the nature of the institution that they were 
embarking on, which I will move on to discuss. 
 
Driven by a desire to enter into a marriage/ non-marriage? 
Within the interview data, there was an emphasis on the language of sameness 
between civil partnership and marriage and a denial of difference.  Consider, for 
instance, Bill’s reflections: 
 
I mean, to me, it was a marriage.  And, I wondered why, you know, there’s 
been this, sort of, discussion lately about […] actual same-sex marriage.  And 
I’m thinking […] legally, we’ve got what we’re after already.  So, what do we 
want gay marriage for? […] I would have thought that […] there were 
certainly common elements, if not exact parity, with marriage (Bill). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Although divorce centres are also being introduced more widely in England and Wales, 
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2015b) 
	   136	  
 
It is significant that this particular client (given his age) should espouse that view, as 
it appears to counter Auchmuty’s (2015) finding that civil partnership did not mean 
‘marriage’ to older people.  Heather further asserted that she and her partner had 
always described themselves as ‘married’.  It may be unsurprising that she should use 
this terminology, given that the media have overwhelmingly referred to civil 
partnership as “marriage” (Peel and Jowett, 2010).  Remarkably, though, Heather 
proceeded to comment as follows: 
 
I was going to say that our relationship was quite a normal relationship, but 
normal in what way?  I mean, that was a bit of a bizarre thing to say, umm, 
because I’m quite sure that most civil partnerships are pretty normal 
(Heather). 
  
This echoes Heaphy et al’s (2013: 170) stories of “ordinariness” amongst his 
interviewees, which might be viewed as “claiming recognition on the basis of 
respectability”. 
 
The practitioners’ accounts featured this idea of sameness to marriage even more 
strongly, which we might expect given their overall focus on this discourse in relation 
to civil partnership formation.  For example:  
 
My experience of the people that I’ve dealt with who have been in a civil 
 partnership, I would say that they see it exactly the same (Ms Clarke). 
 
I think that he probably regarded it as pretty much a marriage (Mr. Henry). 
 
A lot of people in civil partnerships do see themselves as married, which, you 
know, to me is the right way of seeing it (Ms Lane). 
 
It is possible that this understanding has recently been fed into by the fact that civil 
partners are able to convert their partnership into a marriage under the Marriage 
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(Same Sex Couples) Act 2013.24  On top of this, of course, civil partnership, as an 
institution, is extremely close to marriage in its structure and provisions.  In fact, the 
perception of sameness was one of the explanations cited by Ms James for certain 
people choosing not to enter into civil partnerships (and this ambivalence to same-sex 
relationship recognition was likewise noted by Weeks et al (2001)).  Turning to the 
theme of lack of divergence, the solicitors emphasised that: 
 
If you’re looking at civil ceremonies for heterosexual couples versus civil 
partnerships for same-sex couples, there’s not a lot in it (Ms Boyce). 
 
Such accounts seem to mirror that of Sir Mark Potter in Wilkinson v. Kitzinger [2007] 
1 FCR 183, 197, that the intention of the government in introducing the 2004 
legislation was to create, “a parallel and equalizing institution”. 
 
Continuing with the notion of civil partnership and marriage being perceived as 
similar entities, also telling is the use of heterosexual terminology by the interviewees 
to refer to same-sex relationships and ceremonies.  Strikingly, all but two of the 
clients employed such language, with them most regularly referring to having ‘got 
married’ and having had a ‘wedding’.  Such terminology featured, on occasion, 
alongside the more accurate description of having entered into a ‘civil partnership’.  
For instance, Caroline explained that, when she first met with her solicitor: 
 
I said […] ‘oh, I’ve got a civil partnership and I want a divorce’, umm, and 
she asked me how long I’d been married and I said that I’d been married for a 
year now (Caroline). 
 
This quotation raises the possibility that practitioners have been using the terminology 
of ‘marriage’ during their meetings with their civil partner clients.  That idea is 
backed up by Debbie’s comment that, in clarifying what was going to happen in the 
legal proceedings, her solicitor had stressed that she and her partner had been “a 
married couple”.  In addition, 11 of the solicitors employed this language during their 
interviews.  Given that the solicitors’ caseloads will be predominantly made up of 
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different-sex cases, it must be easy to slip into the marriage terminology.25  Even so, 
the suggestion is that they may be viewing civil partners on heterosexual terms.  It is 
notable that the practitioners should be doing so, given Ms Clarke’s assertion that: 
 
I don’t remember any of them particularly saying, ‘well, when I got 
married…’.  I think that they’re quite aware, really, of the fact that it’s a civil 
partnership, and the actual accurate lingo is probably used (Ms Clarke). 
 
In support of this, Mr. Kennedy explained how the two clients that he had dealt with 
had been clear with the terminology of civil partnership.  That observation might, 
though, seem ill fitting with his client Bill’s emphasis on the institution’s marriage-
like qualities. 
 
In opposition to the attitude of sameness, a few of the clients did convey perceptions 
of difference.  For example, it was stated that: 
 
Lots of people just assume that you’re getting married, but you’re not, because 
it’s not a marriage, it’s a civil partnership.  And, they are different, I suppose, 
legally and lawfully […] It may not have been a marriage, but it meant 
something (Freddie). 
 
I sort of equate it with… slightly less than a registry office wedding […] I 
think that civil partnership is more like a business arrangement […] It’s not 
religious, and it’s not spiritual because it’s not a marriage (George). 
 
The argument of civil partnership being worth ‘less’ than a marriage might be used to 
justify reaching differing results on financial relief.  In fact, it was run by the 
respondent in the case of Hincks v Gallardo 2013 ONSC 129, which concerned an 
attempt to resist an application for ‘equalization’ of net family property and spousal 
support made in Canada subsequent to the parties having entered into a civil 
partnership in the UK.  However, the Court concluded that the civil partnership fell 
within the definition of ‘marriage’ contained within the Canadian Civil Marriage Act 
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2005 (this being, “the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others” 
(s.2)).  Consistently with that decision, the solicitors in my study were less willing 
than the clients to acknowledge any particular difference between civil partnership 
and marriage (apart from in relation to adultery, which I discuss below).  That said, 
Ms Ennis did highlight the religious disparity between the two, and Mr. Henry 
expressed the view that: 
 
The whole concept of getting married is such a massive thing, umm, and 
they’re kind of being denied that (Mr. Henry). 
 
Of course, lesbians and gay men are now no longer refused access to marriage, 
subsequent to the coming into force of the 2013 Act (although this had not yet 
occurred at the point of this interview).  Nonetheless, Mr. Henry’s response here 
really stresses the notion of marriage as a key cultural institution (Badgett, 2009). 
 
Mr. Henry went on to contend that the use of the terminology of ‘civil partnership’, 
was putting a class of society into a separate category (alluding to Harding’s (2006) 
description of the institution as a “second class status”).  This view was shared by 
other practitioners: 
 
I think that it’s their status that’s obviously… it’s almost saying… almost 
being discriminatory to say that, ‘because you’re in a same-sex relationship, 
you can only enter into a civil partnership, you’re not entitled to be married’ 
(Mr. Henry). 
 
Mr. Arnold similarly emphasised the importance of parity of terminology, proposing 
that the distinct label of the ‘civil partnership’ had resulted in people erroneously 
conceiving of the institution as something distinct.  This links in with my previous 
discussion about the weight attached to sameness; Mr. Arnold was advocating the 
inclusion of lesbians and gay men within traditionally heterosexual institutions to 
avoid their differentiation from the associated norms.  Consistently with that idea, Mr. 
Kennedy posed the question as to whether there was a need for a separate label to 
‘marriage’, seemingly advocating a form of assimilation.  It is interesting he should 
take this approach, given that the clients were less emphatic about the need to be 
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treated in this way.  Whilst Jennifer acknowledged that, under recent developments in 
the law: 
 
People were able to say that they could get married, and to a lot of, you know, 
people that I know, friends of mine and everything, that was very important 
[…] I thought that it was a bit unimaginative (Jennifer). 
 
Indeed, this keener stress on sameness in the solicitor’s accounts, as against those of 
the clients, is a prominent feature of the wider explanations provided for choosing to 
enter into a civil partnership. 
 
Drawing the above discussion together, the solicitors focused more strongly than the 
clients on motivations relating to traditionally heterosexual romantic love.  Whilst 
they also recognised pragmatic reasons that might factor in, the emphasis remained on 
how same-sex partners bear similarity to those of a different sex.  This marks the start 
of their predominantly formal equality based approach towards civil partnerships, 
which will feature strongly in the next two chapters.  In adopting this focus, my 
analysis will demonstrate that the legal actors were working to mould their lesbian 
and gay clients’ relationships into heteronormative patterns.  The notion of formal 
equality might be a way of rationalising the imposition of the same regime of property 
division to same-sex partners as is applied to heterosexual relationship breakdown.  
However, it simultaneously results in the overlooking of aspects that do not conform 
to the heteronormative ‘ideal’, and to there being a gap between law’s ‘story’ and 
‘reality’.  The suggestion is that same-sex partners have often not consciously taken 
on the economic effects of the legal relationship recognition, and that they have 
chosen to contract out where they have been aware of them.  Failure to acknowledge 
this risks foregoing the chance to reconsider the (heterosexually derived) economic 
obligations and responsibilities that we tend to view as the ‘norm’ (Stychin, 2006a: 
916).  I shall now go on to consider the extent to which dissolution discourses 
similarly pose the (unrealised) prospect of, “rethink[ing] in a radical way the 
institution of the family in law” (Stychin, 2006a: 916). 
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Relationship dissolution: infidelity and irretrievable breakdown 
The clients provided a variety of reasons why their relationships ultimately broke 
down.  Caroline and Isaac, for instance, set out how their partners had caused them 
financial difficulties: 
 
She never stayed in a job for more than five seconds, umm, and just stayed on 
benefits all of the time […] In the end, I just cracked, I think.  Everything just, 
sort of, came to a head.  My credit card debt just got worse and worse and 
worse, my mortgage… I was constantly in an overdraft (Caroline). 
 
He didn’t have any money, refused to pay me, refused to contribute, and 
refused to do anything about it, apart from put his head in a bucket really.  
And, he had very large credit card debts, err, and, umm, err, you know… in 
that situation, I think that anybody else would have just either gone to seek 
professional help or got a job, and he refused to do either of the two (Isaac). 
 
These stories reflect Oswald and Clausell’s (2006) finding that financial issues are a 
common reason for ending same-sex relationships.  In fact, the finances had caused 
such a strain on Caroline’s relationship that the partners had a “massive argument” 
within days of their civil partnership ceremony, and Caroline had sought legal advice 
on dissolution only a week later. 
 
Edward, on a different note, explained that his partner had become very religious, 
which he had found difficult: 
 
It wasn’t that I was completely against his direction and everything that he 
thought and believed, it was just that there was no time put aside for us, really, 
and it meant that we were living quite separate lives (Edward). 
 
Moreover, George described how his partner had left him subsequent to having 
obtained a passport.  He claimed that his partner had been cruel to their pet cats too, 
as a result of which they had developed behavioural problems and had to be re-
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homed.  George expressed having feared that people that are cruel to animals progress 
on behave in this way towards humans.  In a similar vein, Jennifer highlighted how: 
 
The dissolution is going ahead on the basis of unreasonable behaviour, and 
that was a lot to do with her alcoholism, and her behaviour when she had been 
drinking.  So, you know, over a period of time, that has always gone on and it 
just got worse and worse, until it became dangerous for me to stay in our 
home (Jennifer). 
 
This account reiterates Kurdek’s (1991) identification of alcohol problems being a top 
reason for same-sex relationship breakdown.  Jennifer proceeded to focus especially 
on an incident where, whilst she had been sleeping, her ex-partner had physically 
assaulted her, although she additionally described how her ex-partner would often 
hurt herself by throwing things around.  Indeed, Donovan et al (2006) found that 
more than a third of their respondents to their UK-wide survey said that they had 
experienced domestic abuse at some time in a same-sex relationship. 
 
The most frequently cited reason, though, for civil partnership breakdown was 
infidelity.  I will move on to examine my interviewees’ accounts of this issue, and 
how those sit in relation to the legislative framework. 
 
Sex and the civil partnership 
In the early days of formalised same-sex partnerships, there was considered to be 
some prospect of breaking away from heteronormative ideas of monogamy, and of 
queering legally recognised relationships.26  This possibility (at least arguably) 
opened up further as the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was introduced, which omitted to 
set out any requirement for a sexual and monogamous relationship.  Sexuality is left 
unspoken in the legislation, with adultery not being specified as an express basis for 
dissolution.  The lack of provision for dissolution on the basis of adultery appears not 
to have been intended to extend formalised relationships to the likes of carers and 
friends, as Baroness Scotland made clear in the Lords that the Act, “is not a cure-all 
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for the financial problems of those outside marriage” (HL Hansard, 22 April 2004: 
col. 389).  Instead, it seems to have harked back to concerns raised that gay men 
(especially) might not ‘sign up’ to monogamy, in accordance with their stereotypical 
associations (Stychin, 2006a). 
 
The absence of this provision stands in contrast to heterosexual divorce, where it is 
possible to petition using adultery as a factor in evidencing the irretrievable 
breakdown of the relationship under 1(2)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
Woodward and Sefton’s (2014: 15) study of court files found that the petitioner had 
relied on the basis of adultery in 20% of cases (although it has been indicated that the 
proportion of divorcing partners accusing each other of adultery has halved since the 
1970s (Gardner, 2013)).  Yet, civil partners are instead required to demonstrate that 
their partner’s “behaviour” has been such that they, “cannot reasonably be expected to 
live” with them (s.44(5)(a) of the 2004 Act).  The same is true of the more recent 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, where only relations with somebody of a 
different sex would constitute ‘adultery’ (Sched. 4, para. 3(2)). 
 
It might be suggested that, compared to the public interest in supporting different-sex 
marriage (which resulted in the abandonment of the abolition of fault under the 
Family Law Act 1996 (Roiser, 2015)), there is not the same social and legal desire to 
keep people in same-sex relationships.  This may go some way towards rationalising 
the absence of an adultery provision, especially given that, where adultery is not 
admitted, it can be difficult to prove.  Nevertheless, the implication of the legislation 
might appear to be that it is necessarily acceptable to have a number of sexual 
partners within a same-sex relationship.  As against that notion, the fact that my 
interviewees so commonly explained their dissolution as having been brought about 
by affairs indicates that the legislation is based on models that do not correspond with 
my sample’s lived experiences.  The clients generally reported their partners’ affairs, 
rather than their own (with the exceptions of Anthony and Edward, although they 
only admitted behaviour of this sort subsequent to the partnership having taken a turn 
for the worse).  However, those whose relationships have recently dissolved will tend 
to blame the other party, particularly where there have been acrimonious legal 
proceedings (Day Sclater, 1998). 
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Accounts of unfaithfulness were provided both by female and male clients, although a 
distinction might be made in that, whereas the women had mostly moved on to 
another monogamous relationship (as observed in Auchmuty’s (2015) study), the 
unfaithful males were more frequently involved with multiple other men.  For 
instance, Debbie set out how her partner had met another women whilst on a trip 
abroad, subsequently moving to Europe to be with her, and Heather’s partner likewise 
informed her that, “she’d met somebody else a few weeks before”.  Conversely, 
Jennifer explained that her partner had been promiscuous under the influence of 
alcohol.  Her account might seem to work against the idea of lesbian serial 
monogamy, suggesting that it may be a bit too stereotyped (and Weeks et al (2001) 
also found non-monogamy in lesbian relationships).  Turning to the men, Bill, 
Freddie, Isaac, and Anthony all provided stories of their partner having cheated: 
 
I realised that he’d been playing… he’d been behaving this way with maybe a 
hundred or more people […] There was a record for a Gaydar membership 
going back to 2004, […] and it was still ongoing (Bill). 
 
I noticed that there was some little memory card […] and curiosity got the best 
of me.  And, I looked at the memory card and discovered that he was actually 
having sex with quite a lot of different men over a very long period of time, 
and he’d gone to the trouble of keeping all of the photographs.  So, those 
photographs were in our home, and in our previous flat, and even in our bed 
(Freddie). 
 
He was very, very sexually active, and […] he sexually just wanted to be on a, 
kind of… no leash at all.  He wanted to go and do his own thing (Isaac). 
 
Bill’s partner contracted HIV due to his conduct outside of the partnership.  This was 
also the case in relation to Anthony’s partner, with the HIV subsequently causing 
deterioration in his mental health to the extent that they had become “strangers”.  I 
recognise that there has been research (such as that conducted by Francis and Mialon 
(2010)) that has suggested that tolerance of same-sex relationships is negatively 
associated with the HIV rate.  This is because it can arguably cause sexually active 
men (especially) to avoid underground, risky behaviour.   Nonetheless, in terms of 
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contentions (as made by, for example, Eskridge (1996)) of formalised relationship 
recognition working to encourage more ‘responsible’ behaviour in this respect, that 
was not necessarily the experience within my client sample. 
 
Occurrences of infidelity could likewise be found in the solicitors’ accounts.  Mr. 
Derrick, for instance, recalled how one of the parties in a case that he had worked on 
had met somebody through work and formed a new relationship with them.  He 
contended that: 
 
The reasons for it were very usual […] It’s perfectly standard stuff, I think, 
and, err, human nature, you know, people drift apart, people meet somebody 
new and cheat (Mr. Derrick). 
 
Echoing this, Mr. Norris observed that the usual “human frailty” found in different-
sex cases (such as adultery) had likewise been present in his civil partnership matters.  
The solicitors’ suggestions of sameness in this regard fit well with their wider 
construction of the issues and legal frameworks in dissolution matters as being 
identical to different-sex divorce.27  However, they are noteworthy, given that same-
sex partnerships are not treated the same as heterosexual relationships in terms of 
adultery, with the legislation positioning them outside of (and ‘other’ to) monogamy. 
 
In fact, those interviewed found this aspect of the legislation problematic.  That being 
the case, whereas previous work has suggested that it does not matter that there is no 
adultery provision as there is the option of unreasonable behaviour (see, for instance, 
Barker and Monk, 2015), this opinion was not shared by my interviewees.  Heather, 
for example, reported having felt exasperated that: 
 
I had to apply on the grounds of, umm, unreasonable behaviour […] and 
initially my application got declined because the judge that it obviously went 
in front of didn’t read the form, and it basically got sent back to me just saying 
that I should have applied on the grounds of adultery, so […] I had to 
photocopy all of the original paperwork and send it all back with a cover letter 
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basically saying, ‘I can’t, it’s a civil partnership’ […] I can’t see the rationale 
behind it, because if you’re in a committed relationship with someone and 
they’re unfaithful, then it’s adultery (Heather). 
 
Jennifer voiced similar bewilderment to Heather, exclaiming that, “I don’t get it”, 
whilst Bill, taking a stronger position, contended that he felt that there should be a law 
against behaviour such as his partner’s (where he had been unfaithful both days 
before the civil partnership ceremony and a short time after their honeymoon).  The 
clients appeared broadly to favour a type of formal equality, supporting the 
‘transplanting’ of the relevant heterosexual provision into the same-sex legislation, 
and perceiving the possibility of arguing ‘unreasonable behaviour’ alone not to be 
‘enough’.  Again, this is perhaps to be anticipated in light of the more widespread 
approach towards ‘equality’ as necessarily amounting to sameness of treatment (and it 
demonstrates the difficulty of adopting this approach across the board, apart from in 
relation to just a few exceptions).  This is particularly the case in light of contentions, 
such as that of Tatchell (2013), that the current differential in the law between same 
and different-sex couples is “not equality”.  That said, the emphasis placed might be 
construed as signalling the assimilation of same-sex relationships into heterosexual 
culture in a way that many had initially feared (and it may seem to contrast against the 
dissonance shown by those few partners as to the nature of the institution itself, 
above). 
 
Turning to the solicitors, my interviewees did not believe that they would be likely to 
face obstacles in arguing that the non-monogamous circumstances of their clients’ 
cases was ‘unreasonable behaviour’.  This stands against Barker’s (2006) suggestion 
the lack of a specific adultery provision could hold transformative potential, as it may 
not be self-evident that non-monogamy would necessarily constitute unreasonable 
behaviour in a same-sex relationship.  Yet, Ms Lane asserted that her clients’ inability 
to petition on the ground of adultery, “does, you know, probably annoy all of us”.  
She acknowledged the heterosexist origins of the legislation, under which a ‘real’ 
sexual act remains one of vaginal penetration (stemming back to the common law 
definition of adultery, which applies only to heterosexual intercourse (R v. R [1952] 1 
All ER 1194)).  This ties in to Stychin’s (2006a: 907) assertion that the issue of what 
amounts to lesbian and gay sex remains, “shrouded in mystery”.  It seems that one of 
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the central reasons for omitting to include a provision relating to adultery is the legal 
complexity of (and possible squeamishness about) defining sexual acts between two 
women and two men.  This is indicated by Baroness Scotland’s comment, within the 
Parliamentary debates, that, “we do not look at the nature of the sexual relationship 
that enters into the civil partnership.  It is totally different in nature” (HL Hansard, 17 
November 2004: col. 1479).  As Barker (2006) has highlighted, it would appear that a 
greater challenge would have been posed to heterosexuality as a whole had lesbian 
and gay sex been explicitly included within the Civil Partnership Act.  Particularly, it 
may have been beneficial for MPs to have discussed lesbian and gay sexual acts in a 
non-criminal context. 
 
That said, it might seem inappropriate for the legislation to have retained any such 
focus on the physical acts performed by the partners.  There were, in fact, indications 
by the interviewees that gay men may well still retain multiple sexual partners even 
within a committed and formally recognised relationship.  Notably, the fact that this 
observation focuses around men accords with Auchmuty’s (2015) contention that men 
are much less likely to expect fidelity than women.  My finding here helps to add to 
existing body of research that attests to the occurrence of non-monogamy in same-sex 
relationships (Coelho, 2011; Blasband and Peplau, 1985; McWhirter and Mattison, 
1984), and it goes some way to contradict suggestions, such as that of Kondracke 
(2003), that civil unions operate to promote monogamy.  Through behaving in this 
way whilst in a civil partnership, there appears to have been a level of resistance 
towards the imposition of heterosexual, binary-based, norms.  Ms Field observed that 
a number of her male clients were in open relationships, whilst Isaac’s partner had 
worked in the sex industry during the early stages of their relationship.  Bill, who had 
attended a ‘leather club’ with his partner, further described how those who have 
entered into formalised relationships have still been using the site ‘Grindr’.  Bill 
explained that: 
 
There are even the pictures of their ceremony on their sex site, and they were 
inviting people into their beds, or floors, or whatever it was to have sex (Bill). 
   
For this reason, he felt that some same-sex partners must view their relationships, 
even though now legally recognised, as being different to, and set apart from, 
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(traditionally heterosexual) monogamy.  It must be acknowledged that the sexual 
behaviour of Bill and Isaac’s partners did play a significant role in ultimately bringing 
about the breakdown of their civil partnerships.  Therefore, despite the assumptions 
that may appear to underlie the omission of adultery from the 2004 Act, it does not 
seem necessarily to be acceptable for gay men (particularly) to have a number of 
sexual partners.  Yet, in this context, the clients were less concerned with the fact that 
their partner had engaged in physical activity with someone else in itself than with 
their partner’s dishonesty and the consequent breakdown of trust within their 
relationship.   Consequently, my data suggest that there may be a dissonance between 
the legal and social meanings of ‘adultery’. 
 
The notion of there having been an issue with trust was apparent from the explanation 
of Isaac that, “it was that that killed the relationship […] I lost complete trust in what 
was going on”.  In the same way, Bill set out how: 
 
He was never honest enough to tell me, you know, if there was anybody that 
he had slept with […] it was just lie on top of lie, so […] I told him, ‘that’s it, 
you know, go.  There’s no hope’ (Bill). 
 
Bill described his partner, in so behaving, as not having acted “in accordance with the 
principles of civil partnership”.  That sentiment chimes with Mr. Justice Garson’s 
suggestion in the Canadian case of P. (S.E.) and P. (D.D.) 2005 BCSC 1290, [48], 
that, “the wrong for which the petitioner seeks redress is something akin to violation 
of the marital bond”.  The Judge ultimately held in this case that, “intimate sexual 
activity outside of the marriage may represent a violation of the marital bond and be 
devastating to the spouse […] regardless of the specific nature of the sexual act 
performed” [48].  The matter itself concerned a different-sex marriage where the 
husband had been intimate with another man.  The Court found there was no reason 
why the wrong should be limited to heterosexual acts; the husband had committed 
adultery, and an order for divorce was granted.  A similar approach may seem to offer 
a way forward for England and Wales, departing from an outdated focus on the 
specific nature of the physical acts. 
 
In terms of my first research question, any such modernisation in the approach 
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towards adultery could helpfully be extended to different-sex couples, so as to 
challenge gendered constructions around intimate relationships.  It is important that 
the law is congruous with public conceptions and practices and, in this respect, Mr. 
Henry contended that: 
 
I think that the main issue is that the law has looked at monogamous, 
heterosexual relationships for too long, and the world out there isn’t actually 
like that. […] I think that there’s probably been a bit of an explosion, over the 
last thirty years, in terms of how people do choose to live […] We don’t have 
family law to cater to that (Mr. Henry). 
 
Mr. Henry proceeded to suggest that, amongst his wider client base, “all sorts of 
scenarios are thrown up nowadays”.  Taking this idea further, Barker (2013) has 
emphasised that, when we look across time and cultures, we see a diversity of 
relationships.  Many societies are polygamous, and many seemingly monogamous 
societies feature widespread secret non-monogamy.  The legal definition of ‘adultery’ 
as it stands is not reflective of such observations, and does not challenge the 
constructed nature of the heteronormative binary. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite being legally similar (and being based on, “largely analogous foundations- 
notions of stable coupled relationships” (Peel and Harding, 2004: 590)), lesbian and 
gay and heterosexual formalised relationships appear to have different cultural 
meanings attached to them.  I identify amongst civil partners a relative lack of 
emphasis on the romantic notions that have “descended over the heterosexist 
institution of marriage like a fog” (Peel and Harding, 2004: 591).  As against this, a 
wider stress was placed by my client interviewees on the practical advantages of 
entering into a formalised relationship, particularly centring around the need for 
protection on a partner’s illness or death (which sits well with the findings of, for 
example, Clarke et al (2007)).  I have previously observed that rights-based reasoning 
can work against the transgressive possibilities of formalised relationships.28  That 
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said, this difference in focus is important, as romantic discourse has operated to 
obscure the ways in which marriage sustains the power and status of men.  The 
absence of sex within the civil partnership legislation might seem to have indicated a 
further break away from the notion of one man belonging to one woman within the 
home.  However, within my interviews, importance was placed on sameness through 
favouring a separate ‘adultery-like’ basis for dissolving same-sex partnerships (in 
light of a more widespread approach based around formal equality).  This is despite 
the fact that descriptions of gay non-monogamous lifestyles did also feature.   My 
research does, though, offer a way forward in this respect, suggesting (in accordance 
with the partners’ understandings) that the definition of ‘adultery’ should be 
modernised so as to move away from concentrating on the specific sexual act 
performed. 
 
More broadly, the solicitors were consistently keen to emphasise the parallels 
between same and different-sex couples, and often ignored difference where it was 
apparent (such as relating to intentions to create financial obligations).  In addressing 
my second research question, heteronormative assumptions were applied when 
relaying the stories of their civil partner clients, eroding the potential for 
transformation.  It is noteworthy that this should be the case, given that civil 
partnership is distinctively and legally non-heterosexual.  The practitioners tended to 
highlight the aspects of the partners’ lives that were perhaps more socially 
recognisable, in accordance with (hetero)normative behaviours.  In so doing, they 
were acting against Baker et al’s (2004) dimension of respect and recognition, under 
which cultural assumptions are open to challenge (see also Baker, 2001).  The 
accounts led to queries as to the extent to which the solicitors have also built their 
arguments on the basis of sameness, and formal equality, in civil partnership financial 
relief matters.  My analysis will now investigate this. 
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Chapter 6- Similarity and divergence between dissolution and divorce 
 
In this chapter, I examine both the clients’ reflections on, and how the solicitors have 
perceived and conducted, civil partnership cases.  I begin by considering the extent to 
which there has been a focus on sameness between civil partnership dissolution and 
(heterosexual) divorce, before moving on later in the chapter to a discussion of 
difference.  My engagement with this issue follows from chapter 5, given that 
adultery marks an observable divergence in legal framework between civil 
partnership and marriage.  I will be interrogating the degree to which legal actors are 
uniformly applying the concepts developed within divorce law, given that my 
questionnaire findings in chapter 4 suggested that the roles undertaken by civil 
partners might be different from the more traditional roles adopted in marriage.  I 
argue that, in terms of financial relief, heteronormative arguments and case law have 
been employed, and a stress has again been placed on identical treatment and formal 
equality.  This has been in spite of client attempts to emphasise dissimilarity, and of 
acknowledgments by the solicitors themselves of the often incongruent factual 
matrices of the cases.  The chapter will draw on the literature of assimilation and 
transformation, and assert that there is more evidence of assimilation occurring in the 
realm of legal recognition, as solicitors construct their clients’ cases to fit with the 
marriage model.  Rather than being treated as ‘other’, lesbians and gay men are being, 
“included into the dominant system” (Boyd and Young, 2003: 757).  That being the 
case, they are being denied their full potential to expose the constructed nature of 
masculine and feminine roles in formalised relationships, and to cast light on the fact 
that there are other ways of living and being within a family. 
 
Stories of sameness 
In this section, I set out the ways in which my interviewees constructed and treated 
dissolution and divorce as being parallel to one another.  Four themes, relevant to 
heteronormativity, were apparent in the data.  The first was that the solicitors 
frequently used the same language for their same and different-sex matters.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 I initially raised this point in chapter 5. 
	   152	  
Secondly, in their initial meetings with their lesbian and gay clients, they asked them 
the same questions that they would ask a client in a different-sex relationship.  
Thirdly, they have subsequently presented these clients’ cases so as to centre around 
gendered stereotypes that have been carried over from the heterosexual case law.  The 
fourth theme is that legal actors have tended to view equality as entailing sameness of 
treatment or, in relation to asset division, a 50/ 50 split (as per the judgment in White).  
I will discuss each of these themes, highlighting how heteronormative constructs of 
gender inequalities have been applied. 
 
Using identical terminology 
The solicitors in my sample regularly reverted to heterosexual language when 
referring to civil partnership dissolution.  For instance: 
 
I have, on occasions, slipped and said ‘divorce’ rather than ‘dissolution’ 
because it’s absolutely, you know, what I do every day, really.  It’s just 
breaking the habit, not for any other reason.  I just deal with more divorces 
than civil partnerships, so I would, you know, just refer to, ‘well, when we get 
your decree nisi’, and then I’m like, ‘oh no, it’s not a decree nisi in your case’ 
(Ms Clarke). 
  
I see [civil partnerships and marriage] as being the same,	  and I very naughtily 
often refer to ‘divorce’ when it should be ‘dissolution’, umm, and refer to 
‘decree nisis’ when it should be ‘conditional orders’ (Ms Gale). 
 
It is interesting that Ms Clarke suggests here that her employment of inaccurate 
terminology had been a slip of the tongue reflecting the predominant makeup of her 
caseload, whilst Ms Gale implies that hers had been a result of her unconscious 
association between the two institutions.  In any event, the use of such language might 
account for the fact that half of the clients interviewed similarly drew on the 
terminology of ‘divorce’. 
 
There was one exception, in terms of the practitioners’ refusal to apply the labels 
‘husband’ and ‘wife’.  This is despite one of the clients (Debbie) having made 
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reference to her “wife” on a number of occasions.  The legal actors’ approach in this 
respect seems to undermine Hunter’s (1991) suggestion that formalised same-sex 
relationships raise the question of what the “foundational constructs” of ‘husband’ 
and ‘wife’ mean (although perhaps this was only applicable to marriage).  Polikoff 
(2008) stresses the importance of making way for neutral terms, and this attitude was, 
in fact, favoured by a number of solicitors: 
 
I don’t think that they really call themselves a ‘husband’ or a ‘wife’, do they?  
It’s just… they call themselves ‘partners’ […] In that one [case], she said, ‘my 
partner’, or she used her first name […] so, I don’t think that I could say… 
because it isn’t really from that angle (Ms Ennis). 
 
It’s [important] […] making sure that you, you know… not ‘spouse’, 
‘husband’ and ‘wife’.  So, I suppose that you’d have those in the back of your 
head, and you’d be aware of that, umm, to ensure, you know, that you’re being 
accurate and not causing any offence (Ms Main). 
 
Mr. Kennedy also emphasised how using terminology of this nature in the context of 
civil partnership could “confus[e] the issue”. 
 
That said, it should also be recognised that, on occasion, the practitioners used the 
word ‘husband’ when seeking to describe the more highly remunerated partner.  In 
this way, they still subconsciously associated being the earner with being the ‘man’, 
and they were resorting to a problematic labelling of behaviour as gendered.  
Consider, for instance, Ms Irvine’s description of a same-sex matter that she had 
worked on, where there had been a: 
 
Husband earning… well, I say ‘husband’ because I’m talking about the 
dominant party, but the ‘breadwinner’ was earning significantly more (Ms 
Irvine). 
 
This reversion to traditional roles sits well with the solicitors’ responses concerning 
how they would go about dealing with a new civil partnership case, which I will now 
examine. 
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Asking the same questions 
In terms of the conduct of their initial meetings with clients, the practitioners most 
frequently claimed that there was no marked distinction in what they would ask their 
civil partner and married (heterosexual) clients.  Ms Boyce, for instance, stated that 
her preparation for a meeting with a same-sex client would be, “the same as any 
family client”.  Consider these further accounts: 
 
I would say that the concerns are very similar to those that happen on divorce 
[…] You know, ‘can I claim anything against the house?’, ‘what’s going to 
happen about my monthly income?’ (Ms Boyce). 
 
The issues for me were very similar, the arguments were very […] usual and 
typical (Mr. Derrick). 
 
That the solicitors should adopt an approach based on matrimonial work, and not 
account for difference, accords with clients Caroline and Jennifer’s reports of seeking 
legal advice: 
 
She asked me the general questions about, umm, umm, how long I’ve been 
married, what’s the relationship been like […] The normal sort of questions 
that, you know, a solicitor would ask a married couple (Caroline). 
 
What people will do is not explore… you know, perhaps out of 
embarrassment, or lack of knowledge, [they] won’t necessarily ask any 
additional questions to find out if there’s a difference.  So, you know, if 
somebody doesn’t do that, you’re not going to volunteer anything that you 
perceive, because you don’t know whether it’s relevant, when you’re talking 
to somebody whose time is being charged at god knows what by the hour 
(Jennifer). 
 
Jennifer’s response is striking, because it suggests that solicitors are asking the 
(wrong) questions and that, whilst their focus has been on sameness, this may be 
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inappropriate.  The client’s impression moreover sits compatibly with Calhoun’s 
(2000: 34) point that lesbians and gay men feel obliged to present themselves in 
accordance with heterosexuality as a, “condition of access to the public sphere”.  A 
repercussion is that they are denied the possibility to tell their legal representatives 
new stories about their relationships, with the potential of their more “democratized, 
flexible model” of domestic life going unrealised (Weeks, 2004: 161). 
 
The practitioners generally adopted a directed (heteronormative) approach to advising 
their civil partner clients.  This was evident in that, for example, they stated that: 
 
You need to say to them at a fairly early stage, you know, ‘this is the stuff that 
courts look at, and so let’s try to focus on this and you know, yes I know that 
that’s really important to you, but it’s not going to make any difference’ (Mr. 
Arnold). 
 
I wouldn’t do that any differently between heterosexual and same-sex couples.  
You know, you sit this side of the desk and you so easily just get into the 
script.  You just throw it at them (Ms Field). 
 
I think, for a lot of clients, that they will tell you a lot about their current 
situation, umm, and I have to say to them sometimes, ‘well, that doesn’t 
matter’ or, ‘that’s not going to be taken into account’ (Ms Gale). 
 
These narratives indicate that legal actors have been working to, “legitimate[e] some 
parts of human experiences, and denying the relevance of others” (Sarat and Felstiner, 
1995: 147)).  Likewise, they support Harding’s (2011) observation of the way that 
“legal knowledge” excludes other forms of knowledge, and Smart’s (1989) argument 
that legal professionals disqualify alternative accounts in favour of “legal relevances”. 
 
Conversely, a few practitioners did report that there would be a disparity in how they 
would conduct meetings with a civil partner client.  For instance, Ms Field opined 
that:  
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If you’re trying to argue […] from the point of view of a gay man who hasn’t, 
you know… who says, ‘well, I’ve stayed at home and looked after it’, I think 
that […] you’ve got to prove that more […] I’m thinking of my own 
prejudices, you know, what I would, perhaps, for a female client just assume 
and wouldn’t think… but, you know, from a, you know, a same-sex client, I 
would question them quite carefully about what they did (Ms Field). 
 
This comment is of note on three bases: firstly, because of Ms Field’s admission of 
her own prejudices that men do not do housework; secondly, because it indicates that 
a man performing the role of the ‘typical’ housewife has not done enough to obtain an 
equivalent award; and thirdly, because of the inference that legal actors tend not to 
ask wives “carefully about what they did” (because assumptions are made about the 
tasks that a housewife performs).  Other stories of difference featured: 
 
Fact-finding is different on the basis that the relationship would have been 
different, or the things that were relevant in that relationship would have been 
different (Mr. Henry). 
 
Don’t ask same-sex couples exactly the same questions as you would ask, err, 
heterosexual couples.  Umm, or when you do ask them questions, ensure that 
they’re as open as possible, so that they don’t feel that, actually, you’ve 
stereotyped them into a box of heterosexual couples (Ms Gale).  
 
As to how his questions would vary, Mr. Henry struggled to explain, ultimately 
considering the main disparity to be the lack of children (as returned to in the 
discussion below).  Ms Gale’s responses were, in fact, contradictory, given that she 
proceeded to state that civil partners are “no different” to heterosexual couples.   
 
Overall, it appears that there are, in practice, understood to be few differences 
between conducting advisory meetings with civil partner clients, and advising 
heterosexual partners on divorce.  In light of a relative shortage of experience of civil 
partnership cases and a lack of case law, the solicitors placed emphasis on a sameness 
approach between same and different-sex relationships.  This is apparent from the 
account of Ms Boyce that: 
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 One is more tentative, because there isn’t that body of case law behind you, so 
it’s not as if you can put your finger on something and say, ‘look, this has 
happened before and we’re really sure about this, because this has gone to the 
Supreme Court’ […] But, my advice is generally based on all of the 
matrimonial work that I have done before for heterosexual… because, you 
know, the factors are so similar in the way that it’s been drafted, that’s what 
we’re basing it on (Ms Boyce). 
 
The practitioner’s account confirms the common law’s preoccupation with precedent.  
It shows how the solicitors have sought to include same-sex matters within their 
previously developed knowledge base from heterosexual divorce proceedings.  In so 
doing, and by focusing on the things that ‘matter’, they were fitting their same-sex 
clients into the heteronormative mould.  Linking back to the discussion in chapter 2, 
what we see is little evidence of Fraser’s (2012) equality of recognition (or, indeed, 
Baker et al’s (2004) dimension of respect and recognition).  Whereas that ascribes 
value to diversity, what is occurring is a misrecognition of the ways that same-sex 
relationships can be different.  Being “rendered invisible” is the core of 
‘misrecognition’ for Fraser (2003), and it reduces the potential for challenging the 
gendered relational norms.   Furthermore, the solicitors’ approach was incompatible 
with Ettelbrick’s (1989) understanding of “justice”, under which lesbian and gay 
couples are recognised and supported in spite of their differences from the “dominant 
culture”.30  Yet, the approach again corresponds with the strategies adopted by the 
solicitors for arguing their lesbian and gay clients’ cases, which I will proceed to 
explore. 
 
Arguing on the basis of gendered stereotypes 
Prior to considering the tactics employed to present same-sex matters, I will set out 
the practitioners’ reports of what has been happening in different-sex cases.  This is 
because the way that they construct their cases will be driven by what they perceive 
that the courts will want to hear.  In this respect, Ms Boyce contended that: 
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You’ve got to be expecting that the judge is going to be dealing with it as a 
divorce case, because that is what they know, that is what you know (Ms 
Boyce). 
 
That assertion accords with O’Donovan’s (1993: 64) argument that lawyers will 
present their clients as though they are performing an “appropriate social role” as a 
“normal member of society”.  Bearing out my arguments in chapter 2, the solicitors 
highlighted how divorce matters have centred around ideas of there being distinct 
roles for men and women within a marriage, with a patterning of status taking place.  
Ms Gale noted a desire amongst the judiciary to “protect” wives, presumably as a 
result of their ‘feminine’ vulnerability.  On the contrary, men remaining at home were 
viewed as being treated less favourably.  This not only ties in with the notion of the 
providing ‘masculine’ man, but also a claim by Ms Field that it is easier for the courts 
to work out what amounts to a “contribution” to the welfare of the family when it is 
done by a woman (given that, “it’s just what we’re used to”). 
 
These understandings of heterosexual cases must be borne in mind when considering 
accounts of same-sex matters due to assertions such as that:  
 
I would just literally apply all of the principles that I do already. I really don’t 
think that I would do anything differently at all. I wouldn’t, because the law is 
being applied across the board, so I wouldn’t look to do anything different 
(Ms Clarke). 
 
I will get a divorce case out and say, ‘the facts are similar in terms of length of 
relationship, disparity of wealth, why don’t you apply them?’ (Ms Irvine). 
 
Mr. Kennedy similarly stressed how the case of Lawrence had demonstrated to him 
that “the rules are exactly the same” because it had referred to the heterosexual case 
law.  Ms Gale adopted a less confident line, discussing how she would provide civil 
partner clients with a “cautionary note”.  Nevertheless, the nature of that note was 
that: 
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‘We’re going to have to advise you on the basis of what it would look like on 
a heterosexual relationship, umm, until a bigger bank of case law is increased’ 
(Ms Gale).   
 
Certainly, client Debbie was advised on that basis when she sought legal advice, and 
when the solicitor had explained her position by using fictional scenarios concerning 
himself and his wife. 
 
The indications from the data are that practitioners are reverting back to 
heteronormative assumptions when dealing with civil partnerships and, particularly, 
to ideas of masculinity and femininity.  It may be predictable that they should adopt 
this approach, especially given that (as a number of solicitors mentioned) the court 
forms are now the same.  Even so, it works against the ideas that lesbian and gay 
identities can challenge the fixed categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’, and that 
formalised same-sex relationships might, “destabilise the gendered definition of 
marriage for everyone” (Hunter, 1991: 12).  It seems that Graff’s (1997: 137) 
prediction that gay and lesbian partners would be treated as, “equal partners, neither 
having more historical authority” has not necessarily come to fruition.  Moreover, the 
professional interviews support the legal pluralist idea of law not only reflecting, but 
also sustaining, patterns of ‘normality’,31 and Smart’s (1992) portrayal of law as a 
gendering strategy.  By this, I mean that the law encourages the adoption of gendered 
subject positions and identities (a notion that links with O’Donovan’s (1993) 
argument that family law and its discourse constructs a gendered “story”). 
 
Consider Anthony’s account of the conduct of his matter: 
 
That was their argument, that I wouldn’t have been earning what I earn had he 
not supported me, and they also made an argument that we’d been accustomed 
to a joint lifestyle and it was therefore okay for my ex to continue with that 
lifestyle without working […] My ex’s representation said, ‘[he’s] the woman, 
he gave up work, he brought up the children, and we’re going to run the case 
based on that’  […] In court, their side tried to imply that I didn’t do anything, 
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and that I literally would walk in an I would have my slippers at the door and 
supper on the table (Anthony). 
 
The client did not personally view that his partner had helped to bolster his earning 
capacity, although one wonders whether he would have adopted the same view had 
the relationship endured.  I further recognise that an interview with Anthony’s partner 
may have told a different story to the one that that he conveyed, but this could not be 
achieved for practical reasons in the context of this study.  Nonetheless, the client 
described how his ex-partner’s representatives had used the fact that their client had 
not worked during the relationship to their favour, portraying him as a ‘homemaker’ 
(and Mr. Arnold, Anthony’s solicitor, reported similarly).  This was in relation to a 
household where there were no children, and where a cleaner had been employed.  In 
setting out how the legal actors, at least on one side, were, “posturing that one’s a 
man, one’s a woman”, the client detailed how his case was constructed to accord with 
a binary familial model.  In a similar vein, he set out how their submissions related 
back to heteronormative notions of (‘feminine’) economic dependency and 
conceptions of joint living, which seem less compatible with suggestions of greater 
financial separateness amongst same-sex partners.32  Anthony felt that he and his ex-
partner had been “pigeonholed” to fit the existing framework.  He opined that the case 
law that is applied should not be based on heterosexuals, as same-sex couples are 
“different”. 
 
As to the arguments made on Anthony’s behalf, it was contended that the parties 
should be treated on the basis of their lack of gender difference: 
 
We didn’t run it on the other side saying that I was the man, I was the 
‘breadwinner’ […] We tried to neutralise that and just say, ‘we’re two blokes 
[…] he needs to get a job’ (Anthony). 
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The way that we presented it was simply that […] he’s got a number of 
language skills, you know, he’s capable of earning a decent amount of money 
(Mr. Arnold). 
 
The discourse used by Anthony is problematic, as he expressed the need for his ex-
partner to work specifically by reason that he is male.  In fact, both quotations 
replicate what I have contended to be the most persuasive interpretation of 
Lawrence.33  Anthony’s representatives adopted the formal equality based argument 
that both parties should be judged according to pervasive notions of masculinity.  
Therefore, in one way or another, the practitioners were unable to transcend 
heteronormative ideas about gender. 
 
The same observation might be made regarding the legal advice received by Isaac.  In 
his case, the stress did not seem to have been on his ex-partner’s domestic 
contributions (although the client perceived these as having been relatively ‘equal’ 
between them).  However, in accordance with the arguments made on Anthony’s 
partner’s behalf, the client described having been informed that: 
 
I was being seen [by the other side] as the ‘breadwinner’, he was being seen as 
the […] other party within the relationship that didn’t have the funds […] [The 
solicitor] referred to things like ‘family court’ and, you know, ‘this is how it 
works for heterosexual couples’, ‘well, we’re not a heterosexual couple’ […]  
I think that really, you know, the divorce blueprint that they had been working 
with for, you know, decades, she was trying to fit that into, umm, a gay 
couple’s lifestyle, and it doesn’t work […] The divorce process […] it hasn’t 
grown as society has changed (Isaac). 
 
It is significant that Isaac should emphasise the different nature of same-sex 
relationships in the face of a sameness centred practitioner approach.  The intimation 
is that a level of resistance has been maintained to this legal heteronormativity, 
although legal actors may not be hearing or responding to it. 
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Isaac perceived the adoption of a “one size fits all” attitude in terms of financial relief, 
and this was consistent with a point raised by solicitor Ms Boyce concerning: 
 
The risk that things will just be very much done as rote in terms of that, ‘well, 
I’ve dealt with 3,000 divorce cases and now I’m starting to deal with civil 
partnerships, and this seems to fit the mould of what I’ve dealt with before’. 
[…] There’s going to be a lot of match-up with the way that divorce cases 
have been dealt with as to the way that civil partnerships will be dealt with 
(Ms Boyce). 
 
Isaac explained how it had been submitted on his partner’s behalf (as will often be the 
case in relation to wives in heterosexual matters) that he had become accustomed to 
the funding of a “luxury lifestyle” during the relationship, and that he now sought to 
continue it.  This signals that, in response to my second research question, legal actors 
have, at least to some degree, been applying the heteronormative assumptions of 
financial dependency in civil partnership cases.34  Isaac found such arguments 
“difficult”, given that the scenario involved two men.  The client’s response here, 
once more, harks back to ideas about masculinity.  There are, in fact, indications that 
these ideas could be attributed to his legal advisor (at least, to an extent), with the 
client elucidating how: 
 
She said, within the first hour, ‘you have just been used’, umm, and […] we 
discussed why he wouldn’t go out to work, and why he wasn’t prepared to 
bring money into the family unit (Isaac). 
 
The discourse suggests that the practitioner may have adopted an inflammatory 
attitude to encourage the client to pursue the matter further. 
 
Pulling together the strands of my argument, in Anthony and Isaac’s matters, the 
financially weaker side placed greater weight on a binary construction of roles.  
Conversely, the more moneyed side, particularly in Anthony’s case, put stronger 
emphasis on the point that both partners were, as men, able to provide for themselves.  
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The binary line of argument ties in to solicitor assertions, such as that made by Ms 
Field (albeit with reference to a younger man with an older ex-partner), that there is a 
“temptation” to present a same-sex matter in a ‘breadwinner’/ ‘homemaker’ fashion.  
She proceeded to set out how she would argue on a lesser earning client’s behalf that, 
“I’ve supported you, I’ve ironed your shirts”.  In this way, the solicitor was explaining 
how she would draw upon heteronormative constructs of gendered inequalities to 
obtain a favourable result for her client, this leading to the greater assimilation of 
same-sex partners into the mainstream. 
 
Turning to the lesbian clients interviewed, traditional gender roles featured most 
heavily in Debbie’s account.  She set out how her ex-partner had argued throughout 
the proceedings that she had been the ‘breadwinner’, even though Debbie had also 
worked part-time.  This alludes to the heterosexual tendency to dismiss wives’ 
earnings as “pin money”, and solicitor Mr. Henry claimed that, in his cases, one 
partner was often earning the “meaningful” amount of money (Harkness et al, 1997).  
Although Debbie acknowledged that she had performed the majority of the domestic 
chores, she felt that there had been an over-emphasis by the legal actors on, “whether 
you’re the wife or the husband”.  The client’s view of the court proceedings was 
remarkable: 
 
[The legal advisors] speak on your behalf, and that’s it.  I can’t actually then 
go and say to the judge […] ‘can I tell you about this?’  There was no 
approachability.  And then, when we got out back into that, sort of, waiting 
room area, yeah, I said to [ex-partner], ‘did you understand any of that?’, and 
she went, ‘no’, ‘nor me’ […] I was just like, ‘what are they saying’, yeah?  I 
felt out of my league, completely out of my depth (Debbie). 
 
She expresses the opinion here that, as a client, you lose control of your case to 
lawyers (Harding, 2011).  To take this further, whilst Smart (1984: 160) argues that 
lawyers “translate” matters into “legally recognisable categories”, that occurred to 
such an extent that the client’s conflict became unrecognisable to her.  That point was 
additionally implied by Jennifer, who felt that her solicitors: 
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See that they have a job to do, and they will take instructions from me 
[regardless of] whether I’m fully understanding of what to tell them (Jennifer). 
 
As to the practitioners themselves, Mr. Derrick recounted how the opposing party in a 
lesbian matter that he had worked on had submitted that the principles of sharing, 
compensation and needs were all applicable, on the basis that their client had been the 
‘homemaker’.  In this way, they were arguing for an award that included the element 
of substantive equality introduced by Miller/ McFarlane.  It might be noted that, even 
in different-sex couples, there have been relatively few cases in which the concept of 
compensation has performed an independent role in the court’s deliberations (Miles 
and Probert, 2009).  It may be surprising that it should feature in relation to same-sex 
couples, given that the parties are subjected to the same gendered expectations.35  This 
is even more so in the context of a childless case, where the compensation argument 
is more difficult to run.  Of course, I am not arguing here that there necessarily cannot 
be a more vulnerable party within a same-sex relationship, and I refer back to my 
discussion of Fineman’s (2008) work in chapter 2.  However, the roles performed by 
each partner may be based more on, “autonomy and choice”, being less constrained 
by external rules (Weeks, 2007: 187). 
 
Mr. Derrick described how, in the lesbian case that he had advised on, the other party 
had been portrayed as performing a ‘feminine’ supportive role, and this approach was 
repeated in other practitioner accounts: 
 
If you’re acting for that side of the partnership that has stayed at home, 
perhaps you may want to start saying things that make it sound similar to the 
White scenario […] One would want to emphasise those features that are on 
the feminine side, if you like.  So, for example, ‘oh, she cared for the elderly 
grandmother’, ‘oh, she did something in a caring role’, or, ‘she was nurturing 
something’ (Ms Boyce). 
 
As regards this association of women with caring, we find further evidence in Ms 
James’s description of a case with shared childcare subsequent to dissolution.  
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Linking in with the discussion in chapter 7, she set out how there had been a disparity 
in salary between the women concerned, although the court had permitted a clean 
break.  The solicitor felt that: 
 
That would not be allowed to happen if they were straight.  Two young 
children… the judge would say, ‘no, we want nominal maintenance’, at least.  
Especially at our local court […] but not for lesbians, apparently (Ms James). 
 
She believed that the outcome was reached because the court was confident that both 
parties, being women, “would look after the children”.  This was as opposed to the 
position where the man is more closely associated with ‘masculine’ providing, and the 
woman with ‘feminine’ caring.  In this way, assumptions still seem to have been 
made about the women by reason of femininity, with neither partner being treated as 
the money-earner.  That said, the lower earner in Ms James’s matter was apparently 
not conceived of as vulnerable, as tends to occur in relation to female partners in 
heterosexual relationships.  There are hints of lesbians almost being treated as ‘not-
women’, in the sense of notions of traditional dependent femininity (which perhaps 
help to back up Calhoun’s (2000) assertion of lesbians being viewed as 
“ungendered”).  This speaks to a point raised by Ms Irvine, albeit in relation to a 
dispute under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 on the death 
of her client’s lesbian partner, that she had had a significant amount of work to do to 
prove dependency. 
 
More broadly, though, the solicitors appeared to have been working to construct their 
clients’ cases to fit with heteronormative ideas about gender roles in relationships.  
This is in spite of contentions, such as those made by Weeks (2004: 159), that non-
heterosexual people are “in the vanguard”.  As is set out above, it was asserted that 
‘queerness’ entails, “innovation and support for gender nonconformity” (Green, 2010: 
429).36  My questionnaire data support this, suggesting that subsisting same-sex 
relationships hold radical potential.  Yet, at the point of dissolution, civil partnerships, 
whilst initially appearing to have brought about an increase in legal equality, have 
simultaneously facilitated the imposition of a model based on heterosexual power 
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relations (with the radical potential of formalised same-sex relationships 
correspondingly diminishing).  I will now interrogate the way in which the idea of 
equality featured within my interviewees’ narratives, focusing on the interlinked 
understandings of equality between same and opposite-sex couples, and between the 
partners themselves. 
 
‘Equality’ as sameness of treatment 
In respect of their narratives around equality between same and different-sex partners, 
the solicitors’ emphasis was again on formal equality, or sameness of treatment: 
 
The Law Society course now requires you to do diversity training […] People 
are so conscious of that that they won’t, you know, that… ‘we must treat this 
exactly the same’ […] We went to see the leading counsel […] and he was 
saying, ‘look, you know, judges are so keen to show that there’s equality that 
it’s going to be no different from a married case’ (Mr. Arnold). 
 
They have exactly the same expectations, lifestyle, jobs.  They’re no different, 
no different at all.  So, of course they should have the, umm, same, umm, 
treatment (Ms Ennis). 
 
Ms Boyce even went so far as to suggest that, were she to do anything different to 
heterosexual couples, she feared being accused of prejudice (implying that she did not 
have the courage to do so).  The notion of formal equality likewise featured strongly 
in the client accounts, with respondents failing to recognise the heteronormativity of 
the frameworks into which inclusion was sought (Harding, 2011).  For example, they 
stated that: 
 
It doesn’t matter whether you’re gay or straight, you should be treated exactly 
the same (Caroline). 
 
It’s a milestone for gay and lesbian couples to be treated the same, to be 
treated the same in the eyes of the law.  I feel that that’s really important 
(Isaac). 
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My findings in this respect are consistent with Denike’s (2010: 148) assertion of the 
abandonment of queer critiques of the family in favour of access to “privileges of the 
state”.  By attaining inclusion based on rationalising of this nature, lesbians and gay 
men may seem to become supporters of heterosexual marital values.37  This reduces 
their potential to raise questions about the way that gender works in relationships. 
 
Moving on to consider what equality means in addressing potential economic 
inequalities on relationship breakdown, it was contended that, even with respect to 
civil partnerships: 
 
Equality isn’t that they each keep what they’ve got.  It’s joining everything 
that they both own, whether it’s in their name or their sole name, and putting it 
in a pot and then dividing it (Ms Boyce). 
 
I can’t see that […] the concept of sharing would be any different after a long 
relationship (Mr. Henry). 
 
The solicitors were arguably neglecting to notice the financial separateness that may 
be more common, and the lesser degree to which it may be appropriate to transfer 
property between partners on civil partnership dissolution.  There was little 
suggestion, in this respect, that the lawyers had the insight to recognise that the 
marriage frame of sharing does not always work with same-sex relationships.  In fact, 
despite my indications in chapter 5 (which I will elaborate on below) that many civil 
partners have not necessarily been expecting to share what they bring in financially, 
Ms James reported a number of “relatively half/ half” outcomes.  Furthermore, client 
Isaac was advised that his ex-partner may be entitled to 50% of the assets had he not 
agreed to pay a sum in settlement (“under the terms of marriage”), and this was the 
outcome in Anthony’s matter, albeit that he had opposed this division less than the 
apportionment of ‘future’ assets.  Mr. Derrick also described how, in a lesbian matter 
that he had advised on, there had been a 55/ 45% division in his client’s favour.  The 
solicitor gave reason for a near-50/ 50 division using a substantive conception of 
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equality, explaining that it had put the financially weaker party in a stronger position 
(which he considered “fair”, given the substantial length of the relationship). 
 
It should be acknowledged that a number of the solicitors cited relationship length to 
be a determining factor, with shorter relationships being approached more on a basis 
of reflecting the pre-relationship financial status of the parties.  As to the more 
substantial relationships, though, Mr. Arnold considered that: 
 
The door’s shut, for the time being at least, for doing anything but 50/ 50 […] 
Most of our cases are not many tens of millions and the reality is that, in the 
courts on a day-to-day basis, most judges are not interested in arguments about 
an unequal division (Mr. Arnold). 
 
Despite the solicitor’s claims about his caseload, Mr. Arnold still deals with relatively 
large money matters, and his comments should be considered as against those of 
solicitors working on more ‘everyday’ cases.  Ms Lane, for example, viewed it to be 
rare to come across a case where the assets are divided 50/ 50, as a result of needs.  
Even so, she stated that she would seek to negotiate cases to get to a position as near 
to 50/ 50 as possible (and this seems consistent with Hitchings’s (2010) point that the 
‘big money’ principles have been given weight in larger value everyday cases).  A 
White-based approach to equality still seems, at least to an extent, to be having 
influence, and this might be difficult to justify in relationships where there is no 
especially vulnerable party. 
 
In fact, it might seem easier to rationalise this ratio of division in a same-sex 
partnership where the parties have earned and contributed approximately the same 
amount, as was acknowledged by Ms Field.  Therefore, under the appropriate 
circumstances, this outcome could be reached as a result of a consciousness of dual 
earning.  As opposed to this, however, the clients and solicitors alike commonly relied 
on a wider discourse of formal equality between same and different-sex couples.  It 
may be little wonder that this is occurring, given that the legislative and policy history 
of the 2004 Act privileged such conceptions of equality.38  Even so, this 
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understanding is unlikely to offer the kind of radical change that we might to have 
wished to have been catalysed by formalised same-sex relationships.  Indeed, the 
sameness-centred approach might be criticised for omitting to envision more 
transformative models of family.  I proceed by turning to the way that differences 
between dissolution and divorce featured in the participants’ accounts, and addressing 
the extent to which they have signalled any change to the legal approach towards 
financial relief.   
 
Discourses of difference 
The differences raised in the interviews centred around the following issues: 
incongruence in the circumstances of same and different-sex cases; a desire amongst 
lesbian and gay clients to sort out their relationship disputes on their own terms, and 
to settle (rather than leaving resolution to legal professionals); and a difference in 
approach to relationship finances.  I will consider these in turn, arguing that, whilst 
disparities were not reflected in the solicitors’ approaches to asset division on the 
whole, a preference towards self-ordering indicated some degree of client resistance. 
 
Divergent factual matrices 
The main (interrelated) dissimilarities observed by the solicitors between same and 
different-sex matters concerned the partners’ more similar employment statuses, their 
sharing of household tasks, and the common absence of children.  In terms initially of 
civil partners’ working lives, and corresponding with my questionnaire findings in 
chapter 4, it was described how: 
 
Most of the clients would generally be in employment without huge gaps 
between their incomes, whereas I think… thinking, umm, to, err, heterosexual 
cases […] there is quite a big gap […] Most of them are, sort of, from the 
same professional or class background (Ms Field). 
 
I think that, certainly, the salary base may be higher.  So, therefore, actually, 
even if there may be a big differential between one and the other, the one that 
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doesn’t earn as much still earns enough.  So, it’s not… it’s not as if there’s the 
need that there might be (Ms James). 
 
It is perhaps striking that it was the two lesbian solicitors that highlighted these 
differences.  That said, echoing the last sentiment, Mr. Henry also mentioned that it 
may be more difficult for same-sex partners to prove needs.  The question raised there 
was whether the courts would be willing, in a civil partnership matter, to adjust 
capital to recognise the greater need of one party solely by reference to inequality of 
income or earning capacity, with this not having been caused by sacrifice, or 
prejudice in the employment market due to gender.  It was relevant that Mr. Henry, in 
particular, should have been the one to address this point, given that he felt that the 
majority of the matters that he worked on were classified as ‘needs’ cases, despite 
having assets spanning up to £10 million.  The inference may be that, in relation to 
same-sex relationships, the practitioner conceived of needs in a more restrictive sense 
compared with how generously the term has been interpreted in matrimonial 
proceedings. 
 
Yet, this issue was not noted more widely, with heteronormative assumptions and 
arguments frequently being drawn upon.  Ms Irvine, for instance, considered that, in 
the civil partnership cases that she had worked on, there had been a ‘breadwinner’ and 
supporting ‘homemaker’.  Whilst this may have been reflective of the facts of those 
individual cases, she expressed that: 
 
I think that those situations arise regardless of gender if there is financial 
security […] The ability to look after the dog or cats, to spend time with 
elderly relatives, to run the home […] I think that wealth gives you choices 
that you don’t otherwise have (Ms Irvine). 
 
It is interesting that the solicitor should make that contention when my questionnaire 
results suggested that gross household income had little impact on domestic division.  
She ultimately viewed same-sex matters as being, “conventional” in terms of disparity 
in wealth and income between the partners, and the responses of Mr. Henry and Mr. 
Norris were in agreement.  This suggests, in addressing my second research question, 
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that legal actors are indeed applying heteronormative assumptions of the gendered 
division of labour to same-sex relationships, even though they may not be applicable. 
 
In fact, those solicitor accounts stood against my client sample, where six 
interviewees had, for a significant portion of their relationship, held jobs of a similar 
level to their partners.  This proportion resembles my questionnaire finding that 
63.8% of respondents had the same occupational status as their partner.  For ease of 
reference as to the interviewees’ occupations, see appendix H.  Edward and his 
partner held identical professional positions (although his partner was more senior), 
Jennifer and hers were both public sector workers, and Freddie and his partner 
worked as managers, also within the public sector.  George and his partner worked 
full-time within the community and personal services industry, and Heather was a 
professional whilst her partner worked in education (prior to becoming self-
employed).  Bill and his partner had reasonably paid jobs in professional industries 
for over half of their relationship, although his partner was subsequently dismissed for 
criminal activity, and was unemployed for two years before obtaining part-time work.  
It is likely that the relatively widespread finding of similar employment statuses ties 
in with the absence of children in the clients’ households.  This explanation did 
feature in six of the solicitor accounts, with Mr. Arnold stating that: 
 
It does seem to be that, once there’s a child […] it’s a lot easier to get into 
gender stereotypes (Mr. Arnold). 
 
A minority of practitioners additionally perceived that the more frequent absence of a 
single ‘breadwinner’ was mirrored by the lack of a single ‘homemaker’.  Ms James, 
for instance, viewed that her clients had considered their home as being run “jointly”.  
Depictions of the sharing of housework featured more regularly in the client accounts, 
though, with there being reports such as that: 
 
Things like laundry, we would do together.  You know, whoever would just 
put a whites wash on, or a colours, you know… we’d go out and put it on the 
line.  So, you know, both of us would be involved in that […] The gardening, 
umm… we both enjoyed the garden very much and, umm… we both did 
gardening (Jennifer). 
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Cleaning we both shared responsibility for, as no one wants to clean, do they? 
(Isaac). 
 
Dishwasher loading and emptying, whoever came first would be the person to 
do it (Anthony). 
 
These descriptions pointed towards Kurdek’s (1993) “equality” pattern, under which 
the parties are as likely as one another to do the housework.39  Solicitor Mr. Derrick 
did make reference to the, “equal division of labour around the house” in a matter that 
he had worked on, although he stated that one partner would shop a bit more and the 
other would cook.  That perception resembles a “balance” pattern, where the parties 
are responsible for the same number of different tasks (Kurdek, 1993).  This pattern 
similarly featured in client Heather’s account: 
 
She did the, umm, shopping and most of the cooking, probably 90… 95% of 
the cooking.  I tidied up and, err, did the washing up, or loaded the 
dishwasher, unloaded the dishwasher, you know.  I did all of the laundry… so, 
I would strip the beds and do, you know, the washing and drying.  Umm, so 
we sort of split what was left of the domestic chores between us.  And, I think 
that we just sort of fell into those chores, because they were things that neither 
of us minded doing.  She liked cooking, I didn’t.  I didn’t mind doing the 
washing up, I didn’t mind doing the laundry, so I sort of took that on board 
(Heather). 
 
Alongside personal preference, Heather described how the arrangement had been 
motivated by the idea of “equality” in relationships.  That comment accords with 
Patterson et al’s (2004) suggestion that lesbian couples prioritise ideas about ideal 
divisions of labour. 
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Less common amongst the clients’ responses were reflections that tasks had been 
apportioned in conformance with traditional gender roles, although Edward did state 
that: 
 
I was much more, you know, likely to cook and decide what colour we were 
repainting the rooms, and he would do the more practical DIY stuff, umm, 
which he quite enjoyed (Edward). 
 
On top of this, there were relatively few descriptions that more closely matched a 
“segregation” type pattern.  George claimed that his partner did not do anything 
around the house, and Freddie emphasised that he had done the majority of tasks, 
albeit that his partner would help to prepare food and tidy away.  Notably, however, 
Freddie emphasised that he had been “happy” with that arrangement, and the same 
was true of Debbie, who perceived that she had conducted the cooking and cleaning 
in exchange for having worked part-time.  In this way, there were indications that the 
roles may have been selected by the partners (rather than societally imposed), which 
signifies greater equality of working and learning (Baker et al, 2004). 
 
In relation to caring work, whilst none of these clients reported having cared for 
children or elderly relatives, a number stressed having looked after pets.  Debbie 
viewed herself as having been the only person that cared for the dogs within the 
household, and George perceived that he had taken sole care of their cats.  On the 
other hand, Heather and Jennifer considered that they and their ex-partners had looked 
after their pet cats jointly.  Their accounts work against suggestions of one partner 
necessarily conducting the caring work, as has frequently occurred in heterosexual 
relationships.  Not only this, but they are again in harmony with the idea of equal 
sharing under Baker et al’s (2004) working and learning dimension.  Turning to the 
practitioners, several had advised on matters where children had been present.  In a 
similar vein, two reported the care work as having being shared, at least in the context 
of lesbian relationships: 
 
They were raising this little child, and they managed it quite well because they 
were both [academics], and they both paid for the childcare and, you know, 
they spent joint quality time (Ms Ennis). 
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They shared care of the children […] as much as you can do, 50/ 50 […] 
Within lesbian relationships, it’s the norm (Ms James). 
 
Having stated this, though, Ms James went on to assure sameness by highlighting that 
she had advised civil partners who were in more “traditional” relationships, where one 
had stayed at home.  In this way, her response reverted to heteronormative familial 
arrangements. 
 
It might seem that, given the less clear cut and distinctive ‘breadwinning’/ 
‘homemaking’ role patterns (recognised by some solicitors and evinced in the client 
accounts), the adoption of the principles and assumptions developed in the 
matrimonial case law are more difficult to justify in civil partnership matters.  This is 
especially the case given that they have been developed to address the disadvantaged 
position of the stay-at-home housewife.  Nevertheless, it is interesting that, whilst the 
solicitors raised differences in the factual matrices, they did not seem generally to 
have translated into a disparity in how same-sex matters have been approached and 
argued.  Legal actors are broadly not responding to the ways in which lesbians and 
gay cases diverge from the ‘norm’, which mark their relative equality of condition in 
comparison to different-sex couples.  This lessens their potential to instigate 
movement from stereotypes of traditionally gendered roles. 
 
A preference for resolving on their own terms, and against litigation 
A further difference observed by the practitioners was that lesbian and gay clients 
have tended to have a more developed idea of how their matter should be resolved.  
Ms Field set out how: 
 
Often, they’ll come and they’ll give me a mathematical calculation of what 
they’ve paid.  And I don’t usually get that on a dispute, a marriage… you 
know, on a heterosexual case […] I’ll say, ‘it’s not actually quite like that, the 
court isn’t going to approach it on that basis’.  Umm, I don’t know, do you 
think that it’s because… do you think it’s because people understand what 
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marriage is?  Do you think it’s so part of the culture that marriage means 
sharing, whereas civil partnership… I don’t know (Ms Field). 
 
Ms Field hinted that the term ‘civil partnership’ might carry alternative connotations 
to the sharing approach widely associated with marriage.40  Her report of the clients’ 
attitudes may, once more, speak to their relative financial separateness, and that 
notion is supported by the following reflections on same-sex matters: 
 
There’s definitely been more of an air of, ‘we’re going our own way, we need 
to divide our assets and get on with our own lives’.  Whereas, when you see a 
wife who has, perhaps, been working part-time and is very dependent on her 
husband’s income, you get a very different feel (Ms Clarke). 
  
When they break up, they say […] ‘we’ve done everything separately and 
independently, so we’ll carry on doing that.  You’ve had more money than 
me, and you always will.  I’ve always had less money than you, and I always 
will’ (Ms James). 
 
Ms James went on to describe having advised her clients that they could obtain a 
greater proportion of assets under the law, but how they had not wanted her advice.  
There was further evidence for this suggestion in the client data: 
 
I was quite steeled against the solicitors’ advice […]  I’d kind of, in my head, 
already started thinking about what I thought was fair, rather than what was 
legally allowable […] I just really didn’t want a bad energy around it, so I had 
to be very robust in my own head about what I thought was right […] I wanted 
to know that, down the line, I could say that I’d taken financially what I 
thought was, you know, respectful and polite, and realistic, not just what I 
could (Edward).   
 
Edward had consequently agreed to the transfer of a figure that would simply enable 
to him to relocate, this amounting to a lot less than half of value of the parties’ flat.  In 
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so doing, he had resisted the possibility that the dissolution should become 
adversarial, or that the other side should be pushed for a better outcome. 
	  
Indeed, practitioners Ms James and Mr. Norris set out how their civil partnership 
matters had tended not to litigate.  To this extent, in beginning to answer my third 
research question, the introduction of formalised relationships has not necessarily 
brought about the greater engagement of lesbians and gay men with the law.   
Regarding Mr. Norris, none of his same-sex cases (which amounted to around 5% of 
his caseload) had been pursued through the courts, whilst approximately 10% of his 
heterosexual cases went to final hearing.  It should be highlighted that one of the 10 
clients that I interviewed did proceed to final hearing, and that three had ongoing 
matters.41  Then again, people who have been involved in difficult proceedings may 
be more likely to agree to participate in a study such as mine.  Consistently with the 
two solicitors’ accounts, it was detailed how: 
 
I deal with some very acrimonious divorces and, at the moment, I haven’t 
dealt with a terribly […] acrimonious civil partnership (Ms Clarke). 
 
I think in comparison, we did settle the money issue very fast.  If this was an 
opposite-sex couple, no we wouldn’t have […] What I did find is that the 
finances, every time you got the letter, ‘okay’ (Ms Ennis). 
 
The indication is that, whilst heteronormative conceptions of gender have been 
carried over into civil partnership matters, gay men and lesbians are providing some 
resistance to the imposition of heterosexual norms on their relationships.  The clients’ 
apparent preferences in this respect are consistent with governmental 'nudges' in the 
direction of mediation, private ordering and avoiding lengthy family law disputes 
(under, for example, the Children and Families Act 2014).  That said, the number of 
new private law cases was up 23% in July 2015 from the same month in 2014, 
signalling that the government has not managed to get enough litigants to turn to 
mediation (Smith, 2015).  
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  As can be seen at appendix H.	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The possible trend identified may be explained on a number of bases.  Firstly, it might 
be traced back to a point, made by Mr. Henry, about the way that the presence of 
children can cause a separation to become more conflicted (as the parties are obliged 
to continue to deal with one another on parenting related issues).  Seemingly, given 
that children are more often absent in same-sex matters, this takes some of the ‘heat’ 
out.  Secondly, it could reflect a contention, made by Ms James, that her civil partner 
clients were, “happy” with each other’s domestic contributions (as against labour 
division often being, “a straight couple problem”).  A third driving factor for same-
sex couples preferring to work things out for themselves is likely to be the 
longstanding subcultural importance of former partners within lesbian and gay 
kinship networks (Weeks et al, 2001; Van Eeden-Moorefield et al, 2011).  On this 
note, Weinstock (2004) identified the need to develop and maintain non-heterosexual 
identities, and the shared experience of marginalisation, as supporting the 
relationships between lesbians and their ex-partners.  A fourth explanation is the 
historical exclusion of lesbians and gay men from family law (and this “lack” of law 
is also identified as a “problem” by Harding (2011)).   
 
Fifthly, the partners’ disinclination to pursue their matters through the legal system 
may have been exacerbated by their wider cynicism (picked up on by the solicitors) 
relating to ‘law’.  Consider these statements:  
 
I think that their expectations of the law were a lot lower than maybe a 
heterosexual client, that the law wasn’t going to do anything to help them […] 
I think, actually, that both of the clients that I dealt with individually were 
fairly skeptical about the law in general.  They weren’t big fans of it.  Umm, 
maybe that’s been informed by the historical treatment of same-sex 
relationships by the law (Mr. Derrick). 
 
There’s a study that says that something like 80% of people who… straight 
people who break up, the first people that they go and see is a solicitor.  It’s 
really high, and I would say that it’s much lower for homosexual break-ups.  I 
think that the first person that they go to is not a solicitor.  Umm, possibly the 
last… possibly the last.  Because, really, we’re not… we’ve not been seen as 
their friends.  And, the law hasn’t been seen as particularly friendly […] I 
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think that civil partners generally do now… they do because they, umm… 
they know that they have to do something legal.  Something legal happened, 
and they know that something legal has to happen […] It’s not because they 
want to argue about everything, they just want a bit of help (Ms James). 
 
Those claims are reminiscent of the work of Harding (2011), which argues, in terms 
of lesbian parenting, that mothers will often work around legal presumptions and 
create their own rules. 
 
In fact, Ms James and Ms Field considered that civil partner clients are most 
comfortable when dealing with a lesbian or gay solicitor.  There was an impression 
that a commonality of sexuality helped to bridge the gap between clients and ‘law’.  
This was similarly reflected in the partners’ narratives: 
 
[Choosing Mr. Arnold, a gay solicitor] was about not having the barrier of 
difference in sexuality […] There’s just an empathy that you can… when you 
say something, you can work… you have the same, let’s say, foundational 
mentality, or whatever.  And if the solicitor had been straight, I would have 
probably been being prejudiced against the solicitor thinking that the solicitor 
would be prejudiced to me (Anthony). 
 
[The solicitor] was shocked that, you know, he wanted an open relationship, 
and that he wanted continual sex with other people […] but, you know, if that 
had been a gay solicitor- a gay man especially, or a gay man working in a 
solicitors dealing with dissolution- he’d have said, ‘I totally understand what’s 
going on here’.  And, there would have been a lot more tea and sympathy […] 
I guess what I now know is that I think that I would have preferred to have 
met someone who was far more sympathetic to what has happened within, you 
know, that lifestyle.  Err, and that could understand, rather than being clinical 
about it (Isaac). 
 
It is possible that the extensive heterosexuality across the solicitors’ profession and 
judiciary has influenced same-sex partners’ decisions to settle, by reason of their 
unfamiliarity with lesbian and gay lives.  Around 97% of those responding to a 
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question in the Law Society’s (2014: 10) practising certificate holder survey identified 
as heterosexual, whilst this figure was closer to 98% amongst recommendations for 
judicial appointment from October 2013 to March 2014 (Judicial Appointments 
Commission, 2014).  In terms of judicial demographics, the advanced age of the 
judiciary was also raised as an issue, with even solicitor Ms Irvine voicing that the 
legal profession is, “run by people who have very old-fashioned concepts”.  Client 
Debbie viewed that: 
 
I should imagine my granddad, yeah, had he still been alive today, would 
probably not be as accepting of gay people as probably, like, my mum would 
be, do you know what I mean?  Yeah, so, like, I think that the age of the judge 
probably went against me (Debbie). 
 
Therefore, it seems that a lesser tendency of same-sex partners to litigate their matters 
may, at least in part, relate to their difficult relationship with ‘law’ and legal actors.  
However, there appear to have been additional factors at play in lesbian and gay 
men’s avoidance of solicitors, and these suggest that they may have a different 
approach to financial relief to that which has developed through the ‘big money’ case 
law.  I will move on to examine the ways in which my interview participants’ views 
diverged from this approach in the context of civil partnership matters. 
 
A different approach to finance and relationship breakdown 
Regarding the issue of financial division, a few practitioners reported having 
encountered clients that were not seeking sameness of treatment to different-sex 
partners.  For instance, it was reported that: 
 
Some do have a high expectation that they’re going to get different treatment, 
but then you tell them, ‘fine, it isn’t’ (Ms Ennis). 
  
There’s a lot of media hype around same-sex marriages and same-sex 
relationships.  And then, so, people almost have a pre-conception that they 
will be dealt with differently.  Umm, and I think that that’s probably one of the 
most important facts, really, to home in on quite early, is to make it clear that, 
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in the majority, the law has sought to almost mirror what has been the position 
for marriages for some time (Mr. Kennedy). 
 
It is striking that, despite their clients’ expressions of a desire for difference, both of 
these solicitors reported having responded with assertions centring around sameness.  
Notably, this emphasis did not always feature, with some practitioners stressing it 
only to be appropriate to adopt a sameness approach where the facts are directly 
analogous.  Ms Gale, for example, only considered it possible to treat lesbian and gay 
couples the same as heterosexual couples without children.  That said, of course, 
arguments focusing on sameness were adopted in relation to the childless clients 
discussed above.  Moreover, one has to wonder, given the previous assertions about 
the routine application of the heteronormative framework, to what extent the 
practitioners would recognise the circumstances of the cases before them as non-
identical. 
 
Practitioner Ms Field did, however, pose criticism of the application of a 50/ 50 ratio 
of apportionment in same-sex matters, contending that: 
 
You’re imposing this heterosexual model on [people’s relationships] and 
saying […] ‘we’re going to assume that you started as a sharing relationship, 
and then give us reasons why we shouldn’t think that’ (Ms Field). 
 
Client Anthony likewise perceived it to be “unequal” that a “heterosexual stereotype” 
is being applied.  Whilst Rowlingson and Joseph (2010), in their study of 80 different-
sex couples, found that an arrangement of “sharing” was generally considered to be 
what “would” and “should” happen on relationship breakdown, this is not necessarily 
true of same-sex partners.  The indication here, in response to both my first and third 
research questions, was of an alternative approach to finance on relationship 
breakdown.  Ms James elaborated that same-sex partners’ views of equality often do 
not match those of solicitors: 
 
Equality of outcome… they don’t get that.  That’s not something that civil 
partners think about.  Whereas, it’s very much in the mind of, I think, straight 
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married couples.  They get ‘equality of outcome’ much quicker […] My civil 
partner clients… ‘why is that fair?  Why would that be fair?’ (Ms James).   
 
I interpret her to have meant, by “equality of outcome”, the eliminating of material 
imbalance between the parties by way of a transfer of funds from the more, to the 
less, wealthy individual. 
 
The solicitor’s assertion of differing attitudes was supported by client Debbie, who 
disapproved of the legal approach that had been adopted in her matter.  Consider her 
account of how the 50/ 50 division of the proceeds of the sale of their property was 
reached: 
 
If two people came in and they said, you know, we’ve got a biscuit here and 
we’ve got to share it, ‘well, cut it in half.  Have half each, perfect’.  But, the 
fact that one person brought… contributed towards, you know, the majority of 
that biscuit, and the other person… like, one person had put in 9 pence, the 
other one had put in a penny to buy this 10p biscuit, then that wasn’t kind of 
mentioned, was it? […] I just think that, sometimes, it’s what you put into it 
[…] If you’ve put this in, then you’re entitled to that percentage out (Debbie). 
 
She was referring to the contribution of her inheritance towards the purchase of the 
home, which she felt was not adequately reflected in the asset apportionment.  Debbie 
held perceptions of ‘fairness’ which focused on the relationship finances, and which 
she viewed as being more important than equality, in the sense that it was conceived 
of in White.  It may, of course, be the case that such perceptions are also held by 
heterosexual people that bring the greater quantity of money into their relationship.  
This is given that the 50/ 50 approach to division is a legal construct that replaced a 
less generous approach to the economically weaker party.  Indeed, Dowding (2009: 
225) claimed that parties in different-sex divorce cases “may require some 
persuading” that the outcome in their case was “balanced and just”.  Yet, the 
indication within my data is that these opinions may be more common in same-sex 
matters. 
 
Anthony further contended that: 
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I think that equality should be based on- in my view now, I would have 
thought differently had I not gone through this process- on what is accrued or 
disaccrued during the relationship, so your contribution or detraction in 
financial terms.  It’s interesting because, in the end, it all becomes about 
money […] Whichever way you shape equality, the measuring stick needs to 
change.  Maybe it needs to change so that you’re two individuals and then you 
look at the circumstances of the individuals, not hoping that one is perceived 
as a man or a woman (Anthony). 
 
It can only be imagined that Anthony’s views were shaped by his beliefs of his 
partner’s lack of economic and domestic activity, as well as the substantial earnings 
that he personally had brought into the relationship.  Nevertheless, his response works 
contrary to the idea, described by Burgoyne (1990), that all assets should be shared, 
regardless of who contributed what to the household.  It goes against the notion, in the 
heterosexual case law, that the parties’ different contributions should each be 
regarded as no less valuable than the other (unless one of their contributions was 
financially “stellar”  (Cowan v Cowan [2001] 2 FLR 192)).  Not only this, but his 
understanding lacks any recognition of the non-financial ways that people can 
contribute to relationships.  On the contrary, Heather stressed that work outside of the 
economic sphere was of value (although she was unsure as to how it would be 
quantified).  All the same, the client described having settled her own matter by 
presenting her ex-partner with a list of what they both put into the property 
financially. 
 
Amongst other clients, understandings of equality were more nuanced.  Edward 
considered that financial relief outcomes should be determined by what the partners 
understood their formalised relationship to be about.  He explained that: 
 
If it really is a civil agreement… it’s just about you, you know, being each 
other’s next of kin and having some emotional bond then, you know, you 
should probably split up and no one should lose anything that they brought 
into the relationship.  But, I think that if you do feel that it’s akin to a marriage 
[…] and you’re contributing all that you have, as it were, to that relationship, 
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and then you split up, you need… there needs to be some preservation. 
(Edward). 
 
The client deemed it appropriate for there to be a two-tiered approach, depending on 
how ‘marriage-like’ the partners considered their relationship to be.  Whilst it was 
established in chapter 5 that some clients did view their civil partnerships as being 
like a marriage, I also identified a number as having sought to formalise their 
relationship for practical reasons.  Edward regarded it more persuasive for those 
practically driven parties to walk out of their relationships with what they brought in 
(thus respecting the parties’ autonomy). 
 
The emphasis placed by the clients on financial contributions is, once more, likely to 
be at least partially reflective of their lack of children.  It may be that non-financial 
contributions would be viewed as more relevant in the minority of same-sex matters 
where children are involved, and my intention is not to argue that those who have 
made sacrifices to care should not receive financial support on relationship 
breakdown.  However, what was evident from the client accounts was that the ways 
that they conceived of equality were often incongruous with those of the solicitors 
(and that heteronormative assumptions and constructs seem to have been applied by 
legal actors even where children were not present).  It appears to be the case, from 
this study, that lesbians and gay men are eschewing the redistributive practices 
developed in the key case law in favour of a focus on the individual economic 
circumstances prior to and during the relationship.  It is tempting to view the partners’ 
preferences in this respect as a function of their relatively similar income or earning 
potential.  That said, it may be more likely to reflect pre-civil partnership approaches 
to relationship breakdown and the previous lack of legal support on same-sex 
relationship breakdown.  As those in same-sex relationships find that they are no 
longer positioned outside of the law, approaches to money management in legally 
recognised same-sex relationships may change. 
 
As it stands, though, the partners’ focus might be considered problematic for two 
reasons.  Firstly, the fact that the clients tended to place less weight on non-financial 
contributions seems to imply there to be greater scope to argue financial contributions 
as a reason for greater departure from the ‘yardstick’.  This consequence might be 
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criticised, by reason that it, “overlooks deeper structural, gendered economic 
inequalities” (Monk, 2015: 191).  Secondly, I recognise that the clients’ thinking 
works against Ellman’s (2003) contention that, in view of the already “inherently 
uncertain” nature of financial relief outcomes, it is important that there is clarity and 
consistency.42  Still, I argue that recognising the divergent attitudes of same-sex 
partners helps to instigate a movement away from the unthinking and universal 
application of a heteronormative model.  It could open up new critical dialogues 
concerning the existing frameworks not only in the same-sex context, but also in 




The solicitors observed some disparities in their experiences of same and different-sex 
matters, thereby prima facie appearing to generate innovative potential.  That said, 
those observations have had little impact on the way that they have approached and 
argued their civil partnership cases.  As a result of their lack of familiarity with civil 
partnership, legal actors, when addressing financial relief on relationship breakdown, 
have been placing a stress on sameness of treatment and formal equality between 
same and different-sex couples.  Returning to my second research question, they have 
been constructing lesbian and gay cases as being identical to married ones.  This may 
be unsurprising, given both that the formal legal frameworks surrounding civil 
partnership dissolution are very similar to the legal approach to (different-sex) 
divorce, and that the common law has a preoccupation with precedent.  The approach 
is, though, in tension with the fact that same-sex partners, given their lack of gender 
disparity, hold “unique possibilities for the construction of egalitarian relationships” 
(Weeks, 2004: 159). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 It is acknowledged (and was highlighted to me in a conversation on 23rd September 2014 
with R. Leckey) that the greater the need that is created for individual circumstances to be 
investigated, the more it may become necessary to instruct lawyers, and the less feasible it 
may be for parties to resolve matters for themselves. 
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The strategy of encouraging the adoption of subject positions based on traditional 
gendered power relations is presently being extended into civil partnership 
proceedings, and the law of financial relief is working to reproduce traditional 
heterosexual behaviour as the norm.43  Particularly, through adhering to notions of 
equal division as they appear in the key heterosexual cases, practitioners are reverting 
to heteronormative models that draw on assumptions of necessary imbalance in 
relationships.  This is significant, given that lesbians and gay men often do not 
experience such imbalance in their domestic lives, consequent to which dissolution 
matters hold the potential to pose novel challenges to the law.  I argue that 
understandings of legal equality need to shift so as to enable lesbian and gay lifestyles 
to undermine normative power relations in the area of the family, and to allow 
everyone the same capacity impact on their environment (Baker et al, 2004; Cooper, 
2000; 2004). 
 
The presence of a politics around gender subordination in the development of 
redistributive rules poses questions about the unmediated application of those rules to 
same-sex relationships (Leckey, 2013).  Yet, practitioners are not attributing lesbians 
and gay men with equality of recognition, and are generally not responding to the 
ways in which lesbian and gay clients are different, despite client efforts to highlight 
such difference.  Those efforts would appear to indicate that a level of resistance has 
been retained to the imposition of heterosexual relational norms, although the 
potential transformative effects of this are being blunted in practice.  Lesbian and gay 
couples' apparent preferences for settling their family law disputes, rather than 
litigating, may signal some capacity still to help to challenge social and legal 
constructions about the gendered nature of roles in intimate relationships (helping to 
answer my first and third research questions).  Even so, as same-sex partners adapt to 
the position of being ‘inside’ the law, and the emphasis on formal equality that this 
has entailed, their attitudes in this respect may change.  Chapter 7 also identifies 
somewhat of a shift in terms of the approach towards ‘future’ assets.  When opting to 
engage with the law, though, same-sex relationships are predominantly being 
assimilated into the marriage model.  This risks leaving essentialist assumptions about 
male and female roles intact, and causes underlying critiques of the way that gender 
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works in marriage to become “marginalized, even silenced” (Polikoff, 1993: 1549).  
As far as women are concerned, it fails to interrupt the persistence of the ideology of 
domesticity, under which nurturing and caring are normatively assigned to them.  
Indeed, it reduces the capacity of same-sex relationships to expose, denaturalise and 
dismantle such historical constructions of gender that marriage has centred around, so 
as to alter contemporary understandings of gender in all formalised relationships. 
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Chapter 7- In(ter)dependency 
 
This chapter explores my interviewees’ responses concerning finances, given 
observations that money has been treated as, “a virtual index of inequality within 
heterosexual couples” (Heaphy et al, 2013: 107).  My engagement with the issue has 
in mind the discussion in chapter 6, which suggests that a focus on sameness can 
cause difficulty, moulding same-sex relationships into heteronormative patterns.  This 
can result in the overlooking of aspects that are not compatible with the ‘ideal’.  Part 
of the assumption that might be made when adopting this line of thinking is that, 
given that they are no different to heterosexual couples, gay and lesbian partners seek 
to merge their finances in a way that is promoted by “modern marriage” (Burgoyne 
and Routh, 2001).  I will argue here that my data indicate this not to be true amongst 
my client interview sample. 
 
I begin by situating my research in relation to the existing literature on same-sex 
finances, a discussion that is foreshadowed by the briefer coverage of this material in 
chapters 1 and 4.  I will move on to examine pre-separation financial arrangements, 
continuing with the theme of identifying disparities observed by the practitioners 
between same and different-sex partners.44  I will contend that, as is suggested in the 
literature, some of the solicitors, and a number of the clients, conveyed relative 
balance as to how money was managed.  Their narratives moreover depicted 
arrangements of relative individualism in terms of asset holding, which might be 
viewed as creating less financially dependent relationships (Elizabeth, 2001).  This is 
significant in terms of same-sex couples as, not only is one partner not already more 
vulnerable than the other because of their gender, but the partners also seem to retain 
a level of financial resilience.  That being the case, the redistributive practices of 
family law may be less appropriate. 
 
I then address the position post-separation and, in seeking to answer my third research 
question, I contend that the parties’ pre-existing arrangements, alongside a lacking 
sense of futurity, feed into their greater objection to maintenance and pension sharing.  
Of relevance is the fact that that those awards are based on heteronormative notions of 
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‘feminine’ dependency.  In fact, there does appear to be some transformation 
occurring in relation to these ‘future’ assets, in that some practitioners expressed a 
hesitation as to the applicability of this type of award to lesbian and gay couples.  In 
this way, whilst factual dissimilarities may not have translated into changes in the 
ways that same-sex cases are presented, or in the application of sharing,45 they may be 
impacting the kinds of awards that are made.  Legal actors appear more reluctant to 
apply the assumption of financial dependency, with the different values of same-sex 
couples seemingly being reflected.  In a society where women are frequently still 
viewed as necessarily being reliant on their husbands on an ongoing basis, my 
interview findings signal some potential to move away from such traditional gender 
stereotypes (helping to answer my first research question). 
 
Existing literature on same-sex finances: how and why 
It has previously been asserted that, in the context of same-sex relationships, “there 
are no long standing rules about money.  The slate is blank” (Marcus, 1998: 179).  
That being the case, research has suggested that, although often merging their 
finances to some degree, lesbian and gay couples are more likely to keep separate 
finances than heterosexual partners (Mendola, 1980; Blumstein and Schwartz, 1983).  
Weeks et al (2001) and Dunne (1997) have contended that same-sex partners tend to 
contribute equally to household outgoings but, otherwise, hold their money in sole 
accounts.  More recently, Burgoyne et al (2011) and Heaphy et al (2013) similarly 
observed a preference amongst same-sex partners against pooling all of their money, 
and how lesbians and gay men draw on the value of independence in accounting for 
the handling of money in their relationships.  In conjunction with this, they revealed 
that financial decision-making has been perceived as a “shared activity”, with same-
sex descriptions being, “very different from the typical picture of married 
heterosexuals, where an economic ‘division of labour’ along stereotypical gender 
lines is much more common” (Burgoyne et al, 2011: 699).  Indeed, Burgoyne’s 
(1990) earlier work has indicated that, in different-sex relationships, men tend to have 
more economic power and greater control over money (meaning that they have more 
say in how money is used). 
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Lesbian women have particularly been said to wish to, “avoid extreme financial 
imbalances and value self-sufficiency”, having been exposed to the logic of the 
provider role in relationships with fathers or possibly ex-husbands (Clarke et al, 2005: 
358).  In this way, their decisions about merging finances are arguably influenced by 
heteropatriarchy and experiences of power imbalance (Martinac, 1998).  This idea ties 
in with radical feminist resistance against dependency and the oppressive institution 
of sexuality.  It has been asserted, in this respect, that the lesbian, “acts in accordance 
with her inner compulsion to be a more complete and freer human being than her 
society […] cares to allow her”, and that she is forced to evolve her patterns of living, 
learning about, “the essential aloneness of life” (Radicalesbians, 1973: 240).  
Correspondingly, Traies (2014: 214) has identified (albeit by reference to older 
lesbians) a “fiercely independent mindset” that extends beyond the financial, 
encompassing an ability to support oneself in a wider sense.  
 
More generally, a mentality amongst same-sex partners that favours less 
heteronormative financial patterns might be explained by the stress, placed by 
participants in Rolfe and Peel’s (2011) study, on the perceived value of creativity, and 
of their difference from the dominant frameworks.  We might additionally note 
Weeks et al’s (2001: 100) claim that, “separate financial lives can be symbolic of the 
ethic of co-independence which underlies the operation of same-sex relationships”.46  
However, Burns et al (2008) have since pointed out the difficulty of concluding 
whether this approach to money management reflects that ethic or, alternatively, more 
practical concerns.  This is given that it is only relatively recently that same-sex 
couples have been provided with legal assistance for disentangling their finances on 
relationship breakdown.  I will move on to interrogate the ways in which these 
explanations feature in my participants’ accounts, as well the extent to which their 
discourse evinces these models of greater independence and balance more broadly. 
 
Pre-separation finances 
Regarding financial arrangements prior to separation, this discussion addresses two 
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main points: firstly, how the domestic finances have been conducted (including bill 
payment and the making of financial decisions); and, secondly, how the parties’ 
money has been held.  I will argue that, in accordance with the previous literature, 
financial contributions tended to be viewed by the clients as being fairly equal, 
particularly in terms of the quantity paid and of the degree of co-operation between 
partners.  Although one partner has often carried out the task of physically taking 
control of bill payment, this does not map onto accounts of traditional gendered 
power relations.  I will then explain that a degree of separateness was common 
amongst my interviewees’ accounts of same-sex financial arrangements.  
Consequently, there has not been the same interdependency and interconnectedness 
that the courts have aimed to address in their financial relief awards. 
 
A more balanced approach towards financial management 
In terms of the settling of everyday domestic expenses, a few practitioners claimed 
that their same-sex clients had made more ‘equal’ financial contributions to the 
relationship than heterosexual couples.  For instance, there were reports that: 
 
  They shared everything equally, all [of] the bills (Ms Ennis). 
 
They were both bringing money into the household, and they both shared 
responsibility equally (Mr. Kennedy). 
 
Mr. Kennedy’s account, referring to client Bill, was supported by Bill’s description of 
the early years of his relationship (with the exception that he had contributed less to 
the mortgage, because he had put more money into the property initially).  Indeed, the 
partners’ responses themselves more regularly featured this balanced approach.  Their 
depictions seem to evince a form of equality of power because, as against this more 
egalitarian approach, men have traditionally paid more in heterosexual couples (Baker 
et al, 2004).  Thereby, they have sustained power over their wives.  In fact, a number 
of solicitors drew upon that heteronormative arrangement in describing their caseload 
as a whole, with Ms Irvine employing the language of “dominance”. 
 
As to how the balance played out within the clients’ households, explanations 
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included that: 
 
The mortgage was solely in my name, but […] he thought that he must pay 
half, for whatever reason […]  whereas, you know, with my current partner, 
he… you know, obviously, my earnings are at one end, and most people’s 
earnings are at the other end of the scale.  And so, umm, what I agreed with 
my current partner, very early on, is that he pays a proportional representation 
of what he can afford (Isaac). 
 
It was everything 50/ 50, down the middle […] Neither of us carried the other 
(Freddie). 
 
The idea of splitting in half recalls the responses to my questionnaire,47 and Edward 
likewise set out how he and his partner would “match” expenditure “50/ 50”.  This 
was irrespective of the fact that, being a more junior worker within the same 
profession, Edward was earning less.  He did, though, express some dissatisfaction at 
this, reiterating Burgoyne’s (2008) point that making the same contribution to 
expenses can disadvantage the partner with the lower income.  Returning to Freddie, 
the client proceeded to set out how the arrangement between himself and his partner 
had been, “just how we operated” in a relationship where they were earning fairly 
equal amounts.  An emphasis on the partners having earned at around the same level 
featured in six of the client interviews.  This might be contrasted with the position in 
different-sex relationships, where a wife’s earnings have traditionally been viewed 
less seriously than her husband’s.  It has, in fact, been found that there is still a 19.1% 
pay gap between women and men (Office for National Statistics, 2014a). 
 
Alternatively to the system of the partners paying half for the same items, an 
arrangement under which the partners each paid for different items (as was also 
identified in my questionnaire results) was described.  Heather set out how she had 
put a greater proportion of her earnings towards paying the bills, whilst her partner 
had bought the food, and Debbie and Edward detailed how: 
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She paid all of the bills […] so my money didn’t go towards the gas and the 
electricity and the grocery shopping, but my money was just always kept in 
the bedside drawer, ‘let’s go for a meal, yeah?’, ‘okay, let’s take £50 out, we’ll 
go and have a nice meal’, you know.  ‘Let’s go out for the day, we’ll go to the 
[location] Safari Park’ (Debbie). 
 
He’d paid off the mortgage, but […] I’d paid for the windows to be redone, 
the gardening to be done (Edward).   
 
It should be acknowledged that, although Edward’s contribution in this sense was of 
the lesser quantity, the client felt that this had had a “disempowering” impact. 
 
In their accounts of who took charge of ensuring that the domestic outgoings were 
met, the accounts provided were less balanced.  For example, Heather set out how: 
 
She wasn’t interested in that in the slightest, so what I did was, umm, I set up 
a joint account and we both transferred money in every month into that.  And 
then, all of the bills went out of that every month.  Umm, but she had no idea, 
really, what the bills were (Heather). 
 
This report reflects a contention, made by Mr. Norris, that one partner (usually the 
highest earner) will frequently keep the other party ignorant of the household 
finances.  In fact, Heather stressed how she had been happy with the arrangement, as 
her professional background had meant that she would be best suited to the task (this 
reiterating a finding by Skogrand et al (2011) amongst different-sex couples who self-
identified as having “great” marriages).  The client’s sentiment suggests the presence 
of Baker et al’s (2004) ‘working and learning’ dimension of equality of condition, 
given that she was able to pursue her own talents. 
 
Conversely, a few clients detailed having been obliged to take control of the finances 
as a result of their partner’s reckless attitude to money, or lack of financial resources.  
Those accounts fit well with an observation by Heaphy et al (2013: 116) that, 
amongst their (younger) interviewees, “the person who [had] incurred the debt often 
gave up control of their finances to the partner who has avoided debt”.  Within my 
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sample, one wonders to what extent perceptions were influenced by having consulted 
solicitors, particularly given the fact that the clients consistently presented themselves 
as having adopted this managing role (as opposed to their partner having done so).  
Not only this, but it is recognised once more that the clients’ views were most likely 
impacted by the emotional experience of civil partnership dissolution, and that it helps 
psychologically to ‘paint’ oneself positively and the other side negatively (Day 
Sclater, 1998).  Nevertheless, consider the stories of Freddie and Bill: 
 
He was freer with his credit card than I was and, umm, I did open his credit 
card statements, but simply because he didn’t.  And, we had a file system, that 
everyone’s bank account print-offs went into files, and I would open them and 
file them, umm, because he didn’t look at things […] Looking back, I was 
maybe too much of a parent, but then he was too much of a… what’s the… the 
terminology is… he was a victim and I was a rescuer (Freddie). 
 
He never knew what his balance was […] He would secretly buy stuff on the 
internet, and things would… clothes… he had a bit of a… oh dear, if I think 
about it, the number of clothes… I mean, a man doesn’t really need the 
number of clothes that he has […] I think that he would buy a lot of things on 
his credit card and run up and not clear his debts.  And so, it would just rack 
up (Bill). 
 
Mr. Kennedy reiterated how there had been a difference in mindset between his client 
and his ex-partner, which led to Bill taking control of settling the domestic expenses.  
It is noteworthy that the client, as the sole earner within his relationship for some 
time, should do this, as it would seem to go against the notion of delegation of bill 
paying.48  In a similar vein, it runs contrary to Burns et al’s (2008) finding that lower 
earners in same-sex couples conduct more of the everyday management of money.  In 
terms of Freddie, the portrayal of his role as the financial protector echoes a finding 
by Heaphy et al (2013).  In recounting stories of this nature, they emphasised that 
partners with this kind of arrangement do not neatly map onto traditional gendered 
power relations (as it is unclear whether the ‘responsible’ financial party is in the 
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privileged or burdened position) (Heaphy et al, 2013). 
 
Despite having taken responsibility for the system of financial management, however, 
Freddie claimed that he would still speak to his partner about the system that had been 
adopted.  This stress on the notion of the partners talking financial matters through 
with one another was present in the clients’ accounts more widely.  The finding ties in 
with my discussion in chapter 4, as well as with ideas of equality of power, which 
entail an aspect of cooperation and democracy (Baker et al, 2004).  Yet, it stands in 
contrast to Vogler’s (2009) suggestion that relationship finances tend to be a “taboo 
subject” that couples in Western societies dislike talking about.  Jennifer explained 
how: 
 
[Ex-partner] was quite good at, you know, sitting down and going through 
bills, and working out where money was […] We’d sit there on a Saturday 
morning adding up our receipts […] and she’d work out what she’d spent, and 
I’d work out what I spent, and then we’d add it up and do the sums and, you 
know, we’d split the difference (Jennifer). 
 
This description was repeated by practitioner Ms James, who viewed that her clients 
would quite “painstakingly” work out who had spent what and reimburse one another.  
That said, it was incongruous with other solicitors’ reports that: 
 
No proper record’s kept of who paid for what […] They are in love, and not 
worried about ‘I’m paying half, you’re paying half’ (Ms Irvine). 
 
This more heteronormative account draws on strategies of formal equality and the 
language of romance.49 
 
The clients’ reports of financial decision-making, which mainly centred around the 
purchase of large items, correspondingly portrayed arrangements of discussion and 
collaboration.50  This is in comparison to financial decision-making in heterosexual 
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couples, which has tended to be viewed as a more ‘masculine’ pursuit (Edgell, 1980).  
Anthony, despite being the sole earner in his relationship, considered that the 
purchase of their properties had been joint decisions, and claimed that he would 
consult his partner about buying other physical assets, such as vehicles and 
televisions.  In a similar vein, Edward stated that he and his partner would talk about 
purchasing items such as computers or holidays and “make a decision together”.  
Heather, from a slightly different perspective, reflected that: 
 
I suppose that we just had different roles […] I mean, she would quite often 
say, ‘oh, this is what I want’, and I would potentially say, ‘well, that’s a bit too 
much, is there a slightly cheaper model?’ (Heather). 
 
Even so, there is clearly still an element of cooperation within that account that runs 
counter to Ms Irvine’s (more sameness focused) perception of the ‘breadwinning’ 
partner taking control of deciding, for instance, “we’re having this house, we’re 
having this car”.  In compliance with the practitioner’s perception, though, client 
Debbie reported her greater earning ex-partner as having made, “all of the financial 
decisions”.  The client explained how: 
 
She’d just go out and buy a new TV, but, umm, it would never be, like, a £200 
TV, it would probably be, like, a £1,200 TV, and I’d come back and I’d go, 
’oh my god, how big is that?’, ‘I just fell in love with it’.  And, I’d go, ‘okay’, 
yeah, but then she would always class it as, like, she’d bought it (Debbie). 
 
It is unclear whether Debbie viewed that her partner had felt that she had purchased 
the items because she had been out to acquire them alone, or whether this was 
because the purchases were funded out of her earnings.  If the latter, the statement 
stands against a prior assertion by the client that neither of them had seen her 
partner’s earnings as being “mine” and “yours”, with both of them conceiving of it as 
“our money”.  That earlier contention echoes a suggestion that money is often 
perceived as belonging to the “partnership” or “team”, made in the context of 
different-sex couples (Bennett et al, 2012).  We might perceive there to be a conflict 
between the two powerful norms identified by Burgoyne (1990) that, firstly, the 
earner of money “owns” that money, and, secondly, that money is to be shared within 
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families (with the family constituting a unit).  I shall, at this point, proceed to consider 
the extent to which norms of this nature were drawn upon in my participants’ 
accounts. 
 
More distinct financial arrangements and greater independence 
Amongst my sample, Debbie was the only client to express the idea of the 
commonality of the finances.  That said, eight clients had pooled their money with 
their partner’s to some degree within their relationship.  This statistic is close to my 
questionnaire finding that 76.2% of those respondents that were in a civil partnership 
had a joint account with their partner.  Edward and his partner pooled their funds to 
the greatest extent, with each putting most of their salaries into a joint account 
(although retaining separate savings accounts).  Their reasoning for doing so was that: 
 
We had an offset mortgage initially, which meant that it was beneficial to put 
all of the money into one account, because that offset the interest from the 
mortgage (Edward). 
 
That being the case, the client focused on the practical aspects of having a joint 
account.  This is as opposed to Bennett and Sung’s (2013: 704) different-sex 
interviewees, who had more commonly referred to reasons of “trust and sharing”.  
Solicitors Ms Ennis and Ms Gale likewise reported having worked on same-sex 
matters where: 
 
They both worked, you know, child was in a nursery, and they had a joint 
account.  Their wages went into that joint account and everything was 
distributed (Ms Ennis). 
 
Prior to the civil partnership, a very large amount of money was transferred 
from sole hands into joint hands […] because they wanted to show to the other 
that their assets were joint assets, that they could use it both as their own pot 
of money (Ms Gale). 
 
Ms Gale observed that, in both of the lesbian cases that she had advised on, the 
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finances were “mixed” although, in the gay relationship that she had dealt with, the 
joint account was used for the settlement of bills alone.  Only one of these lesbian 
relationships had entailed a difference in the partners’ asset levels.  She asserted a 
gendered difference which was also identified in my questionnaire results.51 
 
Similarly to this second scenario, Jennifer set out how she and her partner had used a 
joint account to cover direct debits and standing orders, alongside having had their 
own personal accounts for their individual spending (and this report matches the most 
common arrangement described by Heaphy et al (2013)).  Anthony and his partner 
had also had a joint account for bills, as well as copies of the two credit cards that 
were in his name (for the purchase of items such as groceries).  He had had his own 
account into which his salary was paid on top of that.  The client did not feel that his 
personal account was a, “‘this is my money, you can’t touch it’ type scenario”, but 
that was presumably because that account was used to pay off the credit cards.  Bill 
reported that, when his partner was in employment: 
 
We both had our individual bank accounts and, umm, we had two joint 
accounts.  One was… one was to serve the domestic things […] so, shopping, 
council tax, water, electricity rates […] and then, the other was what we called 
the ‘mortgage account’.  Because we had contributed differently, umm, we 
kept that separate (Bill). 
 
Of course, in relation to the domestic account, Bill had eventually had to pay extra 
subsequent to his partner losing his job. 
 
Freddie and his partner, although not having had an account in their joint names, had 
used an account that was solely in his name as their ‘bills account’.  This way of 
organising the household finances mirrored a point raised by Ms Field that often: 
 
One person has paid everything out of their account and the other person gives 
them a cheque or a standing order (Ms Field). 
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It would likewise seem to reflect a finding by Heaphy et al (2013: 114) concerning 
the relative commonness of, “situations where there was no meshing of accounts”, but 
nevertheless a, “virtual commitment to jointness”.  On the other hand, after having 
covered the bills, Freddie explained how he and his partner were able to spend as they 
saw fit (considering this “a “personal thing”), and how the two had retained separate 
credit cards. 
 
As against the more joint approaches, there were several accounts of a greater 
separation of finances, such as that: 
 
He had his account and I had my account, and all of the direct debits came out 
of mine (George). 
 
We never had anything that was joint, really, [it] was all single, it was all in 
my name (Caroline). 
 
Such descriptions might seem contrary to Evertsson and Nyman’s (2014) argument 
that individualised systems of financial organisation still generate merged perceptions 
of money and expenditure.  They additionally work against Bennett and Sung’s 
(2013: 714) observation, amongst different-sex partners, of a “strong message of 
togetherness in financial affairs”, and the normative conception (referred to above) 
about money belonging to the family.  In fact, all 10 of the clients reported the 
existence of solely held bank accounts within their household, albeit with some 
utilising these more than others.52  The practitioners similarly reported the presence of 
separate accounts as being a noteworthy feature of their gay and lesbian cases, 
backing up both the existing literature and my finding as to the comparative lack of 
financial merging in same-sex relationships.53  This is relevant in the context of 
financial relief as, whilst sharing may be most applicable where income is pooled, it 
will be less pertinent where it is not. 
 
By way of an illustration of the arrangements described, it was commented that: 
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Once [heterosexual couples] have been married for a period of time, [their] 
finances… intermingle and there are more joint accounts, properties are more 
jointly held, most of the assets are joint.  Whereas, in the civil partnership 
cases that we’ve seen […] the bank accounts have been separate (Mr. 
Derrick). 
 
They just had separate accounts.  I don’t think that they had a joint account 
[…] Most people have at least one account that is joint, really, in heterosexual 
cases (Ms Boyce). 
 
Ms Field, in the same way, considered same-sex partners to have “clear boundaries” 
when it comes to finances, which she viewed as being a consequence of the fact that, 
historically, they “couldn’t not be separate legally”.  This speaks to the above point 
that it may be that the historical lack of legal and financial protection on the 
breakdown of same-sex relationships has mediated against any desire for stronger 
financial merging in same-sex couples.  On a related note, Clarke et al (2005: 357) 
emphasised, prior to the 2004 Act coming into force, that, “pooling can involve 
considerable risk for lesbian and gay couples because the law as it currently stands 
offers them little help in dividing up joint assets when a relationship ends”.  
Obviously, this remains the case for cohabiting couples.  It may be that, as same-sex 
partners become more familiar with the implications of formalised relationships, there 
will be a change in their financial behaviour. 
 
Nonetheless, Ms Field proceeded to discuss a case concerning an older lesbian couple 
where they had been unaware of their partner’s financial circumstances, and: 
 
We had to go through this rather torturous exchange of information just to get 
to the, ‘it should be 50/ 50’ […] The ones who’ve kept things separately may 
[…] want a little bit more convincing. (Ms Field). 
 
It is striking here that the 50/ 50 asset division framework should have been applied, 
given that Ms Field had noted a clear difference in circumstances as against her 
heterosexual caseload.  This reiterates the point made, in chapter 6, about the 
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imposition of heteronormative assumptions, and disparities not translating into a 
change in legal actors’ approach.  Ms Field did highlight that the separateness of the 
parties’ financial arrangements must be a factor that the court would take into 
account.  Yet, her thinking still seems difficult to reconcile with Ms James’s claim 
that: 
 
Keeping things very separate […] that’s much more common, I think, in 
lesbian and gay relationships than straight ones, I think.  Umm, which makes 
it interesting legally, of course.  It’s much easier to separate them out (Ms 
James). 
 
It should be recognised, in contrast to the notion of separateness being a 
distinguishing feature of same-sex partnerships, that Mr. Norris and Ms Lane stressed 
that there had been a reduction in asset intermingling amongst all relationships.  This 
ties in with the emphasis on formal equality and sameness identified in chapters 5 and 
6.  Mr. Norris attributed the trend to the visibility of pre- and post-nuptial agreements 
in the press, as well as to parties’ possible previous exposure to asset division on 
formalised relationship breakdown.  In relation to this previous exposure, 
practitioners will have seen an increase in the number of clients who have been 
married more than once, and remarriage has been cited as a trigger for adjustment in 
practices of money management (Goode et al, 1998).  Even where their money was 
more physically separated, though, the clients’ reports did not necessarily entail a lack 
of financial dependency.  For instance, it was set out how: 
 
 She was dependent on me, and I was dependent on my credit cards (Caroline). 
 
This narrative accords with Bennett and Sung’s (2013) observation of a variation in 
the degree of financial ‘jointness’ amongst their heterosexual interviewees without a 
joint account. 
 
That said, four of the clients did highlight their independence from their partner in 
their relationship, and three practitioners perceived the same of their lesbian and gay 
clients.  Assertions of this nature were moderately rarer amongst my civil partner 
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interviewees than they were within my questionnaire.54  It was voiced, for instance, 
that: 
 
I would say that I always managed to support myself financially, umm, 
because even though I had periods when I was claiming unemployment 
benefits, other times, you know… I’d always got, you know, my share of the 
rent, or the mortgage, or whatever.  So, [ex-partner] never had to financially 
support me (Jennifer). 
 
We weren’t, kind of, dependent on each other’s income (Edward). 
 
That Edward should have perceived his relationship in this way is interesting, given 
that the money in his household had been pooled to the greatest extent (although, of 
course, both partners were well-paid professionals).  The clients’ assertions are 
significant, given that a key concern of feminist campaigners has been to bring 
women to a position of not having to depend on their partner’s resources to meet their 
needs (see, for example, London Women’s Liberation Campaign for Legal and 
Financial Independence and the Rights of Women, 1979).  In offering an answer to 
my first research question, the suggestion is that same-sex relationships, displaying a 
lower level of interdependency, could work to show different-sex couples that there 
are ways of existing in relationships beyond the traditional pattern.  They remain as 
against the “social reality” of a lack of female self-sufficiency within heterosexual 
relationships, and it is contended that a wider recognition of this raises the potential to 
challenge this position of necessary ‘feminine’ dependency (Lewis, 2001).  It is once 
more acknowledged that none of my interviewees had children, and that children 
impact how independently partners view, and retain, their finances.55  Nevertheless, I 
argue that my findings may not relate simply to that aspect of the clients’ factual 
matrices, but that they might indicate some kind of more political, non-normative way 
of being. 
 
In fact, it may be that this way of being has contributed towards the voicing of 
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55 See chapter 4. 
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dissatisfaction, amongst gay and lesbian clients, at the prospect of having to pay more 
‘future’ based items post-separation.  A conflict might be observed with the legal 
position that civil partnership breakdown entitles you to claim against all of your 
partner’s assets, both currently in their possession and otherwise.  It is to that position 
that I will now turn. 
 
Post-separation finances 
In terms of the law concerning different-sex relationship breakdown, ongoing 
periodical payments were, at least traditionally, ordered fairly readily in favour of 
wives (especially where the payee was the primary carer of children (Cowell, 2014)).  
Indeed, in Miller/ McFarlane,56 the House of Lords deemed the Court of Appeal 
wrong to have required Mrs. McFarlane to justify continuing periodical payments, 
considering that the burden should be on the husband to justify any reduction.  This 
arguably worked to encourage the continuing ‘feminine’ reliance and vulnerability of 
women (Deech, 2009).  It has, in recent years, been stressed that setting a specific 
term for these kinds of payments is preferable (L v. L [2012] 1 FLR 1283).  In a 
similar vein, Mostyn J. in SS v. NS [2015] 2 FLR 1124 emphasised that the court must 
consider a termination of spousal maintenance with a transition to independence as 
soon as it is just and reasonable, with a degree of (not undue) hardship in making the 
transition to independence being acceptable.  The Court of Appeal has, moreover, 
suggested that divorcees with children over the age of seven should work, albeit in 
relation to a case where the husband was approaching retirement (Wright v. Wright 
[2015] Fam Law 523). 
 
Yet, lengthy orders are still being made: of the 369 divorce court files examined in 
Woodward and Sefton’s (2014: 20, 23) study (and the 46 cases in which periodical 
payments were awarded), payments were potentially for life in 14 cases, with 
payments in a further eight cases being for a term of 10 years or more.  Not only this, 
but the Supreme Court’s ruling in Vince v. Wyatt [2015] 1 FLR 972, where a wife was 
given permission to pursue a financial claim issued 18 years after their divorce, 
appears to affirm that the judiciary are still working on the basis of women’s ongoing 
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financial dependency.  Awards involving a pension sharing element appear to be 
made moderately more frequently, with this being a feature in 13.8% of Woodward 
and Sefton’s (2014: ix, 25) sample files (as against such orders being made in 10% of 
divorces in 2008 (Ministry of Justice, 2009: 97)).  Whilst still relatively rare, it has 
been suggested that the number of these orders has been on the rise, with retirement 
funds sometimes being the household’s most substantial assets where homes have 
decreased in value (Beckford, 2012). 
 
On examination of the queer literature, however, it becomes apparent that the use of 
these ‘future’ based awards may be more problematic with regard to same-sex 
couples.  Edelman (2004) argues that, whilst the figure of “the Child” constrains 
politics towards future orientation, ‘queerness’ is positioned and defined by its 
separation from reproductive acts (and, therefore, by being future-negating).  In his 
“antisocial” critique, Edelman (2004) has asserted that queer forms of sociality offer 
the possibility of moving beyond the temporality and obligations of heterosexuality.  
He coins the term “sinthomosexual” (referring to those who “choose […] not to 
choose the Child”) to set out how “the Child” can be jeopardised, and other sexual 
realities facilitated (Edelman, 2004: 31).  It is acknowledged here that it has, 
conversely, been contended that, when children are placed in the care of same-sex 
partners, the future can become a more pressing concern (Goodfellow, 2015).  Still, 
Halberstam (2005) has argued that the absence of forward-facing narratives amongst 
lesbians and gay men extends beyond more practical explanations such as the mere 
focus on “the Child” and “reproductive temporality”.  She proposes “queer time”, 
under which, “futures can be imagined according to the logistics that lie outside of 
[…] paradigmatic [heteronormative] markers of life experience” (Halberstam, 2005: 
2).  Halberstam (2005: 2) contends that this time emerged most notably as a result of 
the AIDS epidemic, and that, “the constantly diminishing future [had] create[d] a new 
emphasis on the here, the present, the now”.  Consequently, it carries with it the 
potential to live in a way that is unscripted by the conventional stress on longevity. 
 
In this section, I will investigate the extent to which this viewpoint is reflected in the 
clients’ narratives, and in the practitioners’ approaches to financial relief.  I will argue 
(in helping to answer my third research question) that the partners themselves voiced 
objections to the division of ‘future’ assets, even where they were relatively satisfied 
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with the approach taken towards current assets.  This view appears to have fed into 
the ultimate outcomes on financial relief in civil partnership matters, which may be 
the result of the clients’ preference towards settling on their own terms.57  Thereby, an 
aspect of transformation has been signalled in terms of the types of awards that are 
being made with respect to same-sex partners. 
 
Maintenance 
The indications in the data were that maintenance was viewed to be less suited to civil 
partnership matters than to different-sex cases.  Ms Field considered that her lesbian 
and gay clients would “flip” at the mention of ongoing payments, whilst Mr. Arnold 
referred to it as having been the most disputed issue in Anthony’s case, and the 
biggest issue in relation to his same-sex matters more broadly.  The solicitor remarked 
that: 
 
You say to a gay client, ‘you might well have to pay maintenance as well’ and, 
I have to say, people sort of drop to the floor […] The concept of ongoing 
maintenance, my experience of civil partnership cases is that they find that 
really hard […] Whilst [heterosexual partners] may not like it, they’re not 
wholly surprised that that’s what they have to do, and so they don’t kick up a 
fuss about it.  And indeed, you know, there are a fair few men in the 
heterosexual context that say, you know, ‘I will always look after you’, and 
they’re very generous in terms of their ongoing support.  I’ve not experienced 
that at all in civil partnership (Mr. Arnold).  
 
Objections to the applicability of awards of this nature were made on a number of 
bases.58  Firstly, tying in with Ms James’s point above about the ease with which 
assets can be apportioned out, Mr. Arnold contended there to be more scope for 
arguing for little or no maintenance where the partners have kept their assets separate.  
He explained this as being because: 
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58 Including several of the differences between same and different-sex matters that have been 
set out in this, and the previous, chapter. 
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It’s a lot easier to say, ‘they’ve managed on that’… whereas, if they’re both 
spending out of joint accounts, it’s impossible to know, really, who’s done 
what (Mr. Arnold). 
 
Secondly, Ms Field observed that, given that the partners will tend to have jobs of a 
similar level of seniority, there is not usually such a discrepancy of incomes as to 
justify a maintenance order.  This links in with a view raised by Mr. Henry that 
Miller/ McFarlane is difficult to apply to lesbian and gay matters.  Although 
considering that the precedents on maintenance were not simple for heterosexual 
couples, Mr. Henry indicated that a civil partnership would be less likely to have the 
McFarlane scenario of, “a mother looking after young children, giving up a career”. 
 
Thirdly, issues were raised about the non-, or lesser, working party’s ability to work.  
This was particularly the case concerning to men, which is reflective of notions of 
‘masculine’ ‘breadwinning’.  In fact, this point was stressed by Anthony and Isaac, in 
relation to whom maintenance claims had arisen.  It may be significant that they 
specifically should have been subject to such claims, given that they had perceived 
their cases as having been constructed to the greatest extent in a heteronormative 
‘breadwinner’/ ‘homemaker’ fashion.  It would seem to correspond with that 
construction that this more substantive head should come into play where one partner 
has been presented as more, and one as less, vulnerable.  That said, it should also be 
recognised that the clients’ ex-partners had been dependent on their income and that, 
of course, maintenance can only be awarded where the payee’s earnings are high 
enough to enable them to make such payments. 
 
In any event, Anthony viewed his case as having centred around a scenario of “two 
blokes”.59  Accordingly, he set out how: 
 
They mentioned maintenance and I nearly swallowed my teeth, and [solicitor] 
just said, ‘that’s highly likely’ […] I found that a little bit of a bitter pill to 
swallow, somebody not working, and they wanted £5,000 a month net […] 
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Where you’ve got two people […] that are educated or capable individuals, I 
don’t think that you should… unless there’s clear evidence that somebody’s 
got a need, like a disability, a real medical or physical need… why wouldn’t 
you draw a line and move forward? (Anthony).   
 
He felt that the possibility of a maintenance award had only arisen because his ex-
partner’s legal representatives had adopted the argument that he had been “the 
woman” of the relationship.  Therefore, Anthony was associating maintenance with 
‘feminine’ dependency and vulnerability (whilst he personally viewed his ex-partner 
as a ‘masculine’ man who could support himself).  Likewise, Isaac perceived that he 
and his partner, as men, could “both go and earn a fairly decent wage”, as opposed to 
any notion of his partner being a ‘feminine’ dependent.  The opposition in Anthony’s 
matter had argued that a maintenance order should be made on a joint lives basis, 
given the vast difference in incomes of the parties.  Whilst an order was eventually 
made, it was at a lower level than had been sought by the client’s ex-partner.  The 
provision was to cover a four-year period, to enable Anthony’s ex-partner to 
“reestablish” himself, thereby still placing emphasis on his ability to work.  The order 
was made without the possibility of reapplication, which Mr. Arnold considered was 
unusual in the context of his (mainly different-sex) caseload. 
 
Fourthly, Mr. Arnold repeated the point as to the absence of children (reverting back 
to the thinking of Edelman (2004)), and this was also discussed by Anthony.  Given 
that there were no children in his household, the client considered that maintenance 
payment was inappropriate in the circumstances of his relationship.  Isaac, who 
avoided the outcome by settling his matter, similarly found the prospect difficult on 
that basis: 
 
I didn’t want to be in a position where I was supporting him financially after 
the divorce.  So, a childcare type arrangement, although obviously we didn’t 
have a child, but a judge could have said ‘well, I’m sorry, you’ve got to 
support him’ (Isaac). 
 
That said, Mr. Arnold recognised that, even where children were present, same-sex 
partners still “don’t seem to like” paying maintenance.  Furthermore, it was recounted 
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by Ms James how she had experienced an acceptance at court of a clean break where 
children had been present.60  Therefore, it seems that there may be more factors at 
play than the issue of children alone.  With this in mind, fifthly, Ms Clarke explained 
that, in the same-sex cases that she had worked on, there had not been an anticipation 
that one partner would maintain the other.  She rationalised this as being because the 
parties had had an, “independent spirit”, which harks back to the suggestions of the 
independent mindset of lesbians discussed above.  In support of Ms Clarke’s 
explanation, Ms James set out how maintenance is:  
 
Not really a prevailing view or right.  Nobody sees it like that, yet […] I think 
that [same-sex partners] see ourselves as quite independent within our 
relationships.  I don’t think… I don’t think that I would expect for my partner 
to support me if I… if we broke up.  There’s not that expectation, I think, even 
with children […] They come with that in mind, and I say, ‘well, actually, 
you’d be entitled to umm… you’ve been the primary carer for years, your 
earning capacity is dented, you need more money.  You can’t borrow as much 
money, you could get more’.  ‘I don’t want it’, very, very, very firm (Ms 
James). 
 
Ms James’s narrative backs the implication from Halberstam’s (2005) work that a 
lack of expectation of maintenance amongst same-sex clients goes beyond the 
simplistic explanation of the absence of children.  The solicitor’s use of the word 
“yet” is interesting, as it indicates that the position may be altering.  That this may be 
the case seems to hinge on the question as to whether same-sex couples’ lack of 
willingness to engage beyond the present has been a function of oppression, rather 
than a positive choice.  In terms of this idea of oppression, it has been argued that 
time and future, as articulated through heteronormative temporality, has worked to 
“punish” queer sexualities, foreclosing their imaginaries of futurity (Goltz, 2010).  
Given that same-sex partners have historically been positioned in opposition to the 
very concept of the future, it may be unsurprising that longevity should be devalued in 
lesbian and gay culture (Edelman, 2004).   I have argued in this thesis so far, though, 
that the discourse of formal equality and sameness surrounding the introduction of the 
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civil partnership (and, more recently, same-sex marriage) has been working to bring 
same-sex partners within heteronormativity.  That being so, and particularly with 
there having been some accompanying emphasis placed on future-based notions such 
as commitment,61 it is possible that same-sex partners may become less negative 
about the future over time. 
 
Nonetheless, maintenance orders are still being resorted to in some gay and lesbian 
cases.  This may be as a consequence of the stress placed (by a few practitioners) on 
sameness between lesbian and gay and different-sex cases even in relation to the 
current position.  For instance, it was stated that: 
 
I think that that sort of issue would be really, really similar, because you have 
either been maintained by your partner or your husband or your wife or you 
haven’t.  If you need that, you need it (Ms Boyce). 
 
Despite this, there appears to have been a disinclination to make these orders on a 
longer-term basis.  That being the case, addressing my second research question, legal 
actors appear to have been shying away, in this respect, from applying 
heteronormative assumptions concerning financial dependency.  Mr. Arnold’s wider 
experience of the 10 dissolution matters that he had worked on was that they had 
tended to entail short-term maintenance, where maintenance had been awarded (and 
this was true of Anthony’s matter).  Similarly, Mr. Derrick reported having reached a 
settlement in a lengthy lesbian relationship case where there was a maintenance 
element, although for a term that was non-extendable.  This was in compliance with a 
steer, provided by the Financial Dispute Resolution judge, that it was what she would 
have done.  This example supports a contention, made by Mr. Henry, that, “I doubt 
that there would be many” civil partnerships that result in orders for joint lives, and 
his indication that ongoing maintenance will less readily be awarded in same-sex 
cases than in different-sex ones.  He considered that the transfer of money between 
lesbian and gay partners: 
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Could be reflected in different ways.  It could be done through pension sharing 
(Mr. Henry). 
 
I will move on to consider the extent to which this other type of ‘future’ based award 
has been a feature of civil partnership matters. 
 
Pension sharing 
The data gathered likewise signal a lesser frequency of pension sharing orders in the 
context of civil partnership financial relief.  In the case of Bill, Mr. Kennedy advised 
that the other side would be unlikely, were the matter to proceed to court, to obtain a 
portion of the client’s pension.  Drawing back to the discussion in chapter 6, this was 
rationalised on the basis of the argument that Bill’s ex-partner had not contributed 
towards the pension.  It is appreciated that he had lost his job as a result of his own 
criminal activity (as opposed to an agreement being made between the partners that he 
would stay at home), although the pension was ring-fenced to a greater degree than 
will often occur in opposite-sex cases.  Moreover, Ms James perceived that, in the 
same-sex relationships that she had dealt with, there had been some “inequalities” 
around pensions, but that the judge had not intervened.  She was unconvinced that the 
same would have happened in a heterosexual matter, although deemed the 
comparison a difficult one, given that most straight couples have children.  Indeed, 
returning to the issue of children, Ms Gale also felt that pension sharing orders will be 
most appropriate where children are present, which may account for a lesser 
occurrence of these awards in same-sex cases.  She explained her comment by reason 
that: 
 
The woman may have gone part-time, or may have given up work.  Umm, she 
will have probably given up, therefore, building a greater pension (Ms Gale). 
 
In this respect, Woodward and Sefton (2014: 45) similarly identified that pension 
sharing orders were much more likely in (heterosexual) divorce matters where there 
are children of any age. 
 
However, the client responses once more contained hints of a non-normative way of 
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being in relation to futurity that could instead be used to account for the lack of 
pension sharing.  Turning to Anthony, although his pension was something that he 
had considered prior to entering into the civil partnership, the client confessed that: 
 
If I’m brutally honest, I felt that I shouldn’t have split it […] I really thought, 
‘no, I shouldn’t have to do this […] [an asset that] I can’t draw down on […] 
for many years, that should be mine and mine alone’ (Anthony). 
 
He felt that it was equally “stupid” that his partner should have an entitlement to a 
bonus that he had not yet been paid, and shares in his employer vesting some time in 
the future.  Attitudes of this nature may have played into the Court of Appeal’s 
decision to reverse the order relating to the deferred compensation scheme in 
Lawrence.  Correspondingly, Isaac viewed it to be “really unfair” when he was 
advised that he might lose a portion of his pension to his ex-partner.  It is striking that 
such opposition should have been voiced, given Woodward and Sefton’s (2014: x, 
156) claim that the issue of pensions has not been viewed as particularly contentious 
for heterosexual clients.  That this should be the case may bear connection to 
Rowlingson and Joseph’s (2010) finding that, when different-sex partners thought 
about pension income, they tended to see it in the same way as current income 
(although it is important that their study focused on intact relationships).  Such 
thinking stands against the lack of forward-moving lesbian and gay narratives 
identified by Halberstam (2005). 
 
In a similar vein, the infrequency of pension sharing may additionally be a 
consequence of the lack of expectation again voiced by the financially weaker parties 
as to their entitlement to such an award.  For example, Edward set out how: 
 
The advice from the solicitors was […] ‘you could go for half of the pension if 
you wanted to’, which was not something that I ever wanted to do (Edward). 
 
It might appear surprising that the client was in receipt of this advice at all, given not 
only that he was the youngest within the sample and that the relationship had only 
lasted for eight years, but also that he had worked within the same profession as his 
ex-partner.  Yet, his response sits well with a comment made by Ms James that: 
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I’ve never done a pension sharing civil partner case.  Never.  They just 
don’t… there’s very much a reluctance to take what the other one’s accrued.  I 
mean, that’s quite a lot of… really, out of twenty, you’d think that one would, 
but no.  So, there’s not that same sense of entitlement.  They think that it’s 
fair, they’re happy (Ms James). 
 
Ms James indicated that, situating themselves outside of the heteronormative 
paradigm of dependency, her same-sex clients simply did not seek to pursue this sort 
of claim. 
 
That said, pension orders are (as with maintenance) still being made on civil 
partnership dissolution, with Ms Ennis stressing that the approach to be adopted is to 
treat this issue “exactly the same” as on divorce.  In fact, Mr. Kennedy set out how a 
client had been “horrified” to hear that there was a potential claim of this nature, and 
how his role had entailed having to explain to her that the law in relation to civil 
partnership was essentially the same as that for marriage.  This particular 
practitioner’s account reiterates the sameness of treatment point expanded on in 
chapter 6, and the notion of the imposition of the heteronormative framework.  Ms 
Field further described a lesbian case that she was presently working on where: 
 
I’m saying, ‘divide [both of their pensions] equally, because that will produce 
a fair result’ (Ms Field). 
 
In that matter, however, the partners had been together for a fairly long time (15 
years).  Not only this, but one partner had been in her fifties and the other in her 
seventies, so each would have had a limited future earning capacity.  In this way, the 
solicitor’s advice would seem to be in line with Woodward and Sefton’s (2014: xi) 
finding that pension orders are strongly associated with older couples.  The pensions 
were also some of the partners’ most significant assets, with one being worth around 
three quarters of a million pounds and the other being worth a million. 
 
Anthony had additionally had to accept, in the end, that he was being obliged to share 
his pension.  Seemingly employing a needs-based rationale for this, he explained that 
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this had been on the basis that his ex-partner would otherwise have had no pension 
provision (although he emphasised feeling that this had been his own fault).  Whilst it 
may again seem relevant that the remedy should have been applied in Anthony’s case, 
given the binary way in which his relationship was presented,62 it is recognised that he 
was the highest earning client, and so would most likely have had the largest pension 
‘pot’ to divide.  Indeed, solicitor Ms Irvine asserted that pensions will regularly be an 
issue where there is wealth involved, and that is reflected in Woodward and Sefton’s 
(2014: xi) finding that pension orders have been associated with a relatively wealthy 
socio-economic group.  As well as this, Anthony’s partner was de facto not building 
up his own pension during the relationship, which had lasted for 16 years.63  It may be 
the case that, in same-sex cases, pension sharing only occurs in these more extreme 
scenarios. 
 
In summary, in different-sex relationships, there has been a relatively widespread 
acceptance of longer term (‘feminine’) reliance on the financial support of a 
(‘masculine’) partner.  As against this, suggestions of pension sharing, alongside 
maintenance provision, have been to the surprise of lesbian and gay clients.  I have 
acknowledged that there might be practical reasons why, in civil partnership matters, 
it may seem less appropriate to apply these substantive remedies.  On top of this, 
though, the clients’ reactions to the division of assets of this nature, particularly 
concerning their independence and lack of willingness to engage beyond the present, 
appear to have had an impact on how financial relief matters are playing out.  The 
indication is that a division of ‘future’ based assets is featuring less regularly in 
lesbian and gay cases and that, where they are made, it may be on a more restricted 
basis.  Recognition of the finding is significant, as it carries the possibility of bringing 
about a shift away from viewing formalised relationships as necessarily entailing 
polar opposite, dependent/ provider, positions. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sustained the discussion, in chapter 6, identifying the ways in which 
same-sex case circumstances can differ to heterosexual matters, in this instance with 
respect to financial conduct.  Fewer solicitors noted a balance in terms of household 
expenditure than was described by the clients, although they commonly 
acknowledged the lesser occurrence of jointly held finances in lesbian and gay 
relationships (with nearly half in total doing so).  The consequence of this, tying back 
in to the previous chapter, has not necessarily been a reluctance to approach their 
cases on the basis of a heteronormative, 50/ 50, asset division ratio.  Yet, such 
disparities in the facts seem to have had a part to play in the less frequent imposition 
of maintenance payments and pension sharing in civil partnership dissolution matters.  
In this way, although Ms Boyce might be correct in her assertion that civil partners 
are entitled to claim against all of the assets,64 this is seemingly not what has often 
been taking place in reality. 
 
In response to my third research question, the preference amongst the clients was for 
opting out of the more substantive, ‘future’ based remedies that were introduced to 
address heteronormative imbalances within relationships.  In fact, this preference also 
seems to have been reflected in the outcomes on financial relief.  This is likely to be 
an upshot of the tendency amongst lesbians and gay men to wish to settle their own 
matters.65   On top of this, however, there are hints of a reluctance by the solicitors to 
apply a binary-based framework that runs contrary to client attitudes and 
expectations.  Should it be the case that, in this respect, practitioners are taking into 
account the ways in which same-sex partners are different, this would seem to 
indicate a level of equality of respect and recognition (Baker et al, 2004).  It could 
additionally go some way towards moving away from the imposition of gender 
stereotypes on all relationships (which assists in answering my first and second 
research questions). 
 
That said, lesbians’ and gay men’s negativity towards the future, alongside their 
preferences towards settling (and its association with a distrust of legal actors), may 
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65 Identified in chapter 6. 
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change over time.  This is particularly the case as same-sex partners are further 
incorporated into the realms of legal recognition, and heteronormativity, through the 
adoption of a sameness-based approach between same and different-sex couples.  
Consequently, this thesis is timely, aiming to highlight the potential held by lesbian 
and gay relationships to transform heteronormativity in the financial relief context 
before that potential is lost.  That is not to say, of course, that the approaches of same-
sex clients to asset division have necessarily been ideal.  A shift away from the 
apportionment of ‘future’ assets works to favour the higher earning party in the 
relationship, and it may often be that the existing assets are not enough to strengthen 
the position of the financially weaker party.  It is not my intention to sacrifice those 
who do stay at home and look after the children in service of an egalitarian or dual 
earner normativity.  Nevertheless, my findings offer food for thought around whether 
the law’s presuppositions about necessary dependency are applicable to the modern 
day non-normative couple.  This is important because the law is still conveying 
messages about the way to ‘do’ family.66 
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Chapter 8- Conclusions 
	  
In chapter 1, I set out how there has been a rise in the number of jurisdictions that 
have created frameworks for the formal recognition of same-sex relationships.  This 
being the case, I emphasised the importance of examining what happens at the end of 
same-sex relationships, and how the law comes into play in that event.  In the thesis 
as a whole, I have proceeded to conduct my examination of this issue through 
pursuing three central research questions: how can same-sex relationships, in light of 
civil partnerships (and, by extension, same-sex marriage) help to challenge social and 
legal constructions about the gendered nature of roles in intimate relationships?  To 
what extent do solicitors construct the issues and legal framework as being identical 
in civil partnerships to (different-sex) divorce cases?  How do lesbians and gay men 
understand and experience the law of financial relief?  Therefore, I have both 
considered the impact that incorporation into formal regulatory domains has had on 
same-sex couples and, in the reverse, I have explored the wider impact of including 
lesbians and gay men into those domains.  In this concluding chapter, I will bring 
together the threads of my arguments to provide answers to my research questions.  
As part of this, I will be revisiting the two main (interlinked) theoretical concepts that 
I have engaged with, equality and heteronormativity.  In making an original, empirical 
contribution to the assimilation/ transformation debate,67 I argue that whilst intact 
same-sex relationships still hold the potential to radically transform relational lives, 
that potential is lessened where partners come to ‘law’ (where formal equality has 
been stressed).  Given the different ways in which same-sex partners have conducted 
their domestic lives, this thesis indicates that we should reconsider how we approach 
implementing lesbian and gay ‘equality’. 
 
Summary of findings 
In chapter 2, I asserted that the key (heterosexual) financial relief cases have 
naturalised traits that perpetuate the oppression of women.  The courts have been 
unable to transcend heteronormative assumptions about families, and the concept of 
equality has been used to sustain a dichotomy of roles.  Consequently, gendered 
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behaviour has been reproduced as the norm.  I did acknowledge, however, that the 
judiciary have been attempting to address the real material and structural realities of 
gender-based advantage and disadvantage in family living.  Their intention has been 
to attribute additional value to the previously undervalued work that was traditionally 
(and in the cases of White and Miller/ McFarlane, in actuality) performed by women.  
That being the case, I recognised that it is arguable that, in the cases in question, there 
was little else that the courts were able to do.  Same-sex partnerships appeared to 
offer new opportunities in this respect.  Given that the family lives of lesbian and gay 
partners are not structured around pre-existing gender scripts, they seemed to hold a 
potential to break away from this heteronormative framework.  Yet, legal practice and 
the interpretation of legal principles have meant that any challenge that they have 
posed to social and legal constructions about the gendered nature of roles in intimate 
relationships has not been as successful as it might have been.  Not only this, but it 
seems that gendered norms might even have been solidified by the practice of legal 
actors in civil partnership matters. 
 
As to why this might be, in chapter 1, I detailed how the legislation introducing civil 
partnership and, more recently, same-sex marriage had been accompanied by a 
rhetoric of rights, sameness, and ultimately formal equality.  Adopting this strategy 
risks ignoring the ways in which same-sex relationships can be different, and the 
respects in which they may provide better models for all relationships.  It does not 
attribute them with equality of respect and recognition, celebrating their diversity 
(Baker et al, 2004).  In the quantitative element of my project, I identified that 
lesbians and gay men have greater equality of condition in their partnerships than 
different-sex couples.68  This is in the sense that caring work is shared more equally, 
partners are more able to pursue those household tasks that they find satisfying, and 
democracy and cooperation are favoured both domestically and financially.  I am not 
suggesting that same-sex couples are completely free of gendered societal pressures.  
However, their relationships could help to encourage more egalitarian ways of caring, 
and of conducting housework, within wider society.  Inequalities around the division 
of household labour in heterosexual relationships have proven an obstacle in 
achieving any form of gender symmetry (Crompton, 2009).  As this work is less 
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frequently conducted by one partner alone in gay and lesbian relationships, those 
relationships have held the possibility of showing that there is not one gender that is 
more suited to caring labour.  The impact of this could be powerful, helping to break 
the association between women and domesticity (which assists in addressing my first 
research question). 
 
Nevertheless, that association has operated as a key component of capitalist modes of 
production,69 and a question that I have posed has been to what extent it is possible to 
do something aspirational in the context of an exploitative model.  Chapters 5 and 6 
illustrate this difficulty, with the solicitors (and sometimes the clients) placing an 
emphasis on formal equality between same and different-sex couples.  For instance, 
the practitioners placed a stress on the more heteronormative romantic motivations for 
wishing to enter into a civil partnership, whilst simultaneously overlooking aspects of 
same-sex relationships that do not conform to this heteronormative ‘ideal’.  
Differences have frequently disappeared, with legal assumptions being applied that 
are based on traditional marriage and divorce (Auchmuty, 2015).  Furthermore, where 
divergence has been noted, these have often not translated into a difference in 
approach to financial relief matters.  This is despite marriage’s gendered history, and 
the fact that the rationale of the (heterosexual) law of financial relief is to remedy the 
position of the stay at home carer (Leckey, 2013).  The fact that an approach 
underpinned by this rationale should be applied to same-sex partners is striking, 
because they will often be dual earning.70 
 
My data suggest that legal actors are presenting their clients’ lives in accordance with 
the language of relevance and legal issues.  Therefore, perhaps it is more in 
subsisting, rather than separating, same-sex relationships that potential for 
transformation is held.  In fact, whilst the law of financial relief of England and Wales 
has been lauded for its flexibility, it appears on examination to entail that practitioners 
adopt a fairly formulaic approach.  Solicitors are driving the questions in their 
meetings with lesbian and gay clients, with those questions being the same as those 
posed to heterosexual divorcing partners.  Additionally, they are not encouraging (or 
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70 As was observed in chapter 4. 
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hearing) answers that do not fit into the gendered script.  It may be the case that 
practitioners feel a time pressure to keep their meetings ‘on track’ as a result of their 
busy caseloads.  The clients likewise seemed reluctant to develop their conversations 
with their advisors, having an awareness of being against the clock, and of the 
solicitors billing for their time.  Nonetheless, in answering my second research 
question, the consequence is that the factual matrices of same-sex partners are being 
constructed to accord with ideas of traditional masculinity and femininity.  Lesbians 
and gay men are being assimilated into heterosexual relational norms and, as 
gendered assumptions are carried across, family law risks missing the complex 
messiness of real lives.  This is of concern not only to same-sex couples, but also to 
different-sex relationships that are lived non-normatively.  The finding fits with my 
own, relatively pessimistic, hypothesis that it is tricky to make significant inroads into 
an existing model where an approach derived from formal equality is adopted. 
 
The suggestion in chapter 6 is that, where representing the financially disadvantaged 
lesbian or gay partner, legal actors will still place stress on the binary construction of 
roles.  The parties are presented in accordance with the breadwinning/ homemaking 
familial model, reinforcing ideas about the gendered division of labour and financial 
dependency.  Conversely, practitioners acting for the financially stronger partner have 
emphasised the lack of gender disparity between the parties.  I argued in chapter 2 
that this is perhaps the most convincing account of what occurred in Lawrence.  I find 
this approach problematic too, as the parties appear to be judged in accordance with 
their adherence to gendered expectations.  In terms of men, especially, I have 
observed an expectation that they should go out and earn for themselves, which is 
compatible with traditional ideas of masculinity.  Such expectations seem to be 
lessening the relative equality of condition experienced by same-sex partners (which 
stands against the idea that lesbians and gay men could bring about greater equality of 
condition across wider society).  Specifically, they go against Baker et al’s (2004) 
notion of equal working and learning, given that they do not encourage a sharing of 
the benefits and burdens of work and care.  That is important, due to the normative 
messages that the law continues to convey about family life.  Holding men to notions 
of masculinity appears, moreover, to run counter to conceptions of equality of power 
in two ways.  Firstly, it suggests that people do not have the same capacity to impact 
on their environment, as their life options are still restricted to those assigned to their 
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gender.  Secondly, omitting to break the association between men and economic work 
(and women and the home) signals little possibility for broader change to the 
heteronormative ordering of society. 
 
The (heterosexual) case law continues to be of considerable influence.  This may be 
predictable, given that the dissolution framework is almost identical to that for 
different-sex divorce.  Indeed, it might seem fairly inevitable within a system that 
works on the basis of statute and its interpretation by the courts (with the common law 
being preoccupied with precedent).   Analogies are drawn in the context of, “a web of 
consistent, coherent and predictable doctrine using classifications” (Fineman, 2013: 
113).   As part of the adversarial process, those with nonconforming experiences 
become homogenised and standardised as they are subjected to ‘law’, and the stories 
that are told fall within structured legal narratives.  Even where there is a mismatch 
between the frameworks, such as in the context of adultery, the practitioners placed 
some emphasis on the similarity of behaviour of same and different-sex couples, and 
a desire was expressed for sameness of treatment.  In this way, Barker’s (2006) 
contentions of the transgressive potential of gay (and lesbian) non-monogamy may 
not appear to be coming to fruition.  The indications in this respect sit uneasily with 
Resolution’s (2015a) concern of allowing people to divorce without blame.  However, 
in fact, several of the clients themselves spoke in favour of the adoption of an 
adultery-like basis (albeit that their understanding of adultery notably moved beyond 
a specific focus on the sexual act itself).  In these instances, the partners failed to 
recognise the heteronormativity of the framework into which they were seeking 
inclusion, and omitted to be critical of the assimilatory implications. 
 
Then again, in chapter 6, a level of resistance was noted, with a determination being 
reported for same-sex partners to settle on their own terms, rather than leaving their 
matters to be resolved by legal actors.  In this way, and in turning to my third research 
question, although the introduction of formalised relationships has brought about their 
greater engagement with the law, lesbians and gay men are reluctant to engage with it 
in any protracted way.  This speaks to a number of issues, not least their historical 
status as ‘outsiders’ in relation to the law, and their consequent distrust of lawyers.  
On top of this, though, same-sex partners are approaching financial division in a 
manner that runs contrary to the ways in which the courts have redressed economic 
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power imbalances in relationships.  My findings here make an original contribution to 
knowledge, in that they are beginning to address a gap in the existing knowledge on 
the post-breakdown practices of same-sex partners.  The suggestion in my study is 
that lesbians and gay men are shunning the normative approach of 50/ 50 division in 
favour of financial settlements that reflect the financial contributions made by the 
parties during the relationship.  In this respect, the marriage frame of sharing does not 
appear to always work with civil partnerships.  I have argued that lawyers have been 
reluctant to argue this, based on the principles of formal equality.  That said, it is 
questionable whether it would be appropriate for an approach that focuses entirely on 
individual economic circumstances to be applied to all relationships.  A movement in 
this direction could herald a return to the days of valuing financial earning over other 
forms of familial contribution at a time when, de facto, women are still conducting the 
greater proportion of domestic work in different-sex relationships (George, 2012).  
The richer party, who will more often than not be the man, seems to be the one that 
would benefit if couples were judged against gay or lesbian ‘norms’. 
 
In addition, my data suggest that there has been a shift, in the context of same-sex 
relationships, concerning the substantive elements of ongoing maintenance and 
pension sharing.  This supports a further aspect of my hypothesis that the legal 
recognition of same-sex couples may carry with it some, albeit perhaps fewer, 
transformative effects (and helps to tackle my first research question).  I conclude, as 
initially predicted, that what is happening is not quite as simple as the contrasting 
assimilation/ transformation arguments may lead us to believe.  Instead, a 
combination of both the reproduction and, to a limited extent, subversion of 
(heterosexual) marital norms is taking place.  I contended in chapter 7 that a 
movement away from maintenance and pension sharing is likely to tie in to the 
greater separation of finances within same-sex couples (with a more widespread 
reliance on strategies of partial pooling and independent money management), a more 
common absence of children, and a lesser degree of dependency between partners.  
Not only this, but I identified a potential link to the lack of futurity raised by 
Halberstam (2005) as constituting a central part of lesbian and gay non-normative 
ways of being.  In fact, more individualised ways of managing money have been 
suggested to be gaining in popularity amongst all relationships (Pahl, 2005).  This, in 
itself, has been criticised, on the basis that separating finances can result in gender 
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inequalities generated in the labour market being translated into inequalities in the 
household (Kan and Laurie, 2010: 5).  Nonetheless, it means that the legal approach 
to this issue in relation to same-sex couples is of broader relevance. 
 
An emphasis on financial autonomy and a norm of independence may begin to be 
favoured in the law of financial relief, especially as more lesbian and gay matters are 
litigated.  Concerns have been voiced against any such development, however, given 
that the less frequent apportionment of ‘future’ assets leads to financially weaker 
parties being less well compensated on relationship breakdown.  Family law has been 
described as entailing the weighing of the competing values of promoting personal 
financial autonomy and providing legal protection for the economically disadvantaged 
(Barlow, 2009).  Arguably, a shift towards such individualism weighs too heavily on 
the former side of this balancing exercise.  This poses difficulties in a setting of 
continuing gender inequalities, with women, and above all those with children, 
suffering from any such change in legal approach (Bennett, 2013).  In this respect, 
whilst the potential transgressive impact of same-sex relationship recognition has 
featured heavily in feminist arguments,71 it may seem unlikely to offer the kinds of 
gender role transformations that have been hoped for. 
 
I am not, in this thesis, arguing that the approaches of same-sex partners to financial 
relief are necessarily the most appropriate ones.  Lesbians and gay men can, of course, 
still find themselves suffering economic disadvantage in their relationships that needs 
to be redressed.  This is despite them having a greater choice as to how to organise 
their lives because of the lack of gender scripts.  Furthermore, on a wider scale, 
society has not reached a gender-neutral utopian state.  Women, at present, are 
constrained by structural issues in society to perform domestic work, often leading to 
their financial deprivation.  It is conceded that the law of financial relief alone cannot 
remedy this, and that the problem might be better addressed by the introduction of 
more favourable employment conditions.  For example, it would most likely assist 
were there to be a bridging of the gender pay gap, bringing about equal pay for 
equivalent work.  Even so, whether equality in wage rates would make a significant 
difference to the performance of gender roles is unclear.  This is especially the case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 As was set out in chapter 1. 
	   222	  
given evidence that women have expressed that they like caring work (albeit with this 
expression not having been made on a level playing field) (Houston and Marks, 
2005)).  Women might also be helped into the workplace through the offering of more 
flexible working and support with childcare.  In the Scandinavian countries, for 
instance, women are allowed long periods of part-time work following childbirth to 
encourage them back into the workplace.  However, these policies have notably been 
encouraging them to behave differently to men in terms of their employment patterns, 
which seems to tacitly endorse gender differenced in the home (Scott and Dex, 2009).   
Additionally, it appears that more needs to be done to encourage men to provide care.  
Sweden provides a good example of this having been relatively effective, with ‘daddy 
leave’ having increased from the point of its introduction in 1995, rising to a 17% 
take-up by 2003 (Scott and Dex, 2009: 54).   The UK has not yet attained any such 
position.  Whilst section 117 of the recent Children and Families Act 2014 brought 
about a right to shared parental leave, the caring role of mothers is still prioritised 
(given the need for maternal consent to access this leave) (Mitchell, 2015).  It may be 
that further developments in this direction could pose a weightier challenge to the 
status quo. 
 
Nevertheless, I argue that the law of financial relief is operating systematically on the 
basis of crude stereotypes of the distinct positions of masculinity and femininity.  This 
contributes towards the reproduction of patterned familial roles.  Same-sex partners, 
who often do not fit the heterosexual ‘mould’ in the ways in which they operate 
within the home and the economic sphere, offer clear illustrations of the law’s 
attempts to do this.  Therefore, they have presented an opportunity to open up 
dialogues about the widespread, unthinking application of a heteronormative model.  
The experiences of lesbians and gay men, as explored in this thesis, are valuable to 
critical legal scholarship, helping to bring forward analysis of the way that the law 
constructs and organises.  I have contended that this is particularly important because 
legal classifications have consequences in ‘real world’ lived lives.  Yet, same-sex 
partners who have entered into a formalised relationship, and which has subsequently 
broken down, seem already to have been positioned to be intelligible within this 
framework of heteronormativity.  Little consideration has been given to what a queer 
politics of separating might entail, or what a more suitable approach to lesbian and 
gay ‘equality’ might be, given the divergent ways in which same-sex couples conduct 
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their familial lives.  My thesis makes an original contribution in asserting that, within 
this context, we have a duty to imagine legal structures that would work in a different 
way from straightforward formal equality. 
 
As a result of the fact that different-sex partners (especially) do not presently 
experience significant equality of condition, I concede that it may seem difficult to 
hang a law of financial relief too heavily on notions of autonomy and choice.  
However, as against the current system, I argue that a better way of approaching 
financial relief cases would be to look carefully at the lives of the parties in each case, 
and to give due regard to whether they have adopted a more ‘non-scripted’ lifestyle.  
Such an approach would be preferable to the removal of the existing discretion and 
the introduction of a more formulaic, community of property based system.  That is 
because, whilst allowing legal actors less scope as to how to construct their matters, I 
conceive that such a system may, in itself, be based on heteronormative 
understandings.   The law should seek to recognise the varying ‘realities’ of those that 
come before it, rather than confining them within the roles to which it assigns them.  I 
contend that the question needs to be posed, in each case, as to what degree there was 
dependency between the partners within their relationship.  Moreover, consideration 
needs to be given to whether the parties to a matter can really be placed into 
monolithic gendered categories in the setting of a multiplicity of possible identities.  
In this way, my purpose is to challenge existing assumptions about family living, and 
to reopen critiques of the way that gender works in marriage. 
 
Limitations and possibilities for future research 
Whilst this thesis has facilitated an exploration of the research questions set out 
above, it is important to recognise the limitations of this study and the potential for 
future research.  As to these limitations, I firstly acknowledge that there may seem to 
be a tension between using heteronormativity as a framework for conducting my 
research and, at the same time, it being a key finding of the research.  In this respect, I 
did not approach my empirical work as a chance to project any notions of 
heteronormativity onto my participants, nor specifically to encourage them to offer 
their personal understandings of heteronormativity.  My semi-structured interviews 
allowed the participants to generate their own narratives, which revealed pervasive 
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heteronormativity in their experiences of dissolution.  That is not to say, though, that 
the data do not generate other findings on top of this, and I may analyse those using a 
different lens in future projects.  My focus on gendered categories in this thesis does 
not mean that I have neglected to be aware of the institution of the family and its role 
in wider society.  Secondly, I recognise that relying on the narrative of one side of a 
relationship dispute to extrapolate how the law constructs couples might appear 
problematic, by reason that the partners’ accounts may well contradict one another.  
Interviewing both parties would have facilitated more comprehensive storytelling, as 
it would have enabled comparisons of the partners’ evaluations.  This was not 
practical, however, for the reasons set out in chapter 3. 
 
Furthermore, it is noted that the size of the sample in my qualitative project was fairly 
small.  Whilst I have previously emphasised the difficulties experienced in recruiting 
participants, given the minimal number of people who were eligible (and/ or willing) 
to take part in this study, a larger sample size may offer firmer conclusions as to what 
is happening ‘on the ground’.  One aspect of this limitation of my particular research 
was that I was able to recruit only four female clients.  This made it somewhat 
difficult to draw comparisons between genders, and may consequently lead to an 
accusation of conflating gay and lesbian experiences (although there were, 
conversely, more lesbian than gay male respondents to my quantitative study).  There 
may be more fine-grained distinctions between the experiences of gay male and 
lesbian partners, and this sort of exploration could provide a basis for future study.  
Drawing upon a larger sample of interviewees would be likely to have the added 
benefit of generating participants with children.  Of course, none of the clients 
interviewed for this research had children (or other significant caring responsibilities).  
Similarly, the solicitors interviewed had relatively little experience of civil partnership 
matters involving children.  As a result, it has been hard to identify whether any 
differences in approach to relationship finances was a function of the lack of children, 
rather than of being in a same-sex couple.  There are hints that there is more to it than 
this, which raise questions for further research going forward. 
 
As well as this, I highlighted in chapters 6 and 7 that same-sex partners’ preference 
for settling their financial relief matters, and their resistance to compensation and 
maintenance, may change over time.  It might be that these attitudes reflect pre-civil 
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partnership approaches to relationship breakdown, stemming from a period when 
there was an absence of legal support for lesbians and gay men on the breakdown of 
their relationships.  As same-sex partners become accustomed to being ‘inside’ the 
law, and as they become more familiar with the financial implications of entering into 
a civil partnership, their opposition to the current system of redistribution (and their 
understandings of equality) may shift.  That is particularly the case given that the 
rules on exiting a relationship can work to condition parties’ options and decisions 
during the course of a relationship (Halley, 2011).  Not only this, but it may be that 
the legal recognition of lesbian and gay relationships (and the associated notions of 
‘togetherness’) may encourage them to see those relationships as more of a ‘unit’ than 
they did beforehand.  That could work to bring about a greater merging of finances 
than has occurred previously (although this may be counteracted by the 
abovementioned increase in the holding of separate finances across all relationships).  
The assumptions around financial interdependency that are inherent in legally 
recognised partnerships, and the consequent reduction in welfare to support those in 
lesbian and gay relationships, might also require same-sex couples to rethink their 
money management practices.  Therefore, additional (and perhaps more longitudinal) 
research is needed to explore the degree to which the legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships changes the ways that same-sex couples conduct their everyday lives. 
 
Finally in relation specifically to lesbian and gay relationships, this project leaves 
somewhat open the question as to what impact the introduction of same-sex marriage 
will have.  In this respect, my thesis should be read as a snapshot at a particular point 
in the history of the legal recognition same-sex couples.  Same-sex marriage has been 
introduced since I began the research, with the first same-sex divorces having taken 
place a year later again (after my data collection phase).  Of course, as the dissolution 
framework is the same as that for same-sex divorce, we are given no reason to think 
that the tensions that I have identified will not similarly be carried over.  Still, whilst 
the discourse of civil partnership has focused on sameness and ‘equality’, civil 
partnership is distinctly and purposely not marriage.  Now that it is only one option 
for same-sex partners, the issue arises as to whether civil partnership cases will begin 
to be treated any differently to matters concerning marriages where financial relief is 
being considered.  It could potentially be argued that those who enter into a civil 
partnership in the present day have chosen this institution over marriage, and so that 
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the financial relief principles can be interpreted differently.  The problem with this, of 
course, would be that it could work to contribute towards an even greater 
strengthening of the heteronormativity associated with marriage, and with civil 
partners again being treated as ‘outsiders’.  Investigation is required into the reasons 
why some people are still specifically opting for civil partnership. 
 
More widely, my research has revealed a lack of current data as to how couples tend 
to hold their finances, and the degree of twenty-first century financial ‘jointness’.  
Recent studies on financial autonomy have tended to be relatively small scale and 
qualitative in nature (for instance, Bennett and Sung, 2013, interviewed men and 
women in thirty male-female couples).  A larger scale, quantitative study would be 
helpful to explore the extent to which money is pooled and, indeed, individualised in 
intimate relationships.  Ascertaining such detail is important, particularly in the 
context of the existing system of financial relief, where allocative measures have 
operated to impose a distribution thought to be just by some external standard 
informed by how the spouses are expected to have acted during their relationship 
(Leckey, 2013).  In fact, scholars such as Fineman (2013) have urged would-be 
reformers to reduce the potential of unintended consequences in family law matters 
by grounding their analyses in people’s experiences.  Such research could moreover 
shed light on the degree to which money is viewed, within the modern day couple, as 
belonging to the partnership or, alternatively, as belonging to the person that earns it.  
It may seem that only in the event of a common consensus towards the former should 
the law of financial relief continue to entail the inclusion of all assets into the 
matrimonial ‘pot’.  It has, though, been asserted that the law in this area is not 
intended to reflect the desires of spouses, with Herring (2005) suggesting that 
financial settlements should be viewed as “unfair” from the partners’ perspectives.  It 
may seem necessary, in this respect, to give further consideration to what the 
justifications for the distribution of assets imposed on relationship breakdown both 
are and should be.  I argue that civil partnership offers the possibility of instigating 
these conversations.
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Appendix A. Division of labour in same-sex relationships questionnaire 
 
1. Gender 
a) What is your 
gender? Male  Female  Other  
b) What is the gender 
of your partner? Male  Female  Other  
2. Race 
 
How would you describe your race/ ethnicity? 
White British  
White Irish  
White Other  
Mixed (White and Asian) 
Mixed (White and Black 
African)  
Mixed (White and Black 
Caribbean)  
Mixed Other  
Black African  






Asian Other   

































Which of the following best describes your religion/ belief? 
 
 No Religion    Jewish  
 Buddhist     Muslim 
 Christian (all denominations)  Sikh 







Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation? 
 Bisexual                           Gay  
 Heterosexual    Lesbian 












Which country do you live in? 
 
 England    Wales 
 Scotland    Northern Ireland 







Which of the following best describes your relationship status? 
 Married    Single 
 In a civil partnership  Divorced/ separated   






How would you describe your social class? 
 Middle class   Working class  





Which political party did you vote for in the last general election? 
 Conservative   Liberal Democrat   Labour 









Which of the following best describes your and your partner’s 
occupational status? 
 You Your partner 
Working full-time   
Working part-time   
Retired   
Unemployed   
Full-time carer   
Student   
Other   











What is your and your partner’s highest educational qualification? 
 You Your partner 
PhD   
Master’s degree (e.g. MA, 
MSc)   
Undergraduate degree (e.g. 
BA, BSc, LLB)   




 Vocational qualification (e.g. 
HND)   
A-levels or equivalent   
GCSEs or equivalent   
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 No qualifications   
Other   






a) Do you and/ or your partner 



















c) If yes, who would you say does the majority of the childcare? 
 Me  My 
partner 
 My partner 
and I care 
equally 
 Other 
If other, please specify ____________________________________ 
13. 
Housework 















maintenance       
Caring for a 
sick family 
member 
      
Cooking       
Dishwashing       
DIY       





      
Grocery 
shopping       
Hoovering       
Ironing       
Laundry       




      
If you have answered that yourself and your partner equally share 
any household tasks, please provide details as to how you go about 
doing so _________________________ 
 
 























and I share 
household 
tasks equally 
       
My partner 




       
My partner 














Do you employ any help within 
the home, such as a cleaner, a 
nanny or an au pair? 





Please provide a figure for the 
approximate gross (before tax) 








Would you consider yourself or your partner to be the main earner 
within your relationship? 
Myself  My 
partner 
 Neither  







a) Do you and your partner retain 
separate bank accounts? 
Yes  No  
b) Do you and your partner have a 
joint bank account? Yes  No  
c) Please describe how you divide 





























































tasks in my 
relationship 
is unfair 




done by me 
       







       
My partner 





       
My partner 
and I are 
financially 
independent 
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Appendix B. Questionnaire participant information sheet 
 
Gender in intimate relationships: a socio-legal study 
Questionnaire information sheet 
 
Aims of the research 
This project, conducted by Charlotte Bendall (PhD candidate at the University of 
Birmingham), and supervised by Dr. Rosie Harding (Senior Lecturer at the University 
of Birmingham), explores how civil partnerships and same-sex marriage can help to 
challenge society and the law’s ideas about gender roles in relationships. 
 
The study is focusing upon how the issue of gender is dealt with by solicitors in the 
context of civil partnership dissolution.  It will be examining the compatibility of 
solicitors’ understandings of the lifestyles of same-sex couples, and the ways that 
lesbian and gay clients present their relationships to their solicitors, with lived reality.  
A comparison exercise will be conducted between data obtained through solicitor and 
client interviewing and the findings of an online questionnaire. 
 
Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in this questionnaire study.  Before you 
decide whether or not you wish to do so, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve.  Please do take the time to read this 
information carefully. 
 
The questionnaire will take around 15 minutes to complete and will relate to such 
matters as the division of household labour and money earning within your 
relationship. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
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What are the benefits of taking part? 
Participation could be beneficial in terms of providing an opportunity for you to 
express your views about, and share your experiences of, home life.  Your views will 
hold significant weight within the context of this study. 
 
Am I free to withdraw from the study? 
Yes, you are able to withdraw from the questionnaire at any point up to submission of 
the final page.  However, once you have submitted, it will no longer be possible for 
you to do so, as there will be no mechanism to facilitate the location of your response.  
Questionnaires that have only been partially completed will not be analysed. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should contact the 
researcher using the details set out below.  She will do her best to answer your 
questions. 
 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/ or wish to raise a complaint, please 
write to Dr. Rosie Harding, also at Birmingham Law School.  You may alternatively 
contact her by e-mail at  or by phone on . 
 
How will information about me be used? 
The researcher will prepare an analysis of findings that will be presented at 
conferences relating to gender and family law, as well as published in a journal 
article.  The findings will ultimately be used in order to produce the researcher’s PhD 
thesis, which she plans to convert into a book.  Quotes from your questionnaire 
responses may be used in conjunction with pseudonyms. 
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Your anonymity will be protected at all times, both during and after this study, and 
identifiable data will not be shared.  Paper copies of the questionnaire data will be 
stored securely and indefinitely for the purposes of future research.  Electronic copies 
of the same will be stored on a password-protected laptop computer. 
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Who is funding the research? 
The researcher’s PhD is being funded by way of a scholarship at Birmingham Law 
School. 
 
Will I receive any feedback after the questionnaire? 
You will be provided with the opportunity to supply your e-mail address.  Should you 
choose to do so, the address will subsequently be kept separately from your 
questionnaire data.  Once the project is finished, the researcher will e-mail you with a 
summary of the findings. 
 
Contact for further information 
If you have any questions, please contact Charlotte Bendall by e-mail at 
.  You can also write to her at Birmingham Law School, 
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT. 
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Appendix C. Client interview participant information sheet 
 
Gender in intimate relationships: a socio-legal study 
Client interview information sheet 
 
Aims of the research 
This project, conducted by Charlotte Bendall (PhD candidate at the University of 
Birmingham), and supervised by Dr. Rosie Harding (Senior Lecturer at the University 
of Birmingham), explores how civil partnerships and same-sex marriage can help to 
challenge society and the law’s ideas about gender roles in relationships. 
 
The study is focusing upon how the issue of gender is dealt with by solicitors in the 
context of civil partnership dissolution.  It will be looking particularly at the extent to 
which traditional notions of female ‘homemaking’ and male ‘breadwinning’ have 
tended to feature, as well as what it means to be a ‘husband’ or a ‘wife’ within civil 
partnerships. 
 
The research will also be examining whether gay and lesbian clients perceive there to 
be expectations upon them in terms of how they present their lifestyles to their 
solicitor, and asking whether their presentation in this regard accurately reflects the 
reality of their relationships.  Data obtained in the interviews will be compared 
against the findings of an online questionnaire being conducted by the same 
researcher into the division of household labour in same-sex relationships. 
 
Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study on the basis that 
you are a client that is currently consulting, or has recently consulted, a solicitor in 
relation to the dissolution of your civil partnership. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please do take 
the time to read this information sheet carefully.  Ask the researcher if there is 
anything that is unclear or if you would like more information. 
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Engaging in this particular aspect of the study involves participating in an interview 
with the researcher.  The interview will last for approximately one hour, although it 
may take longer, depending on how much you say. The questions will relate to such 
matters as the division of household labour within your relationship pre-separation 
and your anticipated future arrangements. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
Interviews will take place at a mutually agreed location.  They will be held 
subsequently to your meeting/s with your solicitor and will provide you with an 
opportunity to reflect back. 
 
Prior to participation, you will be asked to sign a copy of the enclosed consent form. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
Participation could be beneficial in terms of providing an opportunity for you to 
express your views about, and share your experiences of, civil partnership and the 
dissolution thereof.  Your views will hold significant weight within the context of this 
study. 
 
What are the risks of taking part? 
Given that there is a strong possibility that you are going through a difficult and 
emotional time in your life, there is the potential that participating in the interview 
might risk upsetting you further.  The researcher will be able to supply you with 
contact details of support organisations if you should so wish. 
 
Am I free to withdraw from the study? 
Yes, you are able to withdraw from the study at any point and without implication.  
You may withdraw either verbally during the interview itself, or afterwards by 
contacting the researcher by e-mail. 
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What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should contact the 
researcher using the details set out below.  She will do her best to answer your 
questions. 
 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/ or wish to raise a complaint about any 
aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the 
study please write to Dr. Rosie Harding, also at Birmingham Law School.  You may 
alternatively contact her by e-mail at or by phone on  
. 
 
How will information about me be used? 
The interviews will be audio-recorded.  Upon their completion, the researcher will 
personally transcribe them.  All identifiable information, including places, 
occupations and names, will be removed during the transcription process. 
 
The researcher will prepare a summary of findings that will be presented at 
conferences relating to gender and family law, as well as published in a journal 
article.  The findings will ultimately be used in order to produce the researcher’s PhD 
thesis, which she plans to convert into a book.  Quotes from interviews may be used 
in conjunction with pseudonyms, if you consent to this. 
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Your anonymity will be protected at all times, both during and after this study, and 
identifiable data will not be shared.  Everything said within the interview will be kept 
confidential.  Only the researcher will hear the entirety of the audio recording of your 
interview, although she may play excerpts from it to her supervisor.  If you consent, 
audio recordings and transcripts will be retained for a period of 10 years as per the 
University of Birmingham code of practice on research. If you do not consent to this 
storage, audio recordings and transcripts will be destroyed at the end of this research 
project, when the researcher no longer needs access to the data. 
 
In the event of you making a disclosure relating to criminal behaviour, confidentiality 
will only be preserved so far as the law permits.  In addition, if an interview reveals 
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that you or another person that you identify in the interview is in significant and 
immediate danger, the researcher will be obliged to take action in response to that 
disclosure. 
 
Who is funding the research? 
The researcher’s PhD is being funded by way of a scholarship at Birmingham Law 
School. 
 
Will I receive any feedback after the interview? 
The researcher will seek to obtain your e-mail address, which she will subsequently 
keep separately from your interview data.  Once the project is finished, the researcher 
will e-mail you with a summary of the findings. 
 
Contact for further information 
If you have any questions, please contact Charlotte Bendall by e-mail at 
.  You can also write to her at Birmingham Law School, 
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT. 
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Appendix D. Solicitor interview schedule 
 
General practice: 
1. Can you tell me a bit about your background in matrimonial disputes? 
2. How many civil partnership dissolution matters have you worked on so far? 
3. Of those, what has the range of household income and assets been? 
 
Cases of client/s ‘matched up’ with solicitor (if applicable) or, alternatively, civil 
partnership cases worked on to date: 
1. Can you tell me a bit about this case/ these cases (e.g. what was the length of the 
relationship; were there any children?)? 
2. Is it/ are they progressing towards settlement and, if so, what is this settlement 
likely to look like?  Otherwise, if a final order has been obtained, what does that look 
like? 
3. (If solicitor was ‘matched up’ with a client) how does the division of assets in this 
matter compare against those reached in the other civil partnership cases that you 
have dealt with? 
4. How does the division compare against those reached within the opposite-sex cases 
that you have worked on? 
 
Division of household labour and finances: 
1. In the civil partnership matters that you have worked on so far, have you observed 
any patterns in terms of the division of household labour/ caring and money earning? 
2. Are these patterns applicable both to your lesbian and your gay clients? 
3. How do these patterns compare against those arrangements made by your straight 
clients? 
4. How about the way that the household finances are dealt with, have you noticed 
any patterns there (e.g. have the civil partner clients that you’ve had been more likely 
to retain separate bank accounts/ less likely to have joint ones)? 
 
Differences/ similarities between civil partnership and marriage: 
1. Why do you think that people choose to enter into civil partnerships? 
2. How do you think civil partnership compares to marriage? 
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3. What about from your perspective in a dissolution context, do you approach these 
matters any differently? 
4. Have you perceived any difference in expectations with regard to your civil partner 
clients (by comparison to your straight clients)? 
5. Are there any differences between what the terms ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ mean 
within the contexts of civil partnership and marriage? 
 
‘Equality’ and fairness within the civil partnership context: 
1. ‘Equality’ has clearly been a key theme within the law of ancillary relief in recent 
years.  Can you tell me a bit about what ‘equality’ means to you in the civil 
partnership scenario? 
2. Does a 50/ 50 split of the assets tend to be an appropriate solution to a civil 
partnership matter (and why)? 
3. Alternatively, are there more persuasive reasons to provide civil partners simply 
with what they brought into the partnership when it comes to asset division?  If so, 
why? 
4. What sort of factors do you think need to be taken into account when deciding what 
a fair settlement might be in relation to a civil partnership? 
5. Returning to this notion of ‘equality’, can you tell me what it would mean to you to 
treat civil partners ‘equally’ to married spouses when it comes to ancillary relief? 
 
Are there any further points that you’d like to cover in relation to this topic? 
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Appendix E. Client interview schedule 
 
General relationship details: 
1. Can you start by telling me a bit about your relationship (e.g. length, any children)? 
2. Can you tell me why you and your partner chose to enter into a civil partnership? 
3. Can you tell me a little about why the relationship broke down? 
 
Household finances: 
1. Were both you and your partner working during the relationship (and, if so, can 
you tell me a bit about your jobs, working hours, etc.)? 
2. What was your level of household income? 
3. Can you tell me a bit about how you and your partner organised the household 
finances? 
4. Who made the financial decisions/ took charge of the bills?  Did you and your 
partner discuss such things? 
5. Did you and your partner hold joint bank accounts? 
6. To what degree did you consider yourself to be financially in/ dependent? 
 
Division of household labour: 
1. Can you tell me a bit about how household chores were apportioned out within 
your relationship (e.g. cooking, cleaning, dish washing, shopping, laundry, DIY, 
gardening, caring for a sick family member)? 
2. Did you and your partner make an active decision to apportion the chores in this 
way? 
3. Did you and your partner hire any help, such as a cleaner or a gardener? 
4. Who cared for your children (if applicable)? 
5. Can you tell me what the arrangements are going forward in relation to childcare? 
 
Developments post-separation: 
1. Can you tell me what stage you’ve reached in your legal proceedings? 
2. Are you and your partner making progress towards settlement and, if so, what is 
this settlement likely to look like?  Alternatively, if a final order has been obtained, 
what does it look like? 
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3. Did you ever consider, prior to entering into the civil partnership, what the 
implications would be if the relationship were to break down (in terms of the finances 
and assets)? 
4. If so, does the legal advice that you are receiving match what you had previously 
thought? 
5. What do you think a fair solution to your matter would be? 
 
Dealings with solicitor: 
1. Did you have any pre-conceptions as to how the meeting with your solicitor would 
go? 
2. Did the meeting go in the way that you thought that it would? 
3. Was there anything that you were surprised that the solicitor needed to know? 
4. You may be aware that ‘equality’ has been a key theme within divorce law in 
recent years.  Can you tell me what it means to you to treat civil partners ‘equally’ 
(both to each other and to heterosexual couples? 
5. Do you feel that your experience of seeking legal advice has impacted upon your 
views in this regard? 
6. Did you ultimately feel that your solicitor seemed to have a good grasp of what 
family life is like for civil partners? 
 
Are there any further points that you’d like to cover in relation to this topic? 
	   289	  




a) What is your 
gender? Male:  Female:  Other:  
b) What is the gender 
of your partner? Male:  Female:  Other:  
2. Age How old are you? _________ years 
3. Race 
How would you describe your race/ethnicity? 
White British  
White Irish  
White Other  
Mixed (White and Black 
Caribbean)  
Mixed (White and Black African)  
Mixed (White and Asian)  
Mixed Other  
Black African  
Black Caribbean  




Asian Other   




















Would you describe yourself as having a 
disability?  
Yes  No  
5. Religion 
Which of the following best describes your religion/belief? 
 
 No Religion    Christian (all denominations)  
 Buddhist     Hindu 
 Jewish      Muslim 





Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation? 
 Bisexual    Gay    Heterosexual     Lesbian  
 Other (please specify) ______________________ 
7. Where 
you live 
Which country do you live in? ________________________ 
8. Social 
Class 
How would you describe your social class? 
 Middle Class   Working Class  





Which political party did you vote for in the last general election? 
 Conservative   Liberal Democrat   Labour 
 Other (please specify) ______________________ 
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Appendix G. Client consent form 
	  
Consent form – client interview 
 
Title of project: Gender in intimate relationships: A socio-legal study 
 
Name of researcher: Charlotte Bendall (supervised by Dr. Rosie Harding) 
 
Please tick box: 
  Yes No 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study entitled ‘Client interview information sheet’ and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time. 
 
  
3 I agree to take part in this study.  
 
  
4 I agree to my interview with the researcher being digitally recorded. 
 
  
5 I understand that the data collected about me during this study will be 
anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
 
  
6 I agree that anonymised quotes can be used. 
 
  
7 I agree to allow the data collected to be used in future research projects. 
 
  
8 I agree that audio recordings may be confidentially stored for 10 years. 
 
  
9 I agree that an anonymised transcript of the interview may be 





















1 for Participant, 1 for Researcher	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*	  Occupations were categorised into ‘community and personal services’ (spanning caring, cleaning and hospitality), ‘education’, ‘financial services’ 
(encompassing banking, insurance and investment management), ‘government’, ‘manufacturing’, and ‘professional services’ (requiring specialist training, 
such as being a doctor or a lawyer).  Employment was on a full-time basis, unless otherwise indicated.  Interviewees were often reluctant to disclose details of 
their salary, although I have indicated where they referred to them as being particularly low or high. 
	  












Extent of assets 
(where described in 
detail) 
Outcome of asset 
division 
Anthony 16 years Anthony Financial services 
(high earner) 
N/A (unemployed) “Significant assets”: 
three properties and 
some land, pension, 
savings and 
investments. 
50/ 50 split of assets, 
with a pension sharing 
order and maintenance 
for four years (matter 
went to final hearing). 
Bill 16 years Both partners prior 
to Bill’s ex-partner 
losing his job, then 
subsequently Bill 
Professional Professional Owned a property and 
“were comfortably off”. 
N/A – matter was 
ongoing. 
Caroline Just over a 
year 
Caroline Financial services 
(low earner) 
N/A (on long-term 
sick leave) 
“No money”, credit 
card debt and a property 
mortgaged in client’s 
name. 
Ex-partner took back 
items (e.g. CDs and 
DVDs) that she had 
brought into the house 
(parties settled 
without proceedings). 





Education Owned a property, and 
client also argued that 
her wife had a £1 
50/ 50 split of the 
proceeds of sale of the 
property (parties 
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million trust fund 
(although documentary 
evidence could not be 
found). 
settled at the Final 
Dispute Resolution 
hearing). 
Edward 8 years Both partners 
(although Edward’s 
ex-partner earned a 
little more) 
Professional Professional Owned a mortgage-free 
property, pensions and 
savings. 
Client agreed, without 
proceedings, to the 
transfer of a figure 
that would enable him 
to relocate (which 
was, “a lot less than 
half of the flat”), and 
ex-partner remained in 
the property. 
Freddie 5.5 years Both partners Government Government Owned a property (for 
which the deposit was 
paid for by client, 
having previously sold 
a flat), ex-partner 
owned a rental flat from 
prior to the relationship 
and had debt. 
Money in joint 
account was split 50/ 
50, ex-partner signed 
over the property to 
client and retained his 
rental flat (parties 
settled without 
proceedings). 






Owned a property, 
otherwise “only 
peanuts”. 
N/A- matter was 
ongoing. 





Professional Education, then 
real estate 
Owned a property and 
lived, “not a privileged 
lifestyle, but we didn’t 
do without much”.  Ex-
partner had obtained 
Client calculated 
(without proceedings) 
what each had paid 
into the property.  It 




property to pursue a 
new venture, which 
client had invested in. 
partner could retain 
any profits on the 
work-related property, 
but that client would 
obtain her investment 
back. 




Owned a property (for 
which client paid for 
the deposit), pension, 
and ex-partner had debt. 
Client agreed (without 
proceedings) to pay a 
£20,000 sum towards 
ex-partner’s debt. 
Jennifer 25 years Both partners Government Government Owned a property (but, 
“it wasn’t very 
expensive”). 
N/A- matter was 
ongoing. 
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Appendix I. Trees of nodes generated in NVivo 
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Appendix J. Tables of positive chi-square results from the questionnaire 
 
Whether the respondent and their partner had the same occupational status by whether or not there are children 
present in the respondent’s household 
   
Children present Children not present Total 





































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 8.960 1 0.003 
	  
Who does the majority of the childcare in the respondent’s household by who the ‘main earner’ is 
   
I am the ‘main 
earner’ 
My partner is 
the ‘main 
earner’ 
Neither of us 
is the ‘main 
earner’ 
Total 


































My partner does the 



























 Value df Sig 
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Who cares for a sick family member in the respondent’s household by who the ‘main earner’ is 
   
I am the ‘main 
earner’ 
My partner is 
the ‘main 
earner’ 
Neither of us 
is the ‘main 
earner’ 
Total 


































My partner does the 



























 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 11.144 4 0.025 
	  
Who does the laundry in the respondent’s household by the respondent’s gender 
   
Male Female Total 
























My partner and I 



















































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 9.785 4 0.044 
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Who does the dishwashing by whether or not there are any children present in the respondent’s household 
   
Children present Children not present Total 




























My partner and I 



















































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 12.291 4 0.015 
	  
Who does the grocery shopping by whether or not there are any children present in the respondent’s household 
   
Children present Children not present Total 














My partner and I 





































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 7.798 2 0.020 
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Who does the grocery shopping in the respondent’s household by the respondent’s relationship status 
   
In a civil partnership/ 
marriage Cohabiting Total 




























My partner and I 














My partner mostly does 













My partner always does 






















 Value df Sig 
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My partner and I 














My partner mostly does 













My partner always does 






















 Value df Sig 
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Who does the cooking by whether or not the respondent’s occupational status is the same as their partner’s 





























My partner and I 



















































 Value df Sig 
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Who does the vacuuming by whether or not the respondent’s occupational status is the same as their partner’s 

































My partner and I 



















































 Value df Sig 
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Who does the vacuuming in the respondent’s household by who the ‘main earner’ is 
   
I am the ‘main 
earner’ 
My partner is 
the ‘main 
earner’ 
Neither of us 
is the ‘main 
earner’ 
Total 


































My partner and I 

















My partner mostly 
















My partner always 



























 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 25.781 8 0.001 
	  
Who conducts the general cleaning by who the ‘main earner’ is in the respondent’s household 
   
I am the ‘main 
earner’ 
My partner is 
the ‘main 
earner’ 
Neither of us 
is the ‘main 
earner’ 
Total 




























































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 16.209 4 0.003 
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Whether domestic help is employed by whether or not the respondent’s gross household income falls within the 
tenth decile 
   
Income falls within the 
ninth decile or lower 
Income falls within the 
tenth decile Total 





































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 26.117 1 0.000 
	  
Whether domestic help is employed by the respondent’s social class 
   
Middle class Working class Total 





































 Value df Sig 
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Whether domestic help is employed by whether or not there are any children present in the respondent’s 
household 
   
Children present Children not present Total 





































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 17.891 1 0.000 
	  
Whether domestic help is employed by the respondent’s relationship status 
   
In a civil partnership/ 
marriage Cohabiting Total 





































 Value df Sig 
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Presence or absence of a joint bank account by the respondent’s gender 
   
Male Female Total 














Partners do not have a 






















 Value df Sig 
Chi-square test 8.375 1 0.004 
	  
Presence or absence of a joint bank account by whether or not there are any children present in the respondent’s 
household 
   
Children present Children not present Total 














Partners do not have a 






















 Value df Sig 
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Presence or absence of a joint bank account by whether or not the respondent’s gross household income falls 
within the tenth decile 
   
Income falls within 
the ninth decile or 
lower 
Income falls within 
the tenth decile Total 














Partners do not have a 






















 Value df Sig 
Chi-square test 19.802 1 0.000 
	  
Presence or absence of a joint bank account by the respondent’s social class 
   
Middle class Working class Total 














Partners do not have a 






















 Value df Sig 







	   308	  
Presence or absence of a joint bank account by the respondent’s relationship status 
   


















Partners do not have a 






















 Value df Sig 
Chi-square test 37.106 1 0.000 
	  
Presence or absence of separate bank accounts by the respondent’s relationship status 
   









































 Value df Sig 
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Who pays the bills in the respondent’s household by who the ‘main earner’ is 
   
I am the ‘main 
earner’ 
My partner is 
the ‘main 
earner’ 
Neither of us 
is the ‘main 
earner’ 
Total 
































My partner and I 

















My partner mostly 
















My partner always 



























 Value df Sig 
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Who pays the bills in the respondent’s household by the respondent’s social class 
   
Middle class Working class Total 


























My partner and I 














My partner mostly 













My partner always 





















 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 10.038 4 0.040 
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Who makes the financial decisions in the respondent’s household by the respondent’s social class 
   
Middle class Working class Total 




























My partner and I 















My partner mostly 














My partner always 























 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 9.518 4 0.049 
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Who makes the financial decisions in the respondent’s household by who the ‘main earner’ is 
   
I am the ‘main 
earner’ 
My partner is 
the ‘main 
earner’ 
Neither of us 
is the ‘main 
earner’ 
Total 

















My partner and I 














































 Value df Sig 
 
Chi-square test 41.854 4 0.000 
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Comparing the females and males 



























2.746 289 0.006 
Comparing those with children in the household and those without 
 
  Gender    
Variable 
 











My partner and 













-2.262 291 0.024 
Comparing those currently in a civil partnership/ marriage and those cohabiting 
 
  Gender    
Variable 
 
























2.432 252.154 0.016 
	  
















Comparing partners both working full-time and partners not both working full-time 
 
  Gender    
Variable 
 













My partner and 










-3.497 267.783 0.001 
Comparing those with children in the household and those without 
 
  Gender    
Variable 
 











My partner and 










3.974 291 0.000 
Comparing those currently in a civil partnership/ marriage and those cohabiting 
 
  Gender    
Variable 
 












My partner and 










3.659 283 0.000 
	  







Comparing those with children in the household and those without 
 
  Gender    
Variable 
 











My partner and 











-2.124 172.125 0.035 
Comparing those currently in a civil partnership/ marriage and those cohabiting 
 
  Gender    
Variable 
 












My partner and 











-2.468 284 0.014 
